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This paper studies the evolution of income concentration in Japan from 1886 to 2002 by constructing
long-run series of top income shares and top wage income shares, using income tax statistics. We find
that (1) income concentration was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period during which the
nation underwent rapid industrialization; (2) a drastic de-concentration of income at the top took place
in 1938-1945; (3) income concentration has remained low throughout the post-WWII period despite
the high economic growth; and (4) top income composition in Japan has shifted dramatically from
capital income to employment income over the course of the 20th century. We attribute the precipitous
fall in income concentration during WWII primarily to the collapse of capital income due to wartime
regulations and inflation. We argue that the change in the institutional structure under the occupational
reforms made the one-time income de-concentration difficult to reverse. In contrast to the sharp increase
in wage income inequality observed in the United States since 1970, the top wage income shares in
Japan have remained remarkably stable over the recent decades. We show that the change in technology
or tax policies alone cannot account for the comparative experience of Japan and the United States.
Instead we suggest that institutional factors such as corporate governance and union structure are important
















Following the seminal work by Kuznets (1955), economists have devoted much 
effort to analysing the evolution of income inequality during the process of economic 
development. This analysis is also central for the policy debate: The left argues that 
concentration of wealth biases the political process in favor of the rich that in turn 
perpetuates the inequality, calling for progressive taxation as a necessary counter-
measure. The right views concentration of wealth as a natural if not necessary outcome of 
economic growth. Thus, progressive taxation may redistribute income and reduce wealth 
concentration, but may also reduce economic growth by depressing entrepreneurship and 
capital accumulation incentives. 
To cast better light on the debate, it is critical to understand the empirical 
relationship between economic growth and income distribution. To this end, economic 
historians have studied changes in income and wealth inequality over centuries in leading 
industrial nations such as Britain, the United States, or France (e.g., Soltow (1968, 1969); 
Williamson and Lindert (1980); Williamson (1985); Lindert (1986, 2000); Piketty, Postel-
Vinay, and Rosenthal (2006)). Historical studies, however, were often hampered by the 
absence of long-run homogeneous series of income and wealth. Recently, a number of 
studies have used income tax statistics to generate such series for several European and 
Anglo-Saxon countries (see Atkinson and Piketty (2006) and Piketty (2005)). Although 
these studies focus on the shares of top income groups due to the nature of the data, they 
provide the first consistent series of income inequality measure in these countries that 
cover most of the 20th century. 
The objective of this paper is to construct the long-run top income shares series for 
Japan and evaluate Japan’s experience from historical and comparative perspectives. 
The data for Japan are of particular interest, not only because Japan is the world’s second 
largest economy after the United States today, but also because its process of 
industrialization was compressed within a very short time period. After the 1868 Meiji 
Restoration, modern economic growth in Japan took off in the 1880s, and the nation 
underwent three phases of industrial revolution – from textiles, heavy industries, to high-
tech industries – within less than 100 years. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 depicts the 
real GDP per capita in Japan, 1820-2004, against that in the United States, 1790-2004. 
Japan’s GDP per capita in 1890 was at the level of U.S. GDP per capita in 1790, or about 
$1,200 in 2004 dollars which is roughly comparable to the GDP per capita of the poorest 
countries in the world today. By 1970, however, Japan caught up with other developed  
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countries, and now has a GDP per capita only slightly lower than the United States. Real 
GDP per capita in Japan grew at the annual compound rate of 2.7% in 1886-1940 and at 
4.7% in 1948-2002. Because the Japanese government introduced a comprehensive 
income tax system in 1887 – a remarkably early date by international standards – we can 
trace the evolution of income concentration during the entire process of industrialization 
using the Japanese tax statistics.
1 As the top income shares series compiled so far for the 
Western countries span only part of their industrialization process, the Japanese data 
provide us with a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between income 
concentration and modern economic growth. To explore the causes of dynamic changes 
in income concentration and provide additional evidence, we also compile the series of 
top income composition, marginal tax rates, top estates and its composition, and top wage 
income shares, all based on tax statistics. 
From our data, three main findings follow. First, income concentration at the top 
1% income group in Japan was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period with some 
short-term fluctuations. Top income shares declined abruptly and precipitously during 
WWII and remained remarkably low for the rest of the 20th century. Our data thus indicate 
that the defining event for the evolution of income concentration in Japan was a historical 
accident, namely the Second World War, which accompanied large-scale government 
intervention, inflation, and war destruction. 
Second, using income composition data, we show that the dramatic fall in income 
concentration at the top was primarily due to the collapse of capital income during WWII. 
Evidence from estate tax statistics confirms the drastic decline in top wealth holdings 
during and immediately after WWII. We argue that the transformation of the institutional 
structure under the postwar occupational reforms, such as the abolishment of 
primogeniture, the establishment of progressive tax, and the changes in corporate 
governance and union structure, prevented the re-concentration of income. Importantly, 
such redistributive government policies, which likely hindered the “natural” process of 
capital accumulation, were accompanied by one of the most impressive and sustained 
economic growths in modern history. 
Third, according to our wage income data, wage income concentration also fell 
sharply during WWII. In sharp contrast to the United States where wage income inequality 
has increased dramatically since the 1970s, top wage income shares in Japan have 
                                                 
1 By contrast, comprehensive income tax was instituted in Prussia in 1891, in the United Kingdom in 1909, in 
the United States in 1913, and in France in 1914, times at which the industrial revolution was already well 
underway in those countries.  
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remained remarkably low in the last three decades. As employment income became a 
major component of the top income after WWII, in addition to the collapse of capital 
income, we identify the fall in wage income inequality as an important reason for the 
permanent decline in income concentration. Comparing the Japanese and U.S. data in 
more detail, we find that technological progress (i.e., skill-biased technological change) or 
tax incentives (i.e., the reduction in marginal income tax rates) alone cannot account for 
the divergent experience of the two countries. Instead we suggest institutional factors, 
most notably corporate governance and internal labor markets, as important determinants 
of wage inequality.  
We draw two broader lessons from Japan’s experience. First, our data indicate 
that Japan achieved two “economic miracles” before and after WWII under very different 
socio-economic conditions, casting immediate doubts on any theory that predicts simple 
correlations between economic growth and income inequality.
2   Second, it was the 
exogenous shock of WWII, rather than endogenous economic or political process, that 
transformed Japan into more equitable society. Consistent with the experience in many 
developing countries today, it underscores the difficulty of undertaking drastic 
redistributive policies in the absence of major impetus. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the preceding 
literature on income inequality in Japan. Section 3 describes the data and estimation 
methods. Section 4 presents our findings from the top income shares series, 1886-2002. 
Section 5 investigates the causes of the observed changes in income concentration, using 
the top income composition and top estates series. Section 6 presents the top wage 
income shares series, 1929-2002. Section 7 provides comparative perspectives and 
concludes. The detail description of our data and methods, as well as a complete set of 
results, are presented in Appendix. 
 
2. Literature Review 
By international standards, modern Japan has been widely perceived as a society 
of relatively low income inequality (e.g., Sawyer (1976)). Although comparing income 
statistics across nations is notoriously difficult and must be interpreted with caution, recent 
OECD reports (Atkinson et al. (1995); Burniaux et al. (1998)) and Japanese government 
                                                 
2 Our findings lend further support to the view that emphasizes the distinctiveness of the post-WWII economic 
systems in Japan (Okazaki and Okuno-Fijiwara (1993); Noguchi (1995); Teranishi (2005)). In stark contrast to 
the pre-WWII system that operated much like a neo-classical market economy, the post-WWII system seems 
to have facilitated high economic growth and low income inequality.  
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studies (Nishizaki et al. (1998); Kokumin Seikatsukyoku (1999)) together offer a better 
comparative picture. As Panel A of Table 1 shows, in the mid 1980s, Japan’s Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of household income before tax and government transfers 
was one of the lowest among major industrial nations. When we consider the distribution 
of income after tax and government transfers, as one may expect, Northern European 
welfare states ranked below Japan (see Panel B). Even though the income inequality in 
Japan rose somewhat during the asset price appreciation in the late 1980s, Japan’s 
ranking among the OECD countries remained approximately the same in the 1990s 
(Burniaux et al. (1998)). In other words, one of the distinct characteristics of Japan today 
is its low income inequality in the absence of government redistribution. When did Japan 
become a nation of low income inequality? Or has Japan always been the so-called 
“equal society”? 
There is an extensive body of empirical work – albeit published mostly in Japanese 
– examining Japan’s income distributions during the 20th century.
3 The lack of household 
survey data has been a major obstacle in estimating the income distribution before WWII, 
however. In the absence of such data, some scholars used income tax statistics.
4 Most 
notably, Shiomi (1933) and Hayakawa (1951) combined national income tax statistics and 
local income tax records to estimate the income distributions of all households in selected 
cities and years. Using similar methods and compiling comprehensive local income tax 
data, Minami (1995, 1998) has recently provided the estimates of the income distribution 
of all Japanese households in selected years. By contrast, Ono and Watanabe (1976) 
studied the long-run changes in income inequality during the pre-WWII period, using 
several indirect measures such as urban-rural and intra-industry wage differentials. They 
also estimated the Pareto coefficients of the income distributions of high-income earners 
based on national income tax data and found that the time trends in these coefficients 
coincided with those indicated by the indirect measures. Otsuki and Takamatsu (1978) 
calculated the Pareto coefficients from 1887 to 1940 using the average and minimum 
household incomes based on the Long-term Economic Statistics (Ohkawa et al. (1974)). 
For the post-WWII period, several types of survey data became available. Wada 
(1975) estimated the income distribution in the 1950s combining the Employment Status 
Survey and the Farm Household Economics Survey. Mizoguchi and Takayama (1984) 
                                                 
3  For a comprehensive survey of income distribution before WWII, see Terasaki (1986); Minami (1995), 
Chapter 1. For the post-WWII period, see Mizoguchi and Takayama (1984), Chapter 1; Mizoguchi and 
Terasaki (1995); Yazawa (2004). 
4 See, for example, Shiomi (1933); Hayakawa (1951); Takahashi (1959).  
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and Mizoguchi and Terasaki (1995) used the People’s Living Conditions Survey to 
examine the changes in income inequality from 1962 to 1990. The income distribution of 
Japanese households can be also estimated from the Family Income and Expenditure 
Survey (e.g., Ohtake (2005)) and the Income Redistribution Survey (e.g., Tachibanaki 
(2000)). Because these surveys employ disparate sampling methods and income 
definitions, the resulting estimates of income inequality can differ considerably. 
Figure 2 summarizes the long-run changes in income inequality based on the 
above studies (for simplicity, we use the Gini coefficients to represent their findings).
5 
Although the Gini coefficients in a given year differ across studies, they display coherent 
time trends. First, the income inequality in Japan rose sharply from 1890 to 1940. Second, 
after WWII, income inequality peaked around 1960, declined in the 1960s, and stabilized 
in the 1970s. Third, the income inequality has been on the rise since 1980, although 
scholars have disagreed over the extent of the increase. For example, in his recent study, 
Tachibanaki (1998) has declared Japan as an equal society a “myth,” generating much 
discussion among scholars, government officials, and the rest of population.
6 
It is important to note that there is no data between 1940 and 1955. In addition, the 
Gini coefficients before 1940 and after 1955 in Figure 2 cannot be compared due to major 
data discontinuity. Nevertheless, general consensus among scholars based on indirect 
evidence is that the income inequality dropped substantially between 1940 and 1955, 
presumably due to WWII and post-war occupational reforms (Mizoguchi and Terasaki 
(1995), p.61). One of the objectives of this study, therefore, is to compile new data that 
enable us for the first time to compare the level of inequality between the pre- and post-
WWII periods and shed better light on the process of the alleged fall in income inequality. 
Note also that most of the pre-WWII studies provide the estimates only for a handful of 
years that may or may not be representative data points. Furthermore, since most of the 
existing studies concern with the income distribution of entire population, we know 
relatively little about high-income groups.
7  In particular, due to the problem of small 
sample and top coding, household surveys cannot be used for a study of high income 
earners. 
To fill these gaps, we construct continuous and homogeneous series of the top 
income shares, i.e., the shares of total income accruing to the upper groups of the income 
distribution, from 1886 to 2002. Although top income shares are not necessarily an ideal 
                                                 
5 Pareto coefficients are converted to Gini coefficients by the formula g=1/(2*p-1) assuming the Pareto Law. 
6 Tachibanaki (2005) is an English version of Tachibanaki (1998). See Ohtake (2005) for the debate. 
7 For important exceptions, see Yazawa (1992) and Miyamoto and Abe (1995), Chapter 6.  
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measure of income inequality – as it does not reflect the shape of the bottom 95% of the 
income distribution – they nonetheless provide valuable information about the degree of 
income concentration that likely affects entrepreneurial incentives and capital 
accumulation in a capitalist economy. Finally, because we employ the same methodology 
used in the recent high income studies presented in Atkinson and Piketty (2006), we can 
compare our data with that of other industrial nations and offer a comparative historical 
analysis of income concentration. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this section, we describe briefly the nature of data and the methods of 
estimation. A complete description can be found in Appendix at the end of the paper. Our 
estimates of top income shares are based on income tax return statistics published 
annually by the Japanese tax administration since the introduction of national income tax 
in 1887.
8 We define “fiscal year” as the year in which tax returns were processed and tax 
collected, in contrast to “actual year” in which the income subject to taxation was earned. 
We identify the correspondence between actual years and fiscal years based on income 
tax laws and Japan National Tax Administration (1988), which is reported in columns (1) 
and (2) in Table A0 in Appendix. Typically, the statistics present the number of taxpayers, 
the amount of income reported by taxpayers, the amount of income tax paid, and the 
composition of the reported income, all by income brackets. 
Income, in our definition, is a gross income before deductions of direct and payroll 
taxes paid by individuals, but after employers’ payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. It 
includes all income components reported in tax returns, namely, salaries and wages, 
unincorporated business income, farm income, self-employment income, dividends, 
interest, rents, royalties, and other small items. Realized capital gains, however, is 
excluded from our definition of income for two reasons. First, realized capital gains were 
not taxable before 1947 in Japan and thus missing from the income tax statistics. Second, 
in general, realized capital gains form a volatile component of income with large 
fluctuations and not a steady source of annual income. Thus, in this study, we focus on 
the series that exclude capital gains.
9 
                                                 
8 Japan Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, Shuzeikoku Tokei Nenposho, 1887-1945, and Japan National Tax 
Administration, Kokuzeikoku Tokei Nenposho, 1946-2002.  
9 We present results including capital gains in Appendix (see Section A.4.3 and Figure A1).  
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Before 1950, the tax unit was “family” defined as a married couple (or a single 
household head) with cohabitating dependents. Incomes of family dependents in a single 
household were aggregated for tax purposes. Starting in 1950, the tax unit became 
“individual,” whereby spouses were taxed separately on their incomes. To produce 
homogeneous series over the entire period, we estimate top income shares using the 
individual tax unit. Thus, our top income groups are defined relative to the total number of 
adults, defined as age 20 and above, in Japan in each year based on official population 
statistics (reported in column (4) in Table A0). Because of high exemption points, only a 
small fraction of individuals filed income tax returns before 1947 (reported in column (6) in 
Table A0). For this reason, our analysis is necessarily restricted to the high end of the 
income distribution. That is, we can estimate the income share for the entire period of 
1886-2002 only within the top 1% income group, while we also provide estimate of the top 
5% income share for sub-periods. 
As the top tail of the income distribution is well approximated by a Pareto 
distribution, we estimate the Pareto coefficient for each year using the tabulations of 
taxpayers by income brackets. We then use simple parametric interpolation methods to 
estimate the thresholds and average income levels of top income groups. As Table 2 
shows, in 2002, the threshold income levels for the top 1% and 0.01% income groups in 
Japan were $110,000 and $264,000, respectively. The top 0.01% income group in the 
same year consisted of roughly 10,000 individuals who earned more than $649,000, and 
their average income was $1.2 million.  
We estimate a top income share by dividing the amount of income accruing to a 
top income group by total personal income computed from National Accounts for 1930-
2002 and from Long-Term Economic Statistics (Ohkawa et al. (1974)) for 1886-1929.
10 
The total and average real incomes per adult from 1886 to 2002 are reported in columns 
(7) and (8) in Table A0. We convert current income to real income in 2002 yen, using the 
CPI deflator from Long-Term Economic Statistics (Ohkawa et al. (1967)). Our top income 
shares estimates are reported in Table A1 in Appendix.  
We estimate the composition of income accrued to the top 1% group, using 
income composition statistics. For years in which composition data are reported by 
income brackets, we use a Pareto interpolation method to obtain the top 1% estimates. 
For years in which only aggregate composition data are published, we use these data. 
                                                 
10 Note that estimates for total personal income before 1930 are less reliable than after 1930, introducing 
potentially biases in our estimates. See the Appendix Section A.2 for a discussion and a sensitivity analysis.  
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Our top income composition series are reported in Table A2. We also estimate marginal 
tax rates for the average individual in the top income groups from 1886 to 2002. The 
estimates are made for an individual with a non-working spouse and two dependent 
children and include standard deductions but exclude local taxes. The series are reported 
in Table A3. 
Next, we construct top estates series using estate tax return statistics published 
annually by the tax administration since 1905. Top estate groups are defined relative to 
the total number of adult deaths in Japan in each year obtained from official population 
statistics. Due to the difficulty in estimating total assets in Japan, the top estate series are 
expressed in the level (as opposed to the share) in 2002 yen using the CPI deflator. Our 
top estates estimates are reported in Table B1 in Appendix.
11 We also provide estate 
composition series, 1926-2002, using aggregate estate composition data, which are 
presented in Table B2. Because estate compositions are not available by estate brackets, 
we cannot produce homogenous top estate composition series. 
Finally, we compute top wage income shares using the similar methodology. For 
the post-WWII period, wage income data are compiled from the Survey on Private Wages 
and Salaries published by the tax administration annually since 1951.
12 The survey covers 
virtually all employees in the private sector but excludes government employees. Wage 
income in our definition includes wages, salaries, bonuses, and allowances, but exclude 
non-cash compensation and retirement benefits. Top groups are defined relative to the 
total number of regular employees in the private sector in Japan. Our estimates of the 
total wage income denominator are based on total salaries from National Accounts. For 
the pre-WWII period, we use salary and bonus data reported in the income tax statistics 
for the fiscal years 1930-1945. Top groups are defined relative to the total number of 
regular employees in Japan. The total wage income denominators are based on total 
salaries and wages from National Accounts.
13 Table C1 in Appendix presents the number 
of wage income earners and total wage income from 1929 to 2002. Our estimates for top 
wage income shares for 1929-2002 are reported in Table C2, and marginal tax rates for 
top wage income earners for 1951-2002 are presented in Table C3 in Appendix. 
  Over the 116 years of our sample period, there are at least three major tax 
reforms, in addition to numerous revisions in income and estate tax laws. These changes 
                                                 
11 Due to the difficulty in reconstructing estate statistics for actual years, our top estates for 1905-57 are 
imprecisely estimated. See Appendix Section B for a detailed discussion. 
12 Japan National Tax Administration, Minkan Kyuyo no Jittai, 1951-2002. 
13 Due to the limited data, our estimates for 1929-1944 are based on restrictive assumptions. See Appendix 
Section C for a detailed discussion.  
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potentially affect the comparability of our data across years. Therefore, to construct 
homogeneous series, we make a number of careful adjustments to the original data (see 
Appendix for a complete description). There are two major challenges in constructing the 
top income shares series that call for special attention. 
First, after the introduction of an extensive withholding system (gensen choshu 
seido) in 1949, most individuals with only employment or pension income were no longer 
required to file self-assessed income tax returns. As a result, even though most income 
earners pay income taxes in Japan, only a minority of taxpayers is required to file a self-
assessed tax return. Fortunately, as mentioned above, the Japanese tax administration 
publishes the wage income statistics from the withholding system that include virtually all 
wage earners in the private sector. We thus use these data to complement the self-
assessed income tax statistics and produce top income shares series. 
The second and perhaps more serious issue is tax erosion and evasion, that is, 
lawful and unlawful under-reporting of income by taxpayers. Because the self-assessed 
income tax statistics are by definition based on reported income, there is a concern that 
our data might reflect trends in tax avoidance and evasion rather than true changes in 
income inequality. For example, compared to wage income that is captured at source, 
farm income and business income in general are said to be subject to a higher degree of 
tax evasion. In effort to avoid tax, employers often shift their compensation from cash to 
perquisites. Most important, in the post-WWII period, all or part of interest and dividend 
incomes are taxed separately at flat rates and withheld at source (gensen bunri kazei) and 
missing from comprehensive income tax base. We discuss these problems associated 
with tax avoidance and evasion in Section 5 and provide sensitivity analysis. 
 
4. Top Income Shares in Japan, 1886-2002 
4.1 Historical Background 
During the early Meiji period, Japan was predominantly a rural society based on 
agriculture and handicraft industry. After the fiscal reform that resulted in the Matsukata 
deflation in 1881-84, the Japanese economy began to modernize and grow rapidly (see 
Figure 1). Large-scale corporations in modern industries, such as railroads and textiles, 
were formed for the first time in the late 1880s. As a result, most historians regard 1886 as 
the starting year of the industrial revolution in Japan (Minami (1981); Miyamoto et al. 
(1995), Chapter 6). The proportion of employment in agriculture declined from 78% in  
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1876 to 65% in 1900; and fell further to 51% in 1920, and 42% in 1940 (NRUS (1959). 
After WWII, it declined even faster from 44% in 1950, to 16% in 1973, and 7.3% in 1995. 
To provide an overview of our sample period, Figure 3 depicts the average real 
income per adult and the CPI in Japan from 1886 to 2002. The average real income more 
than quadrupled from 1886 to 1938, the peak year in the pre-WWII period. It grew 
particularly fast from 1887 to the end of Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), during WWI 
(1914-18), and during the period of military expansion (1932-38). Then the average 
income declined sharply towards the end of WWII (1939-45) that destroyed much of the 
nation’s physical and human capital. The two World Wars were accompanied by high 
inflation. In particular, Japan experienced hyperinflation in 1944-48 during which 
consumer prices rose by 5,300%. After the postwar U.S. Occupation (1945-52), the 
average real income recovered quickly, surpassing the 1938 level by 1959. During the so-
called high-growth period of 1955-73, real average incomes increased by a factor of six, 
achieving one of the fastest sustained economic growths in modern history. After the 1973 
Oil Crisis, the income grew at a slower pace in 1975-90. Since the collapse of the asset 
bubble in 1991, the average real income has declined for a decade. Except for the brief 
period during the Oil Crises, the inflation rate has been stable throughout the post-1950 
period in Japan. 
 
4.2 Trends in Top Income Shares 
Figure 4 reports our estimates of the top 1% income share from 1886 to 2002 and 
the next 4% (denoted as “top 5-1%”) income share for 1907-24, 1937-38, and 1947-2002. 
We first focus on the top 1% income share series. Between 1886 and 1938, the top 1% 
adult population in Japan received as much as 14 to 20% of total personal income. The 
share, however, fell abruptly and precipitously from 1938 to 1945 from 20% to 6.4%, and 
remained relatively stable at around 8% throughout the post-WWII period. There are fairly 
large fluctuations in the top 1% income share before WWII: after a steep fall in 1886-91, it 
declined temporarily during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War 
(1904-05), WWI (1914-18), and the Great Depression (1929-31), each time followed by an 
immediate recovery. In terms of the long-run trend, the top 1% income share was high 
throughout the initial stage of industrialization in 1886-1913 with no clear positive trend. 
Similarly, the extraordinary economic growth from 1950 to 1973 was accompanied by little 
change in the top 1% income share. Finally, despite the recent concerns over rising  
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income inequality, we observe only a modest increase in the top 1% income share in 
Japan during the last ten years.  
The next 4% income share series displays a substantially different pattern. During 
the pre-WWII period, although estimates are not available for some years, the share was 
consistently smaller than the top 1% income share, where the next 4% population 
received on average about 12% of total income. By contrast, after 1947 it has been 
consistently and substantially larger than that of the top 1% and rose from 12% to 16% 
between 1970 and 2000, becoming almost twice as large as the top 1% income share. 
The most striking difference is that WWII did not have much impact on the next 4% 
income share. Figure 4 thus suggests that the income de-concentration phenomenon that 
took place during WWII was limited to within the top 1% income groups.  
Figure 5 demonstrates this point further by decomposing the top percentile into 
three subgroups: the top 0.1%, the next 0.4% (“top 0.5-0.1%”), and the bottom half of the 
top 1% (“top 1-0.5%”). Although the three series exhibit similar overall patterns, the higher 
income group experienced the faster and larger fall in their share during WWII. While the 
share of the top 1-0.5% group declined by 50% (from 4.0% to 2.0%) in 1941-45, for the 
next 0.4% group it fell by more than 60% (from 6.7% to 2.5%) in 1938-45, and for the top 
0.1% group it fell by 80% (from 9.2% to 1.9%) in 1938-45. Our series shows that the fall 
for the top 0.01% income share is even more dramatic: it collapsed from 3.8% to 0.6% in 
1938-45 and has remained around the same level for the rest of the 20th century (see 
Table A1 in Appendix and Figure 9). Note also that, for the top 0.1% and 0.01% income 
groups, their shares show a positive trend before WWII, indicating gradual concentration 
of income at the very top. 
Finally, to provide a comparative perspective, Figure 6 plots the top 0.1% income 
share series in Japan with that in the United States and France, estimated respectively by 
Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty (2003) using the same methodology. The data 
indicate that the top 0.1% income share in Japan was higher than in the United States or 
Fance during the interwar period. Recall that the United States in the 1920s, in particular, 
was the world’s technological leader with giant corporations in capital-intensive industries 
that generated enormous fortunes (Chandler (1962)). Therefore, it is perhaps surprising to 
observe that Japan, whose major exports were textiles and light machinery during the 
same period, exhibited the similar level of income concentration. The top 0.1% income 
share in the United States and France declined roughly in three stages, first during WWI, 
then during the Great Depression, and finally during WWII. Interestingly, by the 1960s, the  
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shares in all three countries had converged to 2%. The figure illustrates a sharp contrast 
in the evolution of income concentration between the United States, on one hand, and 
Japan and France, on the other hand, since 1980. While the top income shares in Japan 
and France have remained low, the share in the United States has tripled in the last two 
decades, returning to the pre-WWII level. In Section 6, we explore the divergent 
experience of Japan and the United States using wage income tax statistics. 
 
4.3 Trends in Top Income Composition 
  To better understand the mechanisms that led to the drastic and permanent 
decline in the top 1% income share during WWII in Japan, we use composition data from 
the income tax statistics. In Figure 7, we decompose the top 1% income share into the 
five categories: (a) employment income (wages, salaries, bonuses, allowances, and 
pensions, excluding benefits-in-kind), and (b) business income (profits from 
unincorporated businesses, farm income, and self-employment income), and (c) rental 
income (from land and buildings, excluding imputed rents), and (d) interest income (from 
bonds, deposits, and savings accounts, excluding returns on insurance policies), and (e) 
dividends (from privately held and publicly traded stocks). Immediate caveats are in order.  
First, for 1886-1945, our estimates are based on the composition of total income 
reported in the income tax statistics. During this period, the series are not homogenous as 
the fractions of adults filing tax returns fluctuated between 1% and 4% (see Table A2 in 
Appendix). Second, because most interest income has been either tax exempted or taxed 
separately at source since 1947, and so were large part of dividends since 1965, these 
components were missing from the income tax statistics (Iwamoto et al. 1995). Namely, 
the disappearance of interest income and the low share of dividends after WWII in the top 
1% income in our estimates can be due to the data limitation. Third, the introduction of the 
withholding system in 1949 might have reduced tax evasion of wage earners. By contrast, 
in the absence of such withholding system, a potentially large portion of business income 
is said to be missing from the income tax statistics.  
With these caveats in mind, we make the following observations from the top 
income composition data. First, throughout the 1886-1937 period, approximately 50% of 
the top 1% income consisted of capital income (i.e., rents, interest, and dividends). Within 
capital income, dividends steadily gained its share, while the share of interest income 
declined. Although not shown in the figure, within rental income, farm rents were a major 
component in the earlier years, but its share declined after 1915. Initially, the share of  
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business income in the top 1% income was higher than the share of employment income, 
but by 1930 the order was reversed. The decline of farm rents and the rise of employment 
income likely reflect the gradual shift from an agrarian economy with concentrated land 
ownership to an industrial economy with professional managers. Second, from 1937 to 
1947, both the capital income and employment income components fell dramatically: right 
after WWII, the top 1% income was almost entirely composed of business income. Third, 
since 1950, the share of employment income in the top 1% income has increased steadily 
at the expense of business income. This trend is likely due to the further shift towards a 
highly industrialized economy with large corporations. Unlike the United States in the 
similar stage of economic development, however, this shift was accompanied by little 
increase in income concentration in Japan. Finally, after WWII, capital income has 
become a less important component in the top 1% income. 
To assess the robustness of the above findings, we provide three additional 
analyses. First, in Figure A3 in Appendix, we present the average composition of total 
personal income in Japan from 1930 to 2002 based on National Accounts (in Panel A) 
and compare with the top 1% income composition (in Panel B). It shows that the share of 
capital income component in total personal income recovered from the collapse in WWII 
only gradually: not until the 1980s the shares of dividends and interest came close to their 
prewar peaks, and the share of rents has remained well below its prewar peak. As in the 
top 1% income, the share of business income in total personal income also declined 
monotonically and dramatically in the post-WWII period.
14  Second, we estimate top 
income composition using an alternative source, a household wealth survey, which 
includes the capital income components missing from the tax statistics. As we show in 
Section 5.5, our findings are robust to the inclusion of the missing components. Third, we 
examine the changes in wealth distribution using estate tax statistics, which we report in 
next section. 
 
4.4 Evidence from Top Estates 
Our income composition series suggest that capital income accrued to the top 1% 
income group fell dramatically during WWII, never returned to the pre-WWII level, and 
was replaced by employment income. Total capital income in the economy, however, did 
recover albeit gradually. Then the fall in the top capital income must have been caused by 
                                                 
14 See Appendix Section A.4 for a detailed discussion.  
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a permanent decline in wealth concentration. In order to test this hypothesis, we turn to 
estate tax return statistics published annually since the introduction of estate tax in 1905.
15 
  Figure 8 plots the average sizes (in real 2002 yen) of the top 0.01% estates and 
the bottom half of top 1% estates (“top 1-0.5%”) from 1905 to 2002 in logarithmic scale. 
The top 0.01% estates, namely, the “very top” wealth holdings, correspond to the roughly 
top 100 decedents in 2002, whose average was about 5 billion yen or $40 million.
16 By 
contrast, the average of the bottom half of top 1% estates, namely, the “moderately high” 
wealth holdings, was about 310 million yen or $2.5 million in the same year.
17 According 
to the figure, both the top 0.01% and 1-0.5% estates increased substantially from 1905 to 
1936. The top 0.01% estates then declined precipitously by a factor of 140 from 1936 to 
1949, and the top 1-0.5% estates declined by a factor of 18 during the same period. In 
contrast to top incomes, top estates not only fell dramatically in 1941-45 but also 
continued to fall during the initial four years of the postwar occupational reforms. Both 
estate levels grew rapidly during the high economic growth period of 1955-73, but they 
have been on decline since the burst of the asset bubble in 1991. While the level of the 
top 1-0.5% estates surpassed the pre-WWII peak by 1970, the level of top 0.01% estates 
in 2002 is still smaller (in real terms) than in 1936 in spite of a ten-fold increase in GDP 
per capita.  
When we compare the two series, the top 0.01% estates were initially about 50 
times larger than the bottom half of top 1% estates, and by the 1930s, about 100 times 
larger. Because of the differential impact of WWII and the postwar reforms on the two 
estate levels, however, by 1949 the former were only about 20 times larger than the latter. 
Moreover, this ratio has remained fairly constant from 1950 to 2002 despite the changes 
in macro economic conditions during these years. In other words, there was a permanent 
decline in the level of the top wealth relative to the moderately high wealth after 1950. 
Table 3 presents estate compositions for selected years, 1935, 1950, and 1987, 
for which the fraction of adult decedents filing estate tax returns are constant at about 
                                                 
15 Due to the data limitation, our top estates series are less precisely estimated than top income share series. 
See Appendix Section B and Table B1 for complete results and a detailed discussion. 
16 Due to the small sample size (50 to 100), year-to-year estimates of the top 0.01% estates can be sensitive 
to the presence of a single extremely large wealth holder. 
17 Although $2.5 million may still seem large, given the high real estate prices in Japan, an upper-middle 
income class family owning a large apartment in Tokyo could leave an estate of that size. Studies suggest that 
the average household assets are considerably higher in Japan than in the United States (see Takayama 
(1992), Chapter 1).  
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9%.
18 Estates are decomposed into: (1) land (both farm and residential), (2) houses and 
structures, (3) business assets (unincorporated business assets and farm assets), (4) 
stocks, (5) fixed claim assets (bonds, cash, deposits, and savings accounts), and (6) other 
assets (including household properties, pensions, and life insurances). The figure shows 
that the largest component of the top 9% estates shifted from financial assets (stocks and 
fixed claim assets) in 1935 to movable properties (business assets, houses and 
structures, and household properties) in 1950, to real estate (predominantly residential 
land) in 1987. The share of stocks and fixed claims assets in the top estates declined 
sharply from 49% in 1935 to 15% in 1950, and then rose to 22% in 1987. Namely, the 
share of financial assets in large estates in the midst of the bubble period was still less 
than half of that in 1935. Thus the top estate composition data provide additional evidence 
for our claim that the shares of dividends and interest in the top income collapsed during 
WWII and have not returned to the pre-WWII level to date. 
To summarize, our top estates series suggest that a permanent reduction in the 
level of the top wealth relative to the moderately high wealth took place during and 
immediately after WWII. This dramatic fall in wealth concentration at the top is not only 
consistent with our findings from the top income shares series, but also provides better 
insights as to why the precipitous decline in top income shares was concentrated within 
the top 1% income group. WWII and the occupational reforms had a very large impact on 
the high end of the wealth distribution, destroying much of the source of capital income. 
Because in general the share of capital income in total income increases with the size of 
income, top income earners likely suffered a disproportionately large loss of their income. 
In other words, our data suggest that WWII and the subsequent reforms had an 
irreversible effect in wiping out high-income rentiers. 
 
5. Understanding the Evolution of Income Concentration 
Using the income and estate tax statistics, we have documented that (1) income 
concentration in Japan was extremely high during 1886-1940 by both historical and 
international standards; (2) the drastic de-concentration of income at the top took place in 
1938-45; (3) income concentration has remained low throughout the post-WWII period; (4) 
the size of top wealth relative to moderately high wealth declined sharply in 1936-49 and 
stayed low, and (5) top income composition has shifted dramatically from capital and 
                                                 
18 Table B2 and Figure B1 present aggregate estate compositions from 1925 to 2002. See Appendix Section 
B.2 for details.  
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business incomes toward employment income over the course of the 20th century. In this 
section, we explore the causes of the evolution of income concentration. 
 
5.1 High Income Concentration in pre-WWII Japan 
One of the merits of our data is that they allow a quantitative comparison of 
income concentration before and after WWII. Our findings strongly confirm the received 
view based largely on qualitative evidence that there was high concentration of income 
and wealth among the elite class in prewar Japan.
19  Preceding studies suggest three 
major constituencies of the very rich: landlords, shareholders, and corporate executives. 
First, there was a concentration of land ownership to a small number of “absentee 
landlords” (fuzai jinushi) mostly in rural areas whose lands were cultivated by tenant 
farmers. Especially in the earlier years, landowners enjoyed social and economic 
privileges over their tenants. After WWI, however, both the commercialization of 
agriculture and the rise of tenant unions led to lower rents and stronger tenant rights 
(Waswo and Nishida (2003), pp.14-7). As a result, large landowners began to diversify 
their assets and invest in financial and industrial assets. These observations are 
consistent with the substantive farmland rents component in the top 1% income during 
1886-1915 and its gradual decline thereafter in our income composition data.  
Second, before WWII, large firms raised its capital primarily from stock markets, 
and business ownership was heavily concentrated on a small number of individual (as 
opposed to institutional) shareholders. For example, Okazaki (2000) finds that, in 1935, at 
ten largest zaibatsu firms, top 10 shareholders held as much as 66% of total stocks 
(pp.103-5). In addition, prewar firms paid out high dividends to their shareholders. 
According to the study by Miyamoto et al. (1995) based on corporate charters of fifty 
companies in the 1880s, on average 70% of profit was distributed to shareholders as 
dividends (p.276). Okazaki (1993) also finds that, in the 1930s the average dividend to 
profit ratio at leading manufacturing firms was close to 70%, while it was less than 50% in 
the 1950s (p.184). 
                                                 
19 According to our data, the top income shares stayed relatively flat or increased only modestly from 1890 to 
1940. By contrast, as Figure 2 shows, concerning the income distribution of all households, the preceding 
studies find a sharp increase in income inequality during the same period. Our findings are not necessarily 
contradictory to these results, if the increase was driven by the changes in the lower end of the income 
distribution. In fact, Mizoguchi and Terasaki (1995) and Minami (1995) attribute the rising income inequality in 
1890-1940 primarily to the widening rural and urban income gap and the increasing intra-industry wage 
differentials.  
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Third, during the interwar period, top management at large corporations received 
extremely high compensation. In addition to high monthly salary, they were rewarded 
large year-end bonuses. According to Miyamoto and Abe (1995), the same fifty corporate 
charters stipulated that 10% of profit be distributed as executive bonuses (p.276). At 
leading manufacturing firms, directors on average received 6% of profit in the form of 
bonus in the 1930s, compared to 2% in the 1960s (Okazaki (1993), p.184). At five leading 
electric power companies, executive bonus was 28 times larger than the average income 
per capita in 1936, while in 1955 it was only 1.5 times larger (Minami (1995), p.123). By 
contrast, paying bonus for rank-and-file employees was an exception rather than a norm 
in prewar firms. Moreover, large shareholders themselves were often corporate directors 
in prewar firms, exacerbating the income concentration. For example, Okazaki (2000) 
finds that, at twenty leading manufacturing firms, top ten shareholders held 23% of the 
director positions in 1935, while they held none after 1947 (pp.103-5). 
In a unique study using individual-level data, Yazawa (1992) compares the 5,000 
highest income taxpayers in 1936 and 1982 based on Who’s Who that published their 
names, income tax paid, addresses, and occupational titles. He finds that, out of the top 
5,000 income earners in 1936 – which corresponds roughly to the top 0.01% income 
group in our study – 31% were in retail business, 22% were in manufacturing, 22% were 
in finance, and 7% had no occupation (pp.155-9). He also shows that they were 
concentrated in metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo (45%) and Osaka (25%).
20 Only 2.2% 
of them, however, were the members of aristocracy and only 3.0% were affiliated with 
zaibatsu holding companies, which indicates that the importance of aristocrats and 
zaibatsu families among the elite class should not be overstated (pp.160-6). 
Last but not least, the legal system in prewar Japan proved favorable to the 
affluent class. Initially, both the 1886 income tax law and the 1905 estate tax law set 
extremely low tax rates in which the highest possible rates were 3% and 1.8%, 
respectively. Although the rates were increased subsequently, until the 1937 temporary 
tax increase law, the effective marginal tax rates for top income and estates groups had 
remained low (see Table A3 in Appendix). In addition, the prewar estate tax law endorsed 
primogeniture and allowed the first-born son (or a designated legal heir) to inherit entire 
family estates as a family head under preferential tax rates and high exemption points. In 
                                                 
20 Note that his sample covers 26 major prefectures out of total 47 prefectures in Japan, under-representing 
rural prefectures (p.149).   
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other words, with the minimum government intervention, rich families could accumulate 
their wealth over several generations before WWII. 
 
5.2 Mechanisms of Income De-concentration in 1938-1945 
Our data indicate that the top income shares fell precipitously and 
disproportionately during WWII, but not at all during the occupational reforms. We explore 
the two key questions in turn: how did WWII reduce the income concentration in such a 
short period of time, and why did the occupational reforms have such little impact?  
WWII likely caused the drastic income de-concentration through three main 
channels: wartime regulations, inflation, and war destruction. First of all, after the 1937 
China Incident and the promulgation of the 1938 National General Mobilization Act, the 
military government implemented a set of regulations affecting landlord rights, shareholder 
rights, and executive compensation (Hoshi (1998), Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), Chapter 3; 
Okazaki (1993)). With respect to landlords, the government facilitated the redistribution of 
farmland from landlords to tenants in 1938 and 1943, regulated rents and land prices 
starting in 1939, introduced a two-tier price system for rice production in 1941 under which 
the government paid much higher prices to owner- and tenant-farmers than to landlords, 
and revised land and house lease laws in 1941 to augment tenant rights (Waswo and 
Nishida (2003), pp.22-3). Although their primary goal was to stimulate food production, all 
of these measures reduced both land value and rental income for landlords.  
With respect to shareholders, the government regulated dividends starting in 1939, 
and capped a dividend-to-equity ratio at 8% in 1940 and at 5% in 1945. As the ratio at 
major companies before WWII often exceeded 10%, the regulation considerably lowered 
the returns on stocks. Moreover, the pressure on shareholders led to the decline in the 
number of shareholders in director positions at major companies after 1940 (Okazaki 
(2000), p.108). The government also regulated interest rates for private bonds in order to 
encourage the absorption of government bonds, reducing the returns on corporate bonds. 
With respect to executives, the government controlled wages and salaries starting in 1939 
and placed a ceiling on executive bonuses in 1940. The 1938 law mandated the 
establishment of works councils, aiming at productivity increase through employee 
empowerment. These measures likely compressed not only inter-firm but also within-firm 
pay differentials during WWII. As shown in Figure 7, the changes in the different 
components of the top 1% income coincide well with the timing of the corresponding 
wartime regulations, indicating their importance in reducing income concentration.   
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Moreover, despite the stringent controls, the price level began to surge after 1938 
and rose dramatically towards the end of WWII (see Figure 3). The inflation likely played 
a key role in reducing the top estates, as it diminished the real value of fixed claim assets 
(e.g., bonds and deposits). It also likely played a role in the collapse of the top capital 
income, because it reduced not only interest income but also rental income as the 1941 
lease laws made it difficult for landlords to increase rents. Furthermore, to finance the 
rapid military expansion, the government increased individual and corporate income taxes 
in 1937, 1938, 1940, 1942, 1944, and 1945 (Japan National Tax Administration (1988)). 
The sharp increase in corporate tax rates mechanically reduced dividend distributions 
from corporations to shareholders.
21  
Finally, WWII led to large-scale destruction of physical and human capital that 
claimed 25% of physical assets and 668,000 civilian casualties by the end (Keizai Antei 
Honbu (1947)). In particular, repeated air raids of major cities by the U.S. air force starting 
in March 1945 likely had a devastating effect on the high income earners who were 
concentrated in the metropolitan areas (Yazawa and Minami (1993), p.366). Note, 
however, that the late timing of the bombing implies that it could not have been a major 
reason for the income de-concentration that had started in 1938. In summary, WWII can 
be seen as a one-time shock that reduced income and wealth inequality in Japan through 
the combination of government regulations, inflation, and war destruction. 
 
5.3 Impact of U.S. Occupational Reforms in 1945-1952 
Upon Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the nation was placed under the indirect 
governance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers until 1952. As preceding 
studies have emphasized, the postwar occupational reforms could potentially have a large 
effect in equalizing the income distribution (Yazawa and Minami (1993); Minami (1995)). 
Three particularly powerfully redistributive measures were implemented during this period.  
First, the land reform in 1947-1950 mandated landlords to sell their farmland to ex-
tenants, eliminating virtually all large- and medium-sized landowners. As a result, the 
percentage of land cultivated by tenants declined sharply from 46% in 1941 to 9% in 
1955. Due to hyperinflation, compensation paid to landowners in real terms was a mere 
fraction of the land value. Second, to finance its large deficits, the government imposed 
                                                 
21 At the same time, one may suspect that the higher marginal tax rates would have invited a higher degree of 
tax avoidance and evasion. Although we cannot deny this possibility, as discussed later, it was also true that 
the government intensified their effort to collect taxes during WWII.  
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extremely heavy and highly progressive property tax (zaisan zei) from 1946 to 1951. The 
property tax affected approximately 13% of all households in Japan in the initial year, and 
taxed away on average 33% of their properties. For the top 5,000 households, more than 
70% of their properties were transferred to the government.  
Third, under the dissolution of zaibatsu in 1946-48, not only ex- and current 
directors of zaibatsu firms were expelled, but also their stocks were confiscated and 
redistributed to a large number of employees and other investors at a market price. 
Consequently, these three measures transferred a significant amount of assets (i.e., land, 
stocks, and other household properties) from the high to the lower end of distribution. In 
addition, the hyperinflation in 1944-48 hit hard high-income rentiers. By contrast, farmers 
and small business owners who sold their products in underground markets were said to 
have earned substantive income in the immediate postwar years, explaining the surge of 
business income component in the top 1% income in Figure 7. 
Despite the emphasis placed on the importance of the occupational reforms in 
reducing income inequality in the literature, our data indicate that, although they affected 
the top estate levels, they had practically no impact on the top income shares. Namely, we 
find WWII, rather than the occupational reforms, as the single most important event in 
reducing income concentration. Our finding may seem surprising at first, but the following 
observations indicate otherwise. First, our finding is consistent with the view that the 
occupational reforms were in many ways a continuation of the wartime policies (Okazaki 
and Okuno (1993); Noguchi (1995); Teranishi (2005)). That is, the restrictions on landlord 
and shareholder rights, the adoption of progressive taxation, and the check on executive 
compensation had already begun during WWII, which likely had set off the process of 
income de-concentration well before the postwar democratization and demilitarization. As 
such, there was little room left for the occupational reforms in further reducing top 
incomes.
22 By contrast, our top estates series indicate that the reforms did have a large 
effect in reducing wealth concentration, whose implications will be discussed in next 
section. 
Second, our finding is also consistent with the comparative evidence that indicates 
a universal role of WWII in reducing income concentration in such diverse countries as the 
                                                 
22 It is also likely that some redistributive measures equalized income at the lower end of the distribution 
without changing the mean. For example, the land reform redistributed land primarily from middle-sized 
landowners to tenants, creating a large number of small-sized farmers. In such cases, we may not observe 
much change in the top 1% income share. 
  
  21
United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Canada (Atkinson and Piketty, 2006). 
Note that none of these countries was occupied after WWII and some did not even 
experienced major war destruction in their homelands. But, without exception, the war 
was accompanied by large-scale government intervention and inflation in these countries. 
In short, in the absence of quantitative evidence, the preceding studies have likely 
overstated the effect of the occupational reforms in equalizing income in Japan. 
 
5.4 Low Income Concentration in Post-WWII Japan 
Perhaps the more challenging question is why the top income shares did not 
recover from the profound yet temporary shock of WWII in the decades that followed. Why 
has the degree of income concentration in Japan remained at the historic low reached in 
the late 1940s? We argue that it was in this context that the occupational reforms played a 
critical role. Most simply, by redistributing assets and reducing wealth (as opposed to 
income) concentration, they equalized the distribution of capital income in subsequent 
years. More importantly, deriving their origins from the wartime policies, the postwar 
reforms transformed the one-time measures into lasting ones, facilitating a structural 
change in the Japanese economy that likely prevented re-concentration of income in 
subsequent decades. 
First, the fiscal reforms in 1950 made progressive taxation a permanent feature of 
the Japanese tax system. Recall that the enormous fortunes that generated the high top 
1% income share in the pre-WWII period had been accumulated at the time when 
progressive income tax hardly existed and capitalists could reinvest almost all of their 
incomes for further capital accumulation. The fiscal environment faced by capitalists after 
WWII was vastly different. As Figure 9 shows, after a spike in 1945-50 caused by 
temporary tax increases and hyperinflation, the marginal tax rate for the top 0.01% income 
group stayed high at around 60% from 1950 until the tax reform in the late 1980s. Tax 
rates on corporate income show similar trends. With respect to estate tax, the 1947 law 
abolished primogeniture and mandated the division of estate among surviving spouse and 
children, and the 1950 law instituted highly progressive estate and gift taxes with top rates 
in excess of 70%. As a result, inter-generational transfers of large wealth became much 
more difficult after WWII. Progressive taxation likely hindered the re-accumulation of large 
wealth, resulting in more equal distribution of capital income.  
Second, the permanent decline in the share of capital income in the top income 
can be further attributed to measures specific to each capital income component. Since  
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the introduction of the land and house lease laws in 1941 until their repeal in 1992, the 
government had heavily protected tenant rights, which depressed the supply of rental 
housing. As a result of both high home ownership rate and more equal land distribution, 
rental income became a less significant source of income for top income earners in the 
postwar period. As for interest income, the government expanded tax-exempted saving 
instruments for small asset holders since the 1960s until they were abolished in 1988. 
These measures had likely promoted wealth accumulation among the middle class, 
equalizing the distribution of interest income. With respect to dividend income, a new 
corporate governance system characterized by bank-centered debt finance and cross-
shareholdings among affiliated companies likely resulted in stable institutional 
shareholders and low dividend rates (Fukao (1995); Teranishi (2000)). As a result, 
dividends too became less concentrated among top income groups in postwar Japan. 
  Third, the changes in human resource management and union structure in Japan 
likely compressed wage distributions within firms. As the so-called “lifetime employment” 
became a hallmark of human resource management at large firms in the 1960s, most if 
not all management positions were filled by long-term employees promoted from within 
(Okazaki (2000)). Moreover, after violent confrontations in 1945-1955, most large firms in 
Japan were organized by single enterprise unions that represented both white- and blue-
collar employees of the firms. By the 1970s, management regularly consulted with unions 
over personnel matters including wages and promotions (Morishima (1991); Moriguchi 
(2000); Kato and Morishima (2002)). These changes likely resulted in less wage 
differentials between white- and blue-collar employees as well as more equitable 
executive compensation. We will turn to wage income statistics to examine these 
hypotheses more closely in Section 6. 
 
5.5 The Effects of Tax Evasion and Avoidance 
In the above analysis, we provided historical explanations for the evolution of the 
top income shares estimated from the income tax statistics. As discussed briefly in 
Section 3, however, the incomes reported by individuals for tax purposes are subject to 
lawful and unlawful under-reporting, and hence may not reflect their true economic 
incomes. In this section, we discuss what is known about the extent of tax evasion and 
avoidance in Japan, and provide sensitivity analysis to show whether our findings can be 
explained away by these phenomena.  
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The precipitous and permanent drop in income concentration after WWII could be 
explained by tax evasion only if the evasion among top income groups relative to the rest 
of the population increased dramatically during WWII and remained high ever since. One 
may assume that tax evasion must have been rampant during WWII when labor and 
material shortages disrupted normal functioning of any administration. Yet, seeking 
additional sources for war finance, the government not only imposed various temporary 
taxes but also tightened the monitoring over tax collection during the war. For instance, 
both the numbers of local tax offices and their personnel rose during WWII (Japan 
National Tax Administration (1988)). Second, it is unlikely that tax evasion was lower in 
the prewar period when the tax administration was smaller and when most businesses did 
not compile systematic accounting records. By contrast, after WWII, both the enforcement 
power and technology available for the tax administration were considerably expanded, 
and most economic transactions took place within large corporations or financial 
institutions that used accounting methods leaving records that the tax administration could 
examine. For instance, it is widely believed that there is little tax evasion in Japan today 
concerning employment, dividend, and interest incomes, precisely because the 
sophisticated withholding system captures these incomes at source with the cooperation 
from corporate employers and financial institutions.  
By contrast, tax evasion is considered to be substantially higher for business and 
farm incomes for which the withholding system does not apply.
23  According to the 
estimate by Hayashi (1987), while nearly 100% of employment incomes were captured, 
only 50% of business income and 10% of farm income were reported to the tax 
administration. However, both business and farm income components in the top income 
are so small in recent years that it would require rates of evasion an order of magnitude 
higher than these estimated rates to generate the top income shares as high as in the pre-
WWII period. For example, if we assume that only 10% of farm income and 50% of 
business income are reported in 1999, then our estimate of the top 1% income share 
would increase modestly from 7.8% to 8.5%.
24  In short, it is difficult to argue that the 
apparent permanent decline in income concentration was due to tax evasion or unlawful 
under-reporting of income. 
                                                 
23 Most advanced countries face similar problems. For example, in the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service also 
estimates that most income tax evasion takes place among small business owners. 
24 In 1999, business income and farm income represent 8.3% and 0.1% of reported incomes in the top1% 
income group. With no evasion, they would represent 16.6% and 1%, respectively, and the top 1% income 
share would be approximately 9% larger than our estimate.  
  24
In addition to tax evasion, individuals may shift their income using legal means and 
instruments to reduce tax payments. One such example is the usage of non-cash 
compensation instead of wages, which will be discussed in Section 6.2. Another way is to 
take advantage of special exemptions. As stated earlier, during the post-WWII period, 
various special treatments had been given to different components of capital income, 
most notably, interest, dividends, and realized capital gains (Iwamoto et al. (1995)). These 
treatments effectively allowed taxpayers to pay tax separately at source (gensen bunri 
kazei), instead of aggregating these components to other incomes and face progressive 
income tax schedule. As a result, the self-assessed income tax statistics do not include 
these capital income components. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the impact of the 
missing capital income components on our estimates of the top income shares.  
The best available source for estimating the distribution of capital income by 
income group is the comprehensive household survey, National Survey of Family Income 
and Expenditure (NSFIE).
25  In particular, the NSFIE in 1999 reports the holdings of 
various financial assets per household tabulated by the size of household head’s income. 
We combine these asset distribution data and National Accounts data to estimate the 
shares of three capital income components missing from the tax statistics (i.e., interest, 
dividends, and the returns on life and other insurance policies) in total income for various 
top income groups. In Table 4, we compare our estimates from the income tax statistics in 
1999 (in Panel B) with the estimates from the NSFIE in the same year (in Panel C). Three 
observations follow. 
First, the estimated average incomes from the NSFIE coincide well with those from 
the tax statistics up to the top 1% income group. For the top 0.5% income group, the two 
estimates differ significantly, however. Because the NSFIE uses a representative sample 
(about 50,000 households) that contains few observations at the high end of income 
distribution, it is difficult to provide precise estimates for the top 0.5% income group and 
above using NSFIE data. It is important to note that we find no systematic downward bias 
in estimating the average incomes using tax statistics compared to the NSFIE. The claim 
that the tax statistics are useless due to systematic under-reporting is thus not necessarily 
valid. 
Second, according to Iwamoto et al. (1995), in recent decades, because of tax 
exemptions and separate taxation at source, approximately 80% of dividend income, over 
                                                 
25  Statistics Bureau of Japan, National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (Zenkoku Shohi Jittai 
Chosa). See Appendix Section D for a detailed discussion.  
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99% of interest income, and 100% of the returns on insurance savings are not subject to 
the progressive income tax and not included in the self-assessed income tax statistics. 
The NSFIE estimates indicate that, compared to the national average, the higher income 
group receives larger portions of their income as dividends but smaller portions of their 
income as interest or the returns on insurance policies. Furthermore, even in the NSFIE 
data, the three capital income components make up very small portion of total income for 
the top income groups. For example, they respectively constitute 1.9%, 2.2%, and 4.5% of 
total income for the bottom half of the top 1% income group (the column “top 1-0.5%” in 
Panel C). Taken together, the table suggests that these components are not particularly 
concentrated at the top of the income distribution in today’s Japan. 
Third, Panel A shows that interest and dividends constitute only a small share 
(2.8%) of total personal income in Japan. Even if we make the extreme assumption that 
all dividends and interest income go to the top 1% income group, it would increase the top 
1% income share by 2.8 percentage point from 7.8% to 10.6%. Observe that this upper 
bound estimate is still substantially smaller than the pre-WWII share of 16%. 
We provide similar sensitivity analysis for 1979-1999, using the NSFIE data. Our 
results are reported in Table D1 in Appendix. Consistent with the estimates from the 
income tax statistics, the table shows that there is only a very modest increase in the top 
top 5% income shares during this period. The share of the three capital income 
components in total income for the top 5% group was only moderately higher than the 
national average in 1979 and 1984, and was actually lower than the national average in 
1989, 1994, and 1999. Therefore, fully incorporating the missing components would have 
only small effects (a slight increase in the 1980s and a slight decrease in the 1990s) on 
our estimates for the top income shares. In summary, adding back the missing capital 
income components would not change our main conclusion that the degree of income 
concentration fell drastically in Japan from the pre-WWII to post-WWII period.  
 
6. Top Wage Income Shares in Japan, 1929-2002 
6.1 Trends in Wage Income Concentration 
In this section, we present our estimates of top wage income shares in Japan to 
investigate the role of employment income in the evolution of income concentration. Wage 
income in our definition includes wages, salaries, bonuses, and pecuniary benefits, but 
excludes non-cash compensation and retirement benefits. For the pre-WWII period, we  
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use salary and bonus data reported in annual income tax statistics for fiscal years 1930-
45 (corresponding to actual years 1929-44). For the post-WWII period, we use wage 
income statistics in the Survey on Private Wages and Salaries published annually by the 
tax administration since 1951. Our estimates of the top 5% and 1% wage income shares 
series in Japan are shown in Figures 10 and 11. 
First, during 1929-1935, Japan exhibited a high degree of wage income 
concentration where the top 5% received more than 20% of total wage income and the top 
1% received about 8% of total wage income. As one might expect, the degree of wage 
income concentration is smaller than that of income concentration during the same period 
(8% versus 16% for the top 1% group). High wage income inequality in Japan during the 
interwar period can be explained by large intra- and inter-firm wage differentials. As 
discussed above, wages and bonuses paid to top management, white-collar employees, 
production workers, and unskilled laborers within the same firm were widely dispersed 
before WWII, resulting in high within-firm wage inequality (Showa Dojinkai (1960), p.269 
and p.263). In addition, with the growth of heavy industries with high capital intensity, 
productivity gap by industry as well as by firm size had widened since the First World War, 
resulting in substantial inter-firm wage differentials (Yasuba (1976)). 
Second, we observe a sharp decline in wage income concentration from 1935 to 
1944, as the top 5% wage income share fell from 23% to 9% and the top 1% share from 
8.9% to 3.2%. This 64% decline in the top 1% wage income share in 1935-44 is 
comparable to the 68% decline in the top 1% income share in 1938-45. According to our 
income composition data in Figure 7, the share of employment income in the top 1% 
income remained fairly stable until 1940 and then dropped sharply in 1940-47. Therefore, 
we attribute the initial decline in wage income concentration in 1935-40 to the tightening of 
labor markets due to military expansion that compressed the wage distribution from 
below. The further decline in 1940-44 is likely due to the wartime regulations that capped 
executive bonus and standardized wages across firms. Although the decline in income 
concentration was largely a capital income phenomenon, the data indicate that 
employment income also played an important role. 
Third, in the post-WWII period, top wage income shares rose substantially from 
1951 to 1961, and then declined gradually over the next two decades. This initial increase 
is consistent with our income composition data that show the recovery of the employment 
income component in the top 1% income after WWII. It is worth noting that the trends in 
the top wage income shares parallel the trends in the income inequality of all households  
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documented by the preceding studies (see Figure 2). Minami (1995b) attributes the rise in 
income inequality in the 1950s and its decline in the 1960s to the Japan’s transition from 
the chronic labor surplus before 1960 to the chronic labor shortage after 1960. 
Considering the top wage income shares, their decline in the 1960s and 1970s can be 
further attributed to the diffusion of the so-called “Japanese-style” management, including 
lifetime employment, enterprise unionism, and joint labor-management consultation that 
tended to compress within-firm wage dispersion (Gordon (1985); Aoki (1988)). For 
example, by the end of the 1960s, executives at large firms were entirely promoted from 
within (Okazaki 2000). In sharp contrast to the pre-WWII period, bonuses were no longer 
paid disproportionately to top executives but distributed more equally among regular 
employees. In fact, recent studies indicate that the average ratio of bonus to total 
compensation in Japan is 20 to 30% for both corporate executives and rank-and-file 
employee (Hart and Kawasaki (1999); Kubo (2004)). 
Finally, despite the concern about the rising income inequality in Japan over the 
last two decades (Tachibanaki (1995, 2005)), we find only a slight increase in the top 5% 
and 1% wage income shares. This is consistent with Ohtake (2005) who finds a relatively 
modest increase in income inequality due largely to demographic changes, such as the 
rise in single-person and old-age households in Japan.   
 
6.2 Comparative Analysis of Japan and the United States 
To facilitate international comparison, we also plot the top wage income shares in 
the United States, estimated by Piketty and Saez (2003), in Figures 10 and 11. In 
addition to wages, salaries, bonuses, and pecuniary benefits, U.S. wage income includes 
stock options. In Japan, stock option became legal only after 1997, and its usage has 
been limited both in the number of firms and the amount of stocks granted.
26 As a result, 
inclusion of stock options would not change our Japanese estimates. 
The figures indicate that the top wage income shares were roughly comparable in 
the two countries during 1929-35. Then wage income concentration in both countries fell 
sharply by the end of WWII. In contrast to Japan, however, U.S. top wage income shares 
had remained low in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, Japan and the United States 
exhibited the similar degree of wage income concentration at the end of the 1960s. The 
pattern of wage income concentration has sharply diverged between the two countries 
                                                 
26  Naito and Fujiwara (2004). pp.255-60. Various restrictions on stock options remained until the further 
revision of the commercial law in 2002.   
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since the 1970s, however. While the top 1% wage income share in Japan has been nearly 
constant at around 5% from 1970 to 2000, the share in the United States has risen 
exponentially from 5% to 12% during the same period. Consequently, today, the United 
States exhibits a much higher degree of wage income concentration than in Japan.  
One may question that the wage income concentration in Japan is seriously 
underestimated because Japanese companies make extensive use of non-cash 
compensation, such as company housing and expense account. According to Abowd and 
Kaplan (1999), the inclusion of in-kind benefits and perquisites to the sum of salary, 
bonus, and stock options would raise total compensation for Japanese CEOs in 1988-96 
by 32% and for American CEOs by 10%. Taking an extreme case where the top 1% wage 
income earners receive all perquisites,
27 this would increase the Japanese share in 1992 
from 4.8% to 6.4% and the U.S. share from 9.6% to 10.6%. In other words, although the 
inclusion of non-cash compensation would certainly reduce the difference, the top 1% 
wage income share would have been substantially higher in the United States than in 
Japan by the early 1980s. 
What explains the diverging trends in wage income concentration between the two 
countries then? Note that, by 1980, Japan had virtually caught up with the United States in 
both the level of income per capita and the stage of industrialization, as both countries 
entered the third industrial revolution characterized by high technology industries. 
Therefore, on the contrary to what recent skill-biased technological progress theories have 
posited (see Acemoglu (2002) for a survey), the comparative experience of the United 
State and Japan suggests that technology alone cannot account for the change in wage 
inequality. At the very least, elements other than technology – demographic changes, 
government policies, and institutional factors (e.g., labor markets, social norms regarding 
pay inequality) – have to be taken into consideration. Although understanding the relative 
contributions of those elements is beyond the scope of this paper, below we briefly 
examine the effect of income tax policies on wage inequality. 
To assess the impact of income tax rates on wage income distribution, Figure 12 
presents the top 0.1% wage income share and the effective marginal income tax rates 
faced by this group in Japan (in Panel A) and the United States (in Panel B) from 1960 to 
2002. In the United States, a number of influential studies, such as Lindsey (1987) and 
Feldstein (1995), have argued that the reductions in the top marginal tax rates since the 
                                                 
27  We assume so to provide an upper bound for the Japanese estimate, as perquisites are most likely 
distributed more equally among all employees in Japan than in the United States.  
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1970s – especially the sharp reduction in the late 1980s – were the key factor that drove 
up high wage incomes. According to their view, referred to as supply-side theory, lower 
income tax rates would increase reported incomes through higher labor supply and/or a 
shift from tax-exempted forms of compensation to taxable cash compensation. Their 
conclusions have been challenged by subsequent studies and remain controversial (see 
Saez (2004) for an extensive survey). It is in this context that Japan’s experience may 
offer a new insight. As shown in Panel A, the marginal tax rate faced by the top 0.1% 
wage income earners in Japan has also declined by 2% between 1980 and 2000, the 
magnitude roughly comparable to that in the United States between 1970 and 1987. 
These reductions, however, have failed to generate any supply-side effects in Japan. The 
comparative experience of Japan and the United States thus also rules out tax incentives 
as the primary determinant of wage inequality. In case of Japan, highly developed internal 
labor markets and the resulting absence of competitive markets for corporate executives 
might have played a key role in preventing the rise in wage inequality. By contrast, as 
Frydman (2005) documents, the inter-firm mobility of U.S. executives have been 
increasing since the 1970s, indicating the presence of active labor markets for top 
managers in recent decades. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have compiled the long-run series of top income shares and 
wage income shares and explored the dynamic evolution of income concentration in 
Japan over the last 116 years. To conclude our study, we review Japan’s experience from 
a comparative perspective. 
According to our data, Japan was a nation of high income concentration 
throughout the pre-WWII period. Although the degree of income concentration in Japan 
was extremely high during the early part of the 20th century by historical standards, it was 
roughly comparable to that of other industrial nations, such as Britain, the United States, 
France, and Germany, during the same period (Atkinson (2006); Piketty and Saez (2003); 
Piketty (2003); Dell (2004)). These countries experienced a substantial decline in income 
concentration during the interwar period, due largely to the Great Depression and the 
subsequent government intervention that imposed progressive taxation. By contrast, the 
impact of the Great Depression on the Japanese economy was far milder (Moriguchi 
(2003)), and as we have shown, income and estate taxes remained low in Japan until the  
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late 1930s. As a result, even by international standards, Japan exhibited a high degree of 
income concentration at the eve of WWII. For example, as late as in 1939, the top 1% 
income earners received almost 20% of total income in Japan, whereas the share was 
about 15% in France, the United States, and Germany.  
  As in the other countries, the top income shares in Japan fell abruptly and 
dramatically during WWII. Analysing the series of income composition, top estates, and 
top wage income shares, we show that this sharp reduction in income concentration was 
due to the collapse of capital income and the compression of wage income caused by 
wartime regulations and inflation. Due to the higher level of income concentration prior to 
WWII, the impact of WWII in reducing income concentration was much more pronounced 
in Japan than in the United States, or even Britain, France, and Germany.  
Our data show that this one-time income de-concentration process had a long 
lasting impact in Japan. We argue that the structural change of the economy that had 
taken place after WWII transformed the temporary effect into a permanent one. In 
particular, we suggest that the fundamental changes in the tax system, corporate 
governance, and human resource management likely have prevented the re-concentration 
of income in Japan. Interestingly, Japan achieved the most impressive and sustained 
economic growth under the environment unfavourable to capital accumulation and without 
significant increase in income concentration. Our findings thus raise some doubt on the 
view that free accumulation and transfer of wealth is a necessary condition for macro 
economic growth. 
 According to our wage income series, the degree of wage income concentration in 
pre-WWII Japan was high and roughly comparable to that in the United States during the 
same period. Top wage income shares fell sharply in the late 1930s and during WWII due 
to tight labor markets and wartime regulations. Wage income inequality rose  initially in the 
1950s but declined in the subsequent two decades, and has increased slightly since the 
1980s. This recent increase in Japan, however, is very small compared to the recent 
surge in wage income concentration in Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on our comparative 
analysis, we argue that neither technology nor tax policy alone can explain the change in 
wage income inequality. Instead we emphasize the importance of understanding the 
interactions between technology, government policies, and institutional factors governing 




A. Top Income Shares 
 
A.1. Definition of Income 
 
Our primary data source is individual income tax return statistics published in Annual 
Statistical Report (Zeimu Tokei Nenposho) from 1887 by the Tax Bureau of Japan Ministry 
of Finance (Shuzeikyoku), renamed the National Tax Administration (Kokuzeicho) after 
1947.
28 Among other information, it publishes a table with the number of taxpayers, the 
amount of reported income, and the amount of income tax, by income brackets, which can 
be used to estimate top income shares.  
  We define income as a gross income before deductions and payroll taxes paid by 
individuals, but after payroll taxes by employers and corporate income taxes. It includes 
employment income, business income, farm income, self-employment income, and capital 
income, but excludes realized capital gains as discussed below. 
We refer to the year of the annual report (the year when income tax returns were 
processed and tax was paid) as “fiscal year” which may be different from “actual year” in 
which the income subject to taxation was earned. Because tax laws affect the nature and 
definition of the reported income in the income tax statistics, we first summarize the 
evolution of income tax laws in Japan. Following description is based on Japan National 
Tax Administration (1988), which provides detailed history of Japanese income tax system 
from 1887 to 1987. 
 
A.1.1. Income Tax Laws, 1887-2002 
 
National-level individual income tax was first introduced in 1887 in Japan. During our 
sample period, there were three major income tax reforms in 1899, 1940, and 1947, and 
numerous minor revisions.  
Under the 1887 income tax law, income was defined comprehensively to include 
capital income (interest, rents, and dividends), employment income (salaries, bonuses, 
benefits, and pensions), business and farm income, and other property income. It set a 
high exemption point (300 yen) and extremely low marginal tax rates (1.0-3.0%) defined 
over 5 income brackets.  
The 1899 law established income tax on three classes of income: corporate 
income, interest income, and individual income not included in the first two classes. 
Individual income tax during fiscal years 1899-1939 is thus often called “Class III income 
tax.”  It maintained the same exemption point (300 yen) and moderate tax rates (1.0-
5.5%) defined over 12 income brackets. Over the next two decades, income tax became 
increasingly progressive, with the highest marginal tax rate reaching 36% by 1920. The 
tax rates were raised further by the temporary tax increase law in 1937 and the revised 
temporary tax increase law in 1938. Under the 1899 law, dividends and bonuses paid by 
corporations to individuals became non-taxable. From fiscal year 1920, however, 60% of 
dividends and bonuses became taxable, and 80% from 1937. We thus correct for missing 
dividends and bonuses, for the fiscal years 1899-1939 (see Section A.3.4). 
The 1940 tax reform, in preparation for the wartime economy, established 
separate taxes on corporate income and individual income. Individual income was subject 
to both schedule tax and comprehensive tax. Under the schedule tax, income was taxed 
at different (flat) rates by income source (i.e., real estate, dividend and interest, self-
                                                 
28 The tax bureau’s jurisdictional area was Japan proper, not including colonies.  
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employment, wage, forestry, and retirement incomes). In addition, comprehensive income 
tax was imposed on individuals’ aggregate income above 5,000 yen with progressive tax 
rates that increased from 10% to 65% over 12 income brackets. We use the 
comprehensive income tax statistics in estimating top income shares for the fiscal years 
1940-1946. 
  The 1947 income tax reform, under the influence of U.S. occupational authority, 
abolished the schedule tax and established a unified comprehensive income tax. Realized 
capital gains became taxable for the first time in 1947 (see Section A.3.2 for details). The 
1947 law also introduced an extensive withholding system (gensen choshu seido) for 
wage earners. As a result, for most wage earners, income tax was withheld at source, and 
they were no longer required to file a self-assessed tax return (see Section A.3.1 for 
details). The unified comprehensive income tax, culminated in the 1950 tax law, however, 
was soon replaced by the hybrid of comprehensive taxation, separate taxation at source 
(gensen bunri kazei), and special exemptions in subsequent years. Under the hybrid 
system, instead of aggregating all incomes earned by an individual to apply a progressive 
tax rate, some incomes were taxed at flat rates separately from other incomes and some 
were tax-exempted entirely. Most important, separate taxation was introduced for interest 
income in 1953, for dividends in 1965, for part of real estate capital gains in 1969. Capital 
gains from stocks had been tax exempted since 1953, and so had interest income from 
certain personal savings in 1963, until most of these exemptions were abolished under the 
1988 tax reform (see Section A.4.3 for details).  
 
A.1.2. Correspondence between Fiscal Years and Actual Years 
 
In estimating top income shares series, it is important to know when the income reported 
in the tax statistics was actually earned. We first describe what the formal laws stipulated 
and then present our preferred specification based on how the laws were implemented. 
The following information is based on the tax codes reprinted in Japan Ministry of 
Finance, Tax Bureau (1988).  
For fiscal years 1887-1898, the income tax law defined the income for tax 
purposes in year t as: for rents, farm income, and business income, the average of the 
incomes earned in previous 3 years (i.e., years t-1, t-2, t-3), and for interest, dividends, 
and employment income, projected income earned in the same year t. For fiscal years 
1899-1925, all income except for farm income (which continued to be the average of 
previous 3 years) was defined as projected income earned in the same year. For fiscal 
years 1926-1946, the law stated that the income reported for tax purposes should be 
based on the income earned in previous year t-1. Starting in fiscal year 1947, with the 
introduction of the withholding system for wage earners, income tax became a pay-as-
you-earn system, and income tax paid in year t was based on the income earned in the 
same year.  
In summary, according to the legal definition, (1) for fiscal years 1887-1898, 
reported income in fiscal year t corresponds to a weighted average of incomes earned in 
years t, t-1, t-2, and t-3; (2) for 1899-1925, reported income in fiscal year t corresponds 
primarily to income earned in year t; (3) for 1926-1946, fiscal year t corresponds to actual 
year t-1; and (4) for 1947-2002, fiscal year t coincides with actual year t. 
In reality, however, we believe that it was difficult for the tax authority to obtain an 
accurate estimate of projected income in the absence of any withholding system during 
fiscal years 1887-1925. In addition, not all taxpayers filed an income tax return during this 
period. According to the laws, taxpayers were required to file a return and report the 
amount of income in April each year. A locally-elected committee then examined 
individuals they deemed responsible for paying income tax, including those who did not  
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file a return. The committee then determined the amount of income tax based both on the 
tax returns and their own inquiry. In fact, a large fraction of the people who paid income 
tax did not file a return (it was 48-78% during 1903-1925, the years for which data are 
available). Given this and the subsequent change in the 1926 law, we postulate that the 
committee was likely to rely on previous year’s income as the best available estimate for 
projected income even before 1926, especially for those who did not file income tax 
returns. Thus, as our preferred specification, we assume that  (1) for fiscal years 1887-
1946, fiscal year t corresponds to actual year t-1; and (2) for 1947-2002, fiscal year t 
coincides with actual year t. Note that, due to the 1947 reform that adopted the pay-as-
you-earn system, income earned in 1946 was not subject to progressive comprehensive 
income tax (it was subject to special tax), and hence we do not have data for 1946. The 
correspondence between fiscal years (in which tax was paid) and actual years (in which 
income was earned) is summarized in columns (1) and (2) of Table A0. 
To see if our estimates are sensitive to the specification of years, we also estimate 
top income shares series using the legal definitions. In doing so, based on income 
composition data, for fiscal years 1887-1898, we place 50% weight on income in year t 
and 50% weight on the simple average of incomes in years t-1, t-2, t-3. For fiscal years 
1899-1925, we place 100% weight on income t, as farm income constituted relatively 
small portion of total income. Figure A4 plots the top 0.1% income share series using the 
legal definitions (“formal law” series), along with our series (“preferred specification”). 
Except for years 1916-1922, two series exhibit fairly similar levels and trends.  
 
A.1.3. Tax Units 
 
For fiscal years 1887-1949, the unit of income tax was “family” defined as a married 
couple with dependents (e.g., children and old parents) or a single head of household with 
dependents. Incomes of cohabitating family members in a single household were 
aggregated for income tax purposes. Starting in fiscal year 1950, the unit of income tax 
became “individual” whereby spouses are taxed separately on their incomes. The income 
tax statistics in 1950-2002 do not allow us to reconstruct household income. To produce 
homogeneous series over the entire period, we choose the individual as the tax unit. 
Fortunately, in fiscal years 1903-1938 and 1949, the statistics provide a breakdown of 
total income into the income of household head and the income of dependents, by income 
brackets. According to these data, the latter is very small relative to the former (less than 
5% of the former in general). Hence, we substitute household income for household 
head’s income, which leads to slight upward bias in our estimates.  
Our top income groups are defined relative to the total number of adults, defined 
as 20 years old and above, in Japan (not including colonies). The total adult population, 
reported in Table A0, is estimated as follows. First, we take the total population from 
Japan Statistical Yearbook (2003), p. 32. Based on census data, the yearbook reports the 
estimated total population as of January 1 for years 1886-1919 and as of October 1 for 
years 1920-2002. Then we take the estimated population of people younger than 20 years 
old for years 1885-1920 from Ohkawa et al. (1974), Volume 2, pp.166-171. Starting in 
1920, Japanese census, conducted every ten years, reports population by age.
29 We 
estimate the population of people younger than 20 years old in between census years by 
assuming its ratio to the total population changes linearly between census years. We 
define our total adult population series as the total population minus the population 
younger than 20 years old. 
                                                 
29 Available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/zuhyou/y0207000.xls.  
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For the 1887-1949 period, we also computed top income shares using “household” 
as the tax unit (the total number of households in Japan is obtained from Otsuki and 
Takamatsu (1982), Table 1, p.340). The results are not reported in the paper, but 
available upon request. We found that the pattern of household top income shares is very 
similar to the pattern of individual top income shares, as the ratio of adults to households 
remained stable during 1885-1950 (which fluctuated between 2.65 and 2.95 with no 
trend).  
 
A.2. Total Income Denominator 
 
In order to obtain top income shares, we need to estimate the total income in Japan to be 
used as the denominator. This denominator should ideally be total personal income 
reported on tax returns had everybody been required to file an income tax return. As only 
a small fraction of households filed income tax returns before 1947, the income tax 
statistics cannot be used to estimate the denominator, and we must rely on National 
Accounts data. 
 
A.2.1. System of National Accounts, 1930-2002 
 
The System of National Accounts (SNA) in Japan has provided comprehensive estimates 
of national income since 1930. There are three partially overlapping series: (1) the old 
SNA, 1930-1976, reported in Historical Statistics of Japan, Volume 3, Section 13-5, (2) the 
68SNA, 1955-1998, reported in Historical Statistics of Japan, Table 3.6,
30 (3) the 93SNA, 
1980-2002, reported in Historical Statistics of Japan, Table 3.24.
31 The SNAs are fairly 
detailed and provide the breakdown of personal income into the main components: wages 
and salaries, social contributions of employers and employees, personal capital income 
(dividends, net interest income, rents received), unincorporated business income 
(agricultural income, imputed rents of homeowners, and other business income). 
Social contributions of employers and imputed rents are not part of the taxable 
individual income. Hence we define our personal income denominator as the sum of 
wages and salaries, employees’ social security contributions, personal capital income, 
and unincorporated business income (excluding imputed rents). The old SNA does not 
report imputed rents separately from received rents for 1946-1976. We have estimated 
imputed rents for the old SNA using the 68SNA, assuming that the fraction of imputed 
rents in total rents for 1946-1955 is equal to the fraction from 68SNA in 1955, the first year 
the 68SNA becomes available. Similarly, the old SNA does not report a breakdown of 
social contributions between employees and employers. We assume that social 
contributions from 1930 to 1954 are divided as in year 1955. Social contributions were 
very small during that period, and therefore this imputation has a very small effect on our 
total income denominator.  
The 93SNA reports the returns on insurance funds separately, but this item was 
included in personal capital income in the old SNA and the 68SNA. We added back the 
returns on insurance funds to personal capital income for the 93SNA years to obtain 
consistent series even though the returns on insurance funds are not part of the taxable 
income. 
Our personal income denominator is obtained from the 93SNA for the 1999-2002 
period, the 68SNA for the 1955-1998 period, and from the old SNA for the 1930-1954 
period, and then spliced together. The 93SNA and 68SNA personal income denominators 
                                                 
30 Available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm. 
31 Available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm.  
  35
are extremely close in 1998 (less than 1% difference) so we do not make any correction to 
connect the 68SNA and 93SNA in 1998. The old SNA personal income denominator in 
1955 is 4.4% higher than the 68SNA in 1955. Therefore, in order to obtain homogeneous 
series, we have reduced old SNA personal income by 4.4% so that the old SNA matches 
the 68SNA exactly in 1955. The old SNA does not provide estimates for 1945. Therefore, 
we have assumed, as in Maddison (1995), that real income in 1945 is one half of real 
income in 1944, based on other estimates from other authors. 
 
A.2.2. Personal Income Denominator, 1886-1930 
 
We estimate the personal income denominator for the years 1886-1930 based on the 
series of personal disposable income in Japan proper in Ohkawa et al. (1974), Volume 1, 
Table 8, column (9). Personal disposable income in 1930 is 11.5% higher than the 
personal income denominator in the same year estimated above from the old SNA. 
Therefore, to obtain homogeneous series, we have reduced personal disposable income 
from 1886 to 1929 by 11.5%. 
It is important to note that total income estimates before 1930 are much less 
reliable than those after 1930, as no elaborate system of national accounts had existed. 
Although the estimates by Ohkawa et al. (1974) are considered most definite and reliable, 
there are three other national income estimates (reported in Historical Statistics of Japan, 
Volume 3, Table 13-3, pp. 344-349).  
Yamada estimates from 1875 to 1948 are about 10 to 15% percent higher than 
Ohkawa et al. estimates before 1900, comparable during the 1900-1915 period, and about 
10 to 20% lower during the 1915-1930 period. Using Yamada estimates would have 
produced a more markedly increasing pattern of top income shares during the period 
1885 to 1930 but would not have changed the conclusion that top incomes shares were 
much higher in the pre-WWII period than in the post-WWII period. 
Hijikata estimates from 1900 to 1937 are substantially (40 to 50%) lower than 
Ohkawa et al. estimates during the 1900-1920 period and somewhat (about 20%) lower 
from 1920 to 1937. Thus Hijikata estimates would have lead to even higher top income 
shares in the 1900-1937 period and more declining pattern of top income shares over the 
1900-1937 period. 
Finally, the Cabinet Bureau of Statistics series from 1887 to 1935 report 
substantially (about 40%) higher estimates than Ohkawa et al. estimates in the 1887-1895 
period and then much (about 30%) lower estimates in the period 1900-1935. Those 
estimates are obtained directly from taxable income, however, and therefore the least 
appropriate as an independent denominator in our study. 
 
A.2.3. Consumer Price Index, 1886-2002  
 
We use a consumer price index (CPI) to deflate our nominal income series. Our CPI 
estimates for years 1886-1938 and 1946-1950 are from Ohkawa et al. (1967), Long-Term 
Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868, Vol. 8, p.135, column (1). Estimates for 1938-
1946 are obtained from taking the ratios of real National Income to nominal National 
Income from Historical Statistics of Japanese Economy, p. 7 and pasted to the Okhawa 
estimates. For the 1950-2002 period, our CPI estimates are from Japan Statistical 
Yearbook. Then the pre- and post-1950 series are spliced together. The price index (with 
base 100 in 2002) is reported in Table A0, column (9). The total real personal income 
denominator and average personal income per adult are reported in columns (7) and (8) 
in Table A0. 
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A.3. Top Income Numerator 
 
For the numerator, we estimate the income accrued to top income groups (e.g., top 
0.01%, 0.1%, 0.5%, 1% etc.), defined relative to the total adult population, as follows. 
Because the top tail of the income distribution is well approximated by a Pareto 
distribution, we estimate the Pareto coefficient for each year using the distribution tables 
in the income tax statistics. We then employ a simple parametric interpolation method, as 
in Piketty and Saez (2003), to estimate threshold income levels for the top income groups. 
We obtain the top income numerators for the respective top income groups simply by 
aggregating all incomes above the thresholds. To produce homogenous series, the 
income definition in the statistics has to be consistent across years. Below, we discuss 
major corrections we made to the original data to ensure consistency.  
 
A.3.1. Combining Self-assessed Income Statistics and Wage Income Statistics, 
1951-2002 
 
Due to the extensive and sophisticated withholding system, most individuals in Japan with 
only employment or pension income are not required to file self-assessed income tax 
returns. Typically, at the end of the year, there is an adjustment in the last amount 
withheld so that total tax withheld coincides exactly with total income tax due. As a result, 
although most income earners in Japan paid income taxes in 1951-2002, only 10-15% of 
all adults filed a self-assessed tax return each year. That is to say, a large number of 
income earners are missing from the self-assessed income tax statistics.  
Fortunately, the Japanese tax administration also publishes wage income tax 
statistics that cover most private wage earners regardless of whether they filed a self-
assessed tax return. We use these statistics to complement the self-assessed income tax 
statistics. The wage income statistics has been summarized in Annual Statistical Report 
and published in more detail in Survey on Private Wages and Salaries since 1952. The 
data include the distribution (by wage income brackets) of annual wage income (the sum 
of wages or salaries, cash benefits, and bonuses) for all employees in the private sector, 
but excludes employees in the public sector, daily-hired employees, and retirees. We 
inflate the survey distribution by a uniform 10 percent factor in order to account for the 
people not included in the wage income survey. This is equivalent to assuming that their 
income distribution is the same as that of private sector employees, which probably 
introduces a slight upward bias in our estimates. 
We then combine the self-assessed income tax statistics and the wage income 
statistics to obtain a complete income distribution. The key difficulty is that those wage 
earners (1) who have income larger than 200,000 yen from other sources, (3) whose 
employment income exceeds 20 million yen, and (3) who receive wages from two or more 
employers during the year, are required to file self-assessed tax returns. Thus, before 
combining the wage income statistics and the self-assessed statistics, we have to subtract 
wage earners filing self-assessed returns from the wage income survey. We use the 
income composition data from the self-assessed income tax statistics to do so.  
Starting in 1963, the composition tables present the number of wage earners 
(defined as taxpayers with any wage income) and the reported wage income, by income 
bracket. From those statistics, we estimate a distribution of wage income earners (by 
wage income brackets) for those self-assessed wage income earners. We obtain such a 
distribution by assuming that the ranking by total income and the ranking by wage income 
are the same. For example, in 2002, the self-assessed tax return statistics report that 
there are 40,035 tax filers in the top income bracket of incomes above 50 million yen. 
Those filers report on average 94.260 million yen. Among those 40,035 filers, 29,916  
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report some wage income, and the total wage income reported in the top bracket by those 
29,916 wage earners is 1,227 billion yen. We assume that the top bracket of the wage 
income distribution contains 29,916 wage earners reporting on average 41.021 million yen 
(1,227 billion divided by 29,916) of wage income. We repeat this procedure for each 
bracket. We then need to estimate the wage income thresholds corresponding to those 
brackets. We proceed as follows. We first estimate the wage share in each bracket as the 
ratio of the average wage income in the bracket (41.021 million yen in the example given 
above) divided by the average total income in the bracket (94.260 million yen in the 
example given above). We then estimate the wage income thresholds corresponding to 
those brackets as the threshold for total income (50 million yen in the example given) 
times the mean of the wage share in the corresponding bracket and the bracket just below 
(in the example given above, these are the brackets 50 million and above, and 20 to 50 
million yen respectively). 
The above procedure generates a distribution of wage income by brackets for 
wage earners filing the self-assessed tax returns. We then subtract out this distribution 
from the wage income distribution based on the wage income statistics. This subtraction is 
done by assuming that the two distributions are Pareto distributed bracket by bracket. The 
resulting net distribution represents all wage income earners who did not file a self-
assessed income tax return. Finally, we add the net distribution to the original self-
assessed income distribution (using the same Pareto interpolation method) to obtain the 
final wage income distribution. 
The key assumption underlying this method is that, among the self-assessed tax 
return filers with positive wage income, the ranking by total income is identical to the 
ranking by wage income. If this assumption is not met, then our method would overstate 
the number of high wage filers in the final distribution and hence create small upward bias 
in our top income share estimates. For the analysis of income inequality, it would be 
extremely valuable if the tax administration produces aggregated tables that show the 
distribution of income earners regardless of whether a self-assessed income tax return 
was filed.
32  
For years 1951-1962, the self-assessed income tax statistics did not report wage 
income or the number of wage income earners by income brackets, but only in the 
aggregate. As a result, for these years, we first estimate top income shares by adding 
wage income earners from the wage survey to the self-assessed tax statistics (without 
making the correction described above). We then correct top income share estimates for 
years 1951-1962 by the ratio of estimates for 1963 with the correction applied to estimates 
for 1963 where the correction is not applied. 
 
A.3.2. Removing Capital Gains, 1947-2002 
 
For fiscal years 1887-1946, although never explicitly stated in the income tax laws, from 
the fact that no capital gains were reported in the composition data, we conclude that 
capital gains were not subject to individual income tax during this period. Since 1947, 
realized capital gains have become taxable, but with special tax rates and special 
exemptions that changed over time (see Ishi (2001), pp.143-44). To obtain consistent 
estimates, we remove capital gains from our data for the 1947-2002 period as follows. 
We first compute the share of realized capital gains in each top income groups 
using the income composition data by brackets and simple linear interpolation (as in 
Piketty and Saez, 2003). Second, we subtract 80% of the realized capital gain component 
from our top income share estimates. For example, if the top 1% income share with 
                                                 
32  Currently, the administration does not compile such data even for internal purposes.  
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capital gains is 6%, and the share of capital gains is 50%, we estimate the top 1% income 
share as 6*(1-0.5*0.8)=3.6%. Removing 100% of the capital gain component would bias 
the income shares downwards, as the ranking of taxpayers by income excluding capital 
gains is not necessarily equal to the ranking including capital gains. This issue also arises 
in the U.S. study by Piketty and Saez (2003) and the Canadian study by Saez and Veall 
(2005). Using micro-data where it is possible to estimate income shares with and without 
capital gains, Saez and Veall (2005) conclude that the 80% rule generates fairly accurate 
estimates.  
Although we do not know if the 80% rule applies also to the case of Japan, the 
following observation provides some assurance. If the correction factor is too large (such 
as excluding 100% of realized gains), then when capital gains surge, the series excluding 
capital gains should dip. If the correction factor is too small, then when capital gains 
surge, the series excluding capital gains should rise. In Figure A1, we present the top 
0.1% income share series with and without realized capital gains for the post-1947 period. 
It shows that the series without capital gains are fairly stable during the two periods of 
asset appreciation, first in the early 1970s and then in the late 1980s. This suggests that 
the 80% rule for correcting capital gains is fairly adequate. To further improve our 
methodology, it would be necessary to have an access to individual micro-data in Japan. 
According to Figure A1, the realized capital gains in fact had a large impact on the 
top 0.1% income share during the two episodes of asset appreciation. It should be noted 
that only part of realized capital gains were taxable and thus included in the income tax 
statistics.
33 Due to the complex and time varying exemption rules for capital gains, it is 
difficult to correct for unreported capital gains with the available data. As a result, the 
series including full capital gains (as opposed to taxable capital gains) would display even 
larger spikes in the early 1970s and late 1980s. Nevertheless, the figure indicates that the 
impact of capital gains on the top shares tends to be short-lived, as capital gains in 
general are realized in a lumpy manner and do not constitute a source of steady annual 
income. We thus believe that the inclusion of capital gains would not change the long-run 
trends in the top income shares series. Furthermore, although we suspect that realized 
capital gains from land and stocks are much higher in the postwar period than in the 
prewar period, it must be noted that the distributions of land and stocks were probably 
much more equal after WWII than before. Thus the inclusion of capital gains would not 
change our main finding that income concentration fell drastically from the prewar period 
to the postwar period. 
 
A.3.3. Erosion of Comprehensive Income Tax Base, 1950-2002 
 
Soon after the introduction of the unified comprehensive income tax system in 1947-1950, 
the Japanese government began to give special tax measures to various components of 
income (see Ishi (2001), Chapter 8; Iwamoto et al. (1995)). As a result, the erosion of 
comprehensive income tax base poses a potentially serious problem for us when using 
the income tax statistics. 
These special measures are: (1) a full exemption of certain income from taxation, 
(2) an option for taxpayer to choose separate taxation at a flat rate for certain income 
(instead of a progressive tax rate applied to aggregate income), and (3) separate taxation 
for certain income with its tax entirely withheld at source. If one exercised an option to 
choose a separate taxation for certain income (sentaku bunri kazei), then it is reported in 
                                                 
33 Capital gains (joto shotoku) reported in the self-assessed income tax statistics are the taxable amount after 
exemptions and deductions as opposed to the full value (the information based on phone conversation with a 
Japan Tax Administration officer on May 5, 2006).  
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the self-assessed income tax statistics. By contrast, any income exempted from tax 
(hikazei) or for which tax is 100% withheld at source (gensen bunri kazei) does not appear 
in the statistics.  
According to the estimates by Iwamoto et al. (1995), before the 1988 reform, 70-
80% of total interest income was tax exempted under the tax privilege given to small-sized 
personal savings, 20% was taxed separately and withheld at source, and only 0.3% was 
subject to progressive comprehensive income tax. After the 1988 reform, only 20% of total 
interest income was tax exempted, but almost 80% was taxed separately and withheld at 
source, leaving less than 0.1% under the comprehensive tax. For dividend income, about 
70% was taxed separately and withheld at source, and 30% was subject to 
comprehensive taxation throughout 1980-2002. 
  Consequently, virtually all interest income and about 70% of dividend income are 
missing from the income tax statistics in recent decades. Ishi (1979, 2001) has attempted 
to compute a comprehensive income base in order to assess the effect of tax erosion on 
taxes collected, using unpublished data obtained from the fiscal administration. In our 
paper, we do not try to incorporate missing interest and dividend income directly in our 
estimates but rather assess the sensitivity of our estimates to those missing components 
using a wealth survey as described in Section D. 
  
A.3.4. Imputing Missing Capital Income, 1898-1938 
 
During fiscal years 1887-1898, the income tax base was comprehensive, fully including 
dividends, interest, and bonuses. During fiscal years 1899-1920, dividend, bonuses, and 
part of interest income were excluded from Class III income and hence disappeared from 
the statistics. From August of 1920 to 1936, 60% of dividends and bonuses were included 
in Class II income, 80% from 1937 to 1939, and 100% after 1940. Interest income was 
fully included again starting only in fiscal year 1940. These changes potentially create 
discontinuities in our data, especially for top income groups to which capital income 
constituted a large share. 
  First, for fiscal years 1921-1939, we can recover missing dividends and bonuses 
from total reported dividends and bonuses in the Class III income tax statistics, because 
we know that a fixed percentage of dividends and bonuses are taxed (60% in 1921-1936 
and 80% in 1937-1939). For fiscal years 1899-1920, no dividends or bonuses are 
reported, and therefore we have to rely on an alternative source to estimate dividends and 
bonuses. From fiscal years 1899-1939, corporate income was taxed separately as Class I 
income tax (we assume that for corporate income, fiscal year t corresponds to actual year 
t-1). For 1921-1939, we can thus estimate corporate profits, using Class I income tax 
statistics, and total dividends and bonuses paid out to individuals, using Class III income 
tax statistics. During 1921-1935, about 50% of corporate profits were paid out as 
dividends and about 20% of corporate profits were paid out as bonuses. For 1936-1938, 
corporate profits were very high (around 12-15% of the total personal income 
denominator), but dividends did not exceed 5% of the total personal income. Therefore, 
we assume that 50% of corporate profits were paid out as dividends in 1899-1920, up to 
5% of total personal income (the 5% rule was binding during the high profit years 1915-
1918). We also assume that 20% of corporate profits were paid out as bonuses in 1899-
1920, up to 2% of total personal income. 
Second, we assume that 75% of those missing dividends and bonuses go to the 
top 1% income earners, 68% to the top 0.5%, 52% to the top 0.1%, 43% to the top 0.05%, 
and 27% to the top 0.01%. Those percentages are based on the relative composition of 
dividend income in top groups in the United States in 1916 in the analysis of Piketty and 
Saez (2003). We reluctantly use this assumption in the absence of the equivalent income  
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composition data for Japan before 1947. Figure A2 presents top 0.1% income share 
series before and after the corrections for actual years 1898-1938. As the figure shows, 
our method smoothes most of the discontinuities in the raw data due to the capital income 
exclusions and seems therefore acceptable. 
We have not made any correction for exempted interest income for fiscal years 
1899-1939. From 1899 to 1919, only a small fraction of interest income (interest income 
from public bonds only) was excluded from Class III income tax. It was taxed separately at 
source (regardless of one’s income level) as Class II income, and represented less than 
1% of the total personal income denominator. Starting in August of 1920, in addition to 
public bond interest, interest from bank deposits was also excluded from Class III income 
and moved to Class II income. As a result, the ratio of Class II income to the total personal 
income denominator jumped from less than 1% to about 5% in 1921. The total interest 
income reported in Class III income tax statistics, however, show no break, implying that 
the top income earners did not have much bank deposit interest. Therefore, we assume 
that no correction is necessary for these interest income exclusions. In addition, for fiscal 
years 1913-1939, for income less than certain amounts, 10 to 20% of employment income 
was tax exempted and excluded from the Class III income statistics. Again, we do not 
correct for this exemption, as it was not a significant amount for top income earners. 
 
A.4. Top Income Composition, 1886-2002 
 
The composition of reported income by income source is published in the income tax 
statistics at the aggregate level for fiscal years 1887, 1901-1946, and 1951-1962, and by 
income brackets for fiscal years 1947-1950 and 1963-2002. Using these data, we 
estimate the composition of the income accrued to the top 1% income group. Although a 
finer decomposition can be done, we use five income categories: (1) employment income 
(wages, salaries, bonuses, and pensions), (2) business income (unincorporated business 
profits, farm income, and self-employment income), (3) rental income (rents from 
farmland, residential land, residential buildings, and business buildings), (4) interest 
income, and (5) dividends. Table A2 reports the fraction of the people filing income tax 
returns and the composition of the top 1% income. 
For fiscal years 1887-1946, aggregate composition data are available in 1887 and 
1901-1946 (thus there is no estimate for actual years 1887-1899 and 1946). The 
categories of income composition changed over the years. For fiscal years 1887 and 
1901-1939, the income from “farmland (tahata)” includes both farm income from selling 
crops from the land (labelled “owner cultivator (jisaku)”) and rental income from leasing 
the land to tenants (labelled “tenant (kosaku)”).
34 For 1917-1939, the breakdown of the 
farmland income is reported in the statistics. For 1887 and 1901-1916, because no such 
breakdown is given, we estimate the amount of rental income included in the farmland 
income, using the ratio of rental income to the farmland income in 1917 (the first year for 
which the breakdown is available). For fiscal years 1901-1939, we use the imputed value 
of dividends and bonuses (see Section A.3.4) in computing the income composition. 
As the composition data by income brackets are not available before 1947, our 
estimate for the top 1% income composition in 1886-1945 is simply the composition of the 
total income reported in the income tax statistics. Because the fraction of population filing 
income tax returns fluctuated from year to year depending on exemption points and the 
conditions of the economy, our top income composition series are not consistent over 
these years. In particular, between 1906 and 1925, relatively high fractions of adults (2.5% 
to 4.6%) filed income tax returns. If we assume that the share of capital income increases 
                                                 
34 These definitions are explicitly stated for the first time in Annual Statistical Report (1938), p.36, note 3-a.  
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with income, our estimates for these years likely understate the share of capital income in 
the top 1% income compared to other years. 
For fiscal years 1947-1950 and 1963-2002, the composition of the top 1% income 
is estimated from composition data by income brackets, using a linear Interpolation 
method as in Piketty and Saez (2003). (We provide no estimates for 1951-1962. For 
1963-2002, we provide estimates only twice a decade.) Realized capital gains are 
removed as described in Section A3.2. It is important to note that, as explained in Section 
A3.3, almost all interest income after 1947 and large part of dividends after 1965 are 
taxed separately at source and thus missing from the income composition. In addition, the 
introduction of the withholding system for wage earners in 1949 likely reduced the degree 
of tax evasion in wage income, contributing to a sudden increase in the share of 
employment income in 1947-1950.  In order to assess these issues, we compare the 
composition of the top income based on the tax statistics with the composition of the total 
personal income based on National Accounts. 
In Figure A3, Panel A shows the composition of the top 1% income, and Panel B 
shows the composition of the total personal income denominator estimated from National 
Accounts (see Section A.2.1), from 1930 to 2002. It is important to keep in mind that (1) 
imputed rents are excluded from the total personal income because they are not included 
in the income tax statistics; but (2) returns on insurance funds (which are not taxable and 
not included in income tax statistics) are included and distributed among the dividend and 
interest incomes in the total personal income. As mentioned in A.2.1, We cannot separate 
the returns from insurance funds from dividends and interest except for recent years with 
the SNA98 series. The SNA98 data show that over half of dividends are actually earned 
through insurance funds. As a result, the total personal income estimated from National 
Accounts would show a larger fraction of capital income than the total income in income 
tax returns had everybody been required to file a tax return. 
Comparing Panels A and B is nevertheless instructive. In 1930, the top 1% income 
group received a far larger share of their income as dividends (33%) than the national 
average (3%), but they received smaller shares of income as interest income (2%) and 
employment income (30%) than the national averages (15% and 45%, respectively). Note 
that, as in the top 1% income, the capital income component in total personal income 
declined sharply during 1937-1947 from 20% to less than 1%. The dividend component in 
the total personal income had recovered to its pre-WWII share by 1980, but the shares of 
interest and rental income components have remained relatively low. Finally, the 
employment income component in total personal income fell sharply in 1944-1946 and 
then increased substantially from 1947 to 2002 at the expense of the business income 
component. But its rise during 1948-1950 was much smaller than that in the top 1% 
income share, indicating that the sudden increase in the latter is likely due to the 
introduction of the withholding system.  
 
A.5. Marginal Tax Rates, 1886-2002 
 
We estimate marginal tax rates faced by the average taxpayers in top income groups 
reported in Table A3 as follows. First, we estimate marginal tax rates (MTRs) at the 
income thresholds for the top 0.1% and 0.01% groups, respectively (denoted as MTR at 
P99.9 and P99.99 and reported in columns (2) and (3)). For each group, we have already 
estimated the threshold income level (see Section A.3). We assume that the taxpayer at 
each threshold income is married with two dependents (e.g., a married couple with two 
children under 18). To obtain net taxable income, we subtract the married exemption and 
two dependent exemptions from the threshold income. We further subtract the average 
amount of standard deductions (for earned income, medical expense, insurance  
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premiums and so on) at the corresponding top income group. We then use a standard tax 
schedule (that presents increasing marginal tax rates by income brackets) to obtain tax 
liability, from which MTR for a given taxable income level can be easily inferred. Top MTR 
(presented in column (4) in Table A3) is simply the highest possible marginal tax rate 
according to the tax schedule. The marginal tax rates do not include local income taxes 
(prefectural and municipal) and social insurance contributions 
Second, we estimate the income-weighted marginal tax rates for the top 0.1% and 
0.01% groups, respectively (reported in columns (5) and (6) in Table A3) as follows. The 
top 0.01% MTR is computed as: MTR Top 0.01% = (MTR at P99.99+Top MTR)/2, where 
we use a simple average as an approximation of the MTR for this group. The top 0.1% 
MTR is then computed as: {Income Share of P99.9-99.99 * (MTR at P99.9+MTR at 
P99.99)/2 + Income Share of P99.99-100 * MTR Top 0.01%} / (Income Share of P99.9-
100). This amounts to estimating the Top 0.1% MTR as the average (weighted by income) 
of the MTRs for top 0.01% group and the bottom 99% of the top 1% group (denoted as 
P99.9-99.99) where the MTR for P99.9-99.99 is estimated as (MTR at P99.9+MTR at 
P99.99)/2. 
 
B. Top Estates 
 
B.1. Definition of Estate 
 
We compile top estate series, using estate tax return statistics published in Annual 
Statistical Report (Zeimu Tokei Nenposho) from 1905 to 2002. Except for 1943, the 
statistics include a distribution table with the number of decedents who paid estate tax, the 
amount of estate, and the amount of tax, by estate brackets. The aggregate estate 
composition is also available starting in 1926, except for years 1942-43, but not by estate 
brackets.  
In the tax statistics, estates are defined as the sum of all properties (real estate, 
houses, household properties, unincorporated business assets, farm assets, stocks, 
bonds, cash, deposits, tenant rights, intellectual property rights, pension rights, etc.) net of 
all debts and liabilities. As virtually all components of transferable wealth are included in 
the definition of estates for tax purposes, the statistics provide an accurate estimate of the 
value of net worth held by decedents.  
Below, we refer to the year of the annual report (the year when estate tax returns 
were processed) as “fiscal year” which may be different from “actual year” in which the 
estate subject to taxation was transferred from an ancestor to heirs due to the ancestor’s 
death. We first summarize the evolution of estate tax laws in Japan, based on the tax 
codes reprinted at the end of the annual reports in 1931 and 1950 as well as Ishi (2001), 
Chapter 12, which summarizes post-WWII developments. 
 
B.1.1. Estate Tax Laws, 1905-2002 
 
The first estate tax law in Japan was promulgated in January 1905 and enforced in April 
1905. During our sample period, there were three major reforms in estate tax laws in 
1947, 1950, and 1958, and many minor revisions. 
For fiscal years 1905-1946, the Japanese estate tax law was based on a “family 
system (ie seido)” defined by the old Civil Code. To maintain the family system, the law 
distinguished the inheritance of family estate (katoku sozoku), which we refer to as “family 
inheritance,” from ordinary inheritance (isan sozoku). Under family inheritance, a single 
heir succeeded entire family estate as a new familyhead (koshu) after the death or 
retirement (at age sixty or older) of the former familyhead. Commonly it was the first son  
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who became a new family head, while if there was no son, a family head named a legal 
heir. By contrast, under ordinary inheritance, estate was transferred to heirs when a non-
family head died or decided to give his or her estate to their heirs while alive. The estate 
was divided equally among children. If there were no children, then it went to a spouse. If 
there were no surviving children or spouse, then lineal ascendants inherited the estate.  
The 1905 law set the exemption point of 1,000 yen for family inheritance and 500 
yen for ordinary inheritance with progressive but extremely low marginal tax rates (i.e., 
0.05%-1.3% for family inheritance and 0.1%-1.8% for ordinary inheritance) defined over 
20 estate brackets. Gifts given to heirs within one year prior to the inheritance were 
aggregated to estates for tax purposes. Military personnel who died in war were exempted 
from estate tax. In 1926, the exemption point for family inheritance was increased to 5,000 
yen and for ordinary inheritance to 1,000 yen.  
Under the 1905 law, the inheritance tax statistics in fiscal years 1905-1947 report 
the two forms of inheritance in separate tabulations. In estimating top estates, we 
aggregate the distributions of family inheritance and ordinary inheritance. The former is by 
far the dominant form of inheritance at the top of the estate distribution because non-
family heads rarely owned large assets. We consider all forms of inheritance (not only 
those from deaths), because family inheritance due to retirement should be considered as 
an inter-generational transfer of wealth, and excluding it would lead us to underestimate 
the number of estates. We also include all ordinary inheritance cases, although excluding 
the cases not due to death would not change our series by much. 
The 1905 law was superseded by the 1937 temporary tax increase law and the 
1938 revised temporary tax increase law, both of which imposed additional tax on estates 
to increase wartime revenue. The 1940 estate tax law established highly progressive tax 
rates, while keeping the preferential treatment for family inheritance. As of 1946, the 
exemption point was 20,000 yen for family inheritance with marginal tax rates of 1.5%-
55% defined over 19 brackets. For ordinary inheritance, the exemption point was set 
lower (5,000 yen) and the tax rates higher (5.5%-70%).
35 
As part of the postwar democratization, the 1947 estate tax law abolished the 
distinction between family and ordinary inheritance and established a modern system of 
separate estate and gift taxes. It set the exemption point of 20,000 yen for estate tax with 
low marginal tax rates of 1.0-6.0%.
36  The estate tax statistics continue to present 
tabulations by the size of estate under the 1947 law.  
Under the 1950 estate tax law, following the recommendations by the Shoup 
Commission, Japan adopted inheritance tax based on cumulative amount of inheritance 
and gifts received by an heir (also known as “accession tax”). As a result, for fiscal years 
1950-1957, distribution tables are based on the size of inheritances as opposed to 
estates. To provide homogenous series, we convert inheritance statistics to estate 
statistics (see B.1.3). The 1950 law also changed fiscal year from accounting year 
(starting in April) to calendar year (starting in January). It set the exemption point of 
200,000 yen and highly progressive tax rates of 25%-90% defined over 11 brackets.
37 
Finally, with the 1958 reform, Japan adopted a hybrid system of estate tax and 
inheritance tax. It initially set the very high exemption point of 1.8 million yen, resulting in 
the much smaller number of people filing estate tax returns. The statistics for fiscal years 
1958-2002 are presented by the size of estates and hence are directly comparable to the 
statistics for 1905-1949.  
 
                                                 
35 Annual Statistical Report (1950), p.280. 
36 Annual Statistical Report (1950), p.279. 
37 Annual Statistical Report (1950), p.278.  
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B.1.2. Correspondence between Fiscal Years and Actual Years 
 
Estate tax statistics reported in fiscal year t are the estate tax returns processed in year t, 
and do not necessarily coincide with the returns filed for the deaths that took place in year 
t. In fact, due to delays in both filing and processing, before WWII, majority of the tax 
returns filed for the deaths in year t were likely processed in year t+1, and some in even 
later years.
38 Thus, strictly speaking, the statistics in fiscal year t correspond to a weighted 
sum of the estate distributions in actual years t, t-1, t-2 etc.
39 Because the statistics in 
1905-1949 do not break down processed returns by the year of death but instead pool 
them in one distribution table, it is difficult to reconstruct the estate distribution 
corresponding to an actual year.  
By contrast, starting in 1950, the distribution table in fiscal year t covers only the 
deaths taking place in the same year t, and separate aggregate statistics are reported for 
the tax returns processed in year t but filed in previous years. Furthermore, when there is 
a revision in estate tax laws in 1937, 1938, 1940, and 1947, annual reports in subsequent 
years publish separate estate distribution tables according to which version of law applies. 
For example, the 1937 statistics have two distribution tables, one for the “1905 law” 
estates (which reports the returns filed before 1937 but processed in 1937) and the other 
for the “1937 law” estates (which reports the returns filed and processed in 1937). In this 
case, we know for sure that the “1937 law” estates include only the deaths in 1937, while 
the “1905 law” estates consist primarily of the deaths in 1936 and 1935.  
In the world of constant price, using the statistics in year t to estimate top estates 
in year t would result in smoother time series, as it amounts to taking a moving average 
over several years. During a period of high inflation, however, by placing a higher weight 
on current year than actually is, it would lead to a large upward bias in our estimates. 
Therefore, it is important to reconstruct an estate distribution for a given actual year as 
much as possible, exploiting the information based on legal changes. We determine the 
correspondence between actual and fiscal years as follows. 
For actual years 1905-1935, in the absence of better information, we assume that 
estate tax returns reported in fiscal year t+1 correspond to the deaths in year t (which is a 
median year among t-1, t, t+1). We thus ignore the small number of returns reported in 
fiscal year 1905 and use only the 1906 statistics to estimate the 1905 distribution. 
For actual year 1936, we add the distribution tables of the “1905 law” estates 
reported in fiscal years 1937-1939. For actual year 1937, we add the “1937 law” estates 
reported in fiscal years 1937-1940. For actual year 1938, we add the “1938 law” estates 
reported in fiscal year 1938 and 60% of the “1938 law” estates reported in fiscal year 
1939. For actual year 1939, we add 40% of the  “1938 law” estates reported in fiscal year 
1939 and the “1938 law” estates reported in fiscal year 1940. The fractions 60% and 40% 
are chosen so that the total numbers of estates in 1938 and 1939 are approximately 
equal. Note that 1937 is the only year for which we can recover all and only deaths in 
1937. Thus our 1937 estimate is most precise among all. By contrast, our respective 
estimates for 1938 and 1939 are imprecise, but the average of the 1948 and 1949 
estimates should be fairly accurate. 
For actual years 1940-1945, we assume that the “1940 law” estates reported in 
fiscal year t+1 correspond the deaths in year t-1. We thus ignore very small number of the 
                                                 
38 This statement is based on tables in the annual reports in 1905-1936 that provides the number of returns 
pending from previous fiscal years.  
39 As the law stipulates that estate tax is based on the value of estate at the time of deaths, we assume that 
the statistics sum up nominal estates across years without correcting for inflation. Late returns are subject to 
penalty or adjustment, which is imposed in addition to estate tax.  
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“1940 law” estates reported in 1940 in estimating the 1940 distribution. The distribution 
table is not available in fiscal year 1943, so we have no estimate for 1942. 
For 1946, we add the “1940 law” estates reported in 1947-1949. This may result in 
an overestimate, because we pool the statistics from three annual reports that include 
virtually all the 1946 deaths as well as some deaths in 1944 and 1945. Given the 
hyperinflation in 1944-46, however, the effect of the extra returns from 1944 and 1945 on 
our 1946 estimate should be small. 
For actual years 1947-1949, we assume that “1947 law” estates reported in 1947-
1948 correspond to the deaths in 1947, that 70% of the “1947 law” estates reported in 
1949 correspond to the deaths in 1948, and that 30% of the “1947 law” estates reported in 
1949 and all the “1947 law” estates reported in 1950 and 1951 correspond to the deaths 
in 1949. We then inflate the numbers for 1949 by a factor 12/9 to adjust for the fact that 
the “1947 law” applied to only 9 months during fiscal year 1949 (from April to December 
1949) as the new law took effect in January 1950 and thereafter followed the calendar-
year schedule. The 70%-30% split of the 1949 statistics between 1948 and 1949 is 
chosen so that the total numbers of estates in 1948 and 1949 are roughly equal. Although 
our respective estimates for 1948 and 1949 are imprecise, their average is fairly accurate.  
For actual years 1950-1957, the statistics in year t report the estates for deaths in 
year t that are processed by March of year t+1. As a result, approximately 80% of the 
deaths in year t are included in the statistics in year t. The remaining portion is reported, 
only at the aggregate level and not by brackets, in the statistics in the subsequent fiscal 
years. We assume that the distribution of estates reported in later fiscal years is the same 
as the distribution reported in fiscal year t , and we inflate the distribution in year t 
accordingly. 
For fiscal years 1958-2002, with the introduction of the new hybrid system, the 
statistics in year t report the deaths in year t processed by June of year t+1. Because the 
number of deaths in year t reported in later years becomes small (less than 10%), we 
make no corrections. 
 
B.1.3. Correcting for Deductions, 1905-1952 
 
For fiscal years 1905-1952, distribution tables are presented by the “taxable value” of 
estate (or inheritance for 1950-1952), namely the size of estate (or inheritance) net of 
debts and after deductions. By contrast, for fiscal years 1953-2002, tables are presented 
by the size of estate (or inheritance) net of debt and before deductions. For fiscal years 
1953-57, both the amounts of inheritance before and after deductions are reported. To 
obtain the true value of estates, we need to add back deductions for fiscal years 1905-
1952. Below, we describe deductions and our methods of correction. 
For fiscal years 1905-1914, there was no major deduction (only for funeral 
expenses), and we make no corrections. For fiscal years 1915-1925, the deduction for 
family inheritance, called “Section 3-2 deduction,” was introduced. It allowed 1,000 yen 
deduction for estates below 3,000 yen and 500 yen deduction for estates below 5,000 
yen. The statistics in these years are presented by the size of estate after the deduction. 
Therefore, we add back the Section 3-2 deduction for family inheritance, using the 
aggregate amount of Section 3-2 deductions. We then add together the distributions of 
family and ordinary inheritances using a standard Pareto interpolation method. 
The 1940 law introduced 1,000 yen deduction per dependent family member. In 1942, the 
amount of dependent deduction was increased. For fiscal years 1940-1946, the statistics 
report only the aggregate amount of dependent deductions. We compute the average 
deduction per estate from the aggregate data and add it back to the original tabulations.   
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The 1947 law abolished dependent family deductions and introduced a basic 
deduction of 50,000 yen per estate for estate tax purposes as well as per gift for gift tax 
purposes. We add back 50,000 yen per estate and gift to the original tabulations. 
The 1950 law introduced four types of deductions: basic deduction (150,000 yen 
per heir), small amount deduction (30,000 yen per heir for inheritance smaller than certain 
size), spouse deduction (50% deduction from the amount inherited), and minor deduction 
(small deduction for minors younger than 18 year old). The basic deduction was increased 
to 300,000 yen in 1952. We add back deductions of 180,000 yen per heir for years 1950 
and 1951 and 330,000 yen per heir for 1952, which are the sum of the basic deduction 
and the small amount deduction for the respective years. We do not correct for the spouse 
and minor deductions because they are relatively small relative to the two other 
deductions according to the aggregate statistics. 
For fiscal years 1953-2002, we make no corrections as tabulations are presented 
in estates net of debts before deductions. 
 
B.1.4. Converting Inheritance Statistics to Estate Statistics, 1950-1957 
 
For all fiscal years except 1950-1957, the unit of observation in the tax statistics is “estate” 
defined as the properties owned by the decedent. For fiscal years 1950-1957, the unit of 
observation switches to “inheritance” defined as the properties received by an heir. As a 
result, tax statistics in 1950-57 report the number of heirs and the amount of inheritances 
ranked by brackets of inherited wealth. As the estate of a decedent is typically divided 
among multiple heirs, the inheritance statistics are not directly comparable to the estate 
statistics. In this study, we estimate series based on the estate unit.  
To convert inheritance distributions to estate distributions, we simply assume that 
each decedent has 2.5 heirs and that estates are divided equally among heirs. The 
number, 2.5, is taken from the average ratio of estate to inheritance in the 1958 statistics 
which simultaneously report the number of estates (decedents) and the number of 
inheritances (heirs) for the first time. From the inheritance statistics, we estimate estate 
distributions by multiplying the brackets by 2.5 (for example, the bracket 200,000 to 
500,000 yen becomes the bracket 500,000 to 1,250,000 yen), and by dividing by 2.5 the 
number of inheritances in each bracket to obtain the number of estates. 
  Note that our estimates for 1950-1957 are based on strong assumptions and have 
a larger margin of errors than in other years. Nevertheless, these estimates provide 
important evidence for the years immediately after the WWII. 
 
B.2. Construction of Top Estate Series, 1905-2002 
 
We define top groups (e.g., top 1%, top 0.1%) relative to the total number of adult 
decedents in each year. The series of adult decedents in Japan is taken from the number 
of deaths by age groups published in Japan Statistical Yearbook for years 1985-2002 and 
in  Historical Statistics of Japan, pp.218-219, for years 1905-1985. These series are 
reported in column (1) in Table B1. The number of estate tax returns (after the 
adjustments described in Section B.1.2) is reported on column (2). As column (3) 
indicates, the fraction of adult decedents filing the estate tax returns varies across years 
depending on exemption points and economic conditions, ranging from the high of 31% in 
1942 to the low of 1% in 1958. 
We estimate the average size of estate for various upper groups of the estate 
distribution, using a standard Pareto interpolation method. We convert the nominal value 
of estates to the real value, expressed in 2002 yen, using the CPI deflator (see Section 
A.2.3). Table B1 displays our estimates of top estates series from 1905 to 2002. Unlike  
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our top income shares, we do not attempt to estimate the shares of estates left by top 
decedents, because there is no simple way to compute the total amount of estates left by 
all decedents in each year, including those who did not file estate tax returns.  
 
B.3. Estate Composition, 1925-2002 
 
Estate composition data are available only at the aggregate level for fiscal years 1926-
2002, except for years 1942-43. Because composition data by brackets are not reported, 
it is not possible to create homogenous top estate composition series. In Table B2 and 
Figure B1, we present the decomposition of aggregate estates into eight categories: (1) 
agricultural land (i.e., farm land, forest land, and tenant right), (2) residential land (i.e., 
housing land and leasehold), (3) houses and structures, (4) business assets of (i.e., 
machinery, goods, raw materials, intellectual property rights, account receivable, 
agricultural equipment, and farm products), (5) stocks (for both privately-held and publicly-
traded companies), (6) fixed claim assets (i.e., public and corporate bonds, cash, 
deposits, savings accounts, and other claims), (7) other assets (which includes household 
properties, life insurance, pensions, and standing timber), and (8) debts (i.e., private debts 
and public obligation). Note that the sum of the first seven categories may exceed 100% 
in Figure B1, as we define estates net of debts to be 100%. The composition estimates 
are based directly on the aggregate estates composition published in the annual reports. 
For simplicity, we assume that fiscal year t corresponds to actual year t-1 for fiscal years 
1926-1946 and to actual year t for fiscal years 1947-2002 (because composition data are 
reported only for the returns filed under the new law after 1947). In other words, we do not 
use the complex specification of years we used for top estate series described in Section 
B.1.2.  
Column (1) in Table B2 reports the fraction of adult decedents filing estate tax 
returns (these numbers are different from those column (1) in Table B1 due to the 
different specification of years). Because the estate composition is sensitive to the fraction 
filing returns, and the fraction fluctuates substantially from year to year, it is difficult to see 
trends in estate composition from these series. For example, the fraction drops from 
26.1% in 1957 to 0.9% in 1958 (due to the high exemption level under the 1958 law), 
which likely caused a sharp fall in the share of agricultural land, on one hand, and a large 
increase in the share of stocks. 
To facilitate better comparison, Table 3 presents top estate compositions for 
selected years, 1935, 1950, and 1987, for which the fractions of adult decedents filing 
returns are comparable at around 9% (9.0% in 1935, 8.8% in 1950, and 8.0% in 1987). 
Estates before subtracting debts are defined to be 100%. It shows that the largest 
component of top estates in Japan shifted from financial assets (stocks and fixed claim 
assets) in 1935 to movable property (business assets, houses and structures, and 
household properties) in 1950, to real estate (agricultural and residential land) in 1987. 
Thus the top estate composition data provide additional support for our finding based on 
the top income shares series that, top capital income collapsed during WWII and has not 
returned to the pre-WWII level to date, despite the high economic growth in the post-WWII 
period. 
 
C. Top Wage Income Shares  
 
In estimating top wage income shares, we use two different sets of statistics for the pre- 
and post-1950 period, as discussed below. As a result, note that our estimates for 1929-
1944 are less precise than and not fully homogenous with the 1951-2002 estimates. 
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C.1. Top Wage Income Shares, 1951-2002 
 
The National Tax Administration has annually published the statistics on wages and 
salaries in the Survey on Private Wages and Salaries (Minkan Kyuyo no Jittai) since 
1951.
40 The survey covers all employees (except for daily-paid employees) in the private 
sector but excludes government employees and retirees. Because the survey is based on 
the data filed by employers who are legally responsible for withholding tax at source for 
their employees, it provides accurate and detailed information on wages and salaries, 
often by firm size, industry, tenure, and sex. The statistics include a distribution table that 
reports the number of wage earners and the amount of annual wage income by wage 
income brackets, which we use to estimate top wage income shares.  
Our definition of wage income includes wages, salaries, overtime pay, bonuses, 
and various allowances, but excludes non-cash compensation (such as company housing, 
expense account, stock options) and retirement benefits. It is before subtracting 
employee’s social security contributions and before including employer’s social security 
contributions.
41   Thanks to of the sophisticated withholding system with end-of-year 
adjustments, the tax statistics in fiscal year t report wages and salaries earned in the 
same year t. Therefore, fiscal year and actual year coincide for the wage income tax 
statistics in 1951-2002. 
We again use a standard Pareto Interpolation method to estimate top wage 
income shares. We define top groups (top 5% and 1%) relative to the total number of 
regular employees, which excludes temporary workers as well as daily employees, in the 
private sector in Japan. The series for regular employees for 1951-2002 are obtained from 
Historical statistics of Japan, Table 19-7,
42 and are reported in column (2) in Tables C1. 
The number of employees in the wage income survey is reported in column (3). As shown 
in column (4), from 1951 to 2002, the coverage of the survey has rose from 55% to 97% 
of regular employees in the private sector. 
To obtain top wage income shares, we divide the amounts of wages and salaries 
accruing to top wage income groups by 90% of total wages and salaries from National 
Accounts. The denominator is reported in column (7) in Tables C1, under the label, “total 
wage income.” To be consistent with our definition of wage income, total wages and 
salaries from National Accounts include employees’ social security contributions and 
exclude employers’ social security contributions. In recent years, where the coverage of 
the survey is almost complete for regular employees in the private sector, total wage 
reported in the survey are approximately 90% of wages and salaries from National 
Accounts. Thus, we use the factor 90% to correct for the exclusion of daily employees and 
government employees in the wage income survey. We present all values in real 2002 
yen, using CPI. Our estimates for top 1% and 5% wage income shares for 1951-2002 are 
reported in Table C2 and Figures 10 and 11. 
 
C.2. Top Wage Income Shares, 1929-1944 
 
For fiscal years 1930-1945, the annual reports publish the data on salaries and bonuses 
as part of the composition tables in income tax statistics. The data include the numbers of 
taxpayers who received salaries and bonuses, respectively, and the amounts of salaries 
                                                 
40 The first survey was conducted in 1949, but its sample differs from the subsequent surveys and its results 
were never published (National Tax Administration (1980), Minkan Kyuuyo Jittai Chosa Sanjunen no Ayumi). 
We cannot locate the original 1950 and 1951 surveys. The data for 1951 are found in Takahashi (1959). 
41 The information is based on phone conversation with a Japan Tax Administration officer on May 5, 2006). 
42 Available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/19.htm.  
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and bonuses they earned. The income tax statistics in fiscal years 1920-1929 also report 
the amounts of salaries and bonuses but not the numbers of salary and bonus earners. 
We thus cannot use the data before 1929 to estimate top wage income shares. We 
assume that fiscal years 1930-1945 correspond to actual years 1929-1944 for the reasons 
described in Section A.1.2. 
For the denominator, we take the total salaries (excluding employers’ social 
security contributions) from the old SNA for 1930-1944. For 1929, we extrapolate total 
salaries assuming that the fraction of salaries in total personal income is the same as in 
1930.  
We define top groups relative to the total number of regular employees. Although 
the tax statistics during this period do not exclude temporary workers, we use regular 
employees to be consistent with the 1951-2002 estimates. Moreover, naturally, most if not 
all top wage earners are regular employees. The total number of regular employees in 
Japan is estimated as follows. The total number of employees is reported in Historical 
Statistics of Japan, Volume 1, Table 3-6, for years 1930, 1940, and 1947. For 1930, 
employees and family workers are not reported separately, thus we assume that the 
fraction of family workers to total employees in 1930 is the same as in 1940. We then 
estimate the total number of employees for years between 1930, 1940, and 1947, simply 
by linear interpolation. Finally, we estimate the number of regular employees for 1929-
1944, using the fraction of regular employees to total employees in 1953, the first year in 
which such information is available. These assumptions are restrictive, but our estimates 
are not very sensitive to these assumptions.  
  We make the following adjustments to the salaries and bonuses reported in the 
income tax statistics to recover the full value. For fiscal years 1930-1939, the earned 
income credit allowed taxpayers to deduct 20% of wage income for those with total 
income under 6,000 yen and 10% for those with total income between 6,000 and 12,000 
yen. We therefore assume that the average deduction was 15% and inflate the reported 
amount of salaries by a factor 1/0.85. For fiscal years 1940-1945, the earned income 
credit is 10% of wage income for those with total income below 10,000 yen. We assume 
that the average deduction is 8% and inflate the reported salaries by a factor 1/0.92. 
Because, for fiscal years 1930-1936, only 60% of bonuses are taxable and reported in the 
statistics, we inflate bonuses by a factor 1/0.6. Similarly, for fiscal years 1937-1939, as 
only 80% of bonuses are reported in the statistics, we inflate bonuses by a factor 1/0.8. 
For fiscal years 1940-1945, as 100% of bonuses are reported, we make no adjustment.  
The number of bonus earners in the income tax statistics is always smaller than 
the number of salary earners. We assume that all bonus earners also have some wage 
income, so that we can attribute all bonuses to all the taxpayers reporting positive 
salaries. Furthermore, we assume that those reporting salaries and bonuses on income 
tax returns represent the top wage income earners. This assumption does not necessarily 
hold, as individuals with large non-wage income and modest wage income also file tax 
returns, and may bias our estimates of top wage income shares downward. 
Thus, from the aggregate statistics, we can compute the share of total wage 
income accruing to the tax return filers with positive wage income. To obtain the shares of 
wage income accruing to fixed fractions of wage earners (e.g., top 1% and 5% groups) 
using a standard Pareto interpolation method, however, we need at least two observations 
on the share of income and the fraction of employees per year. Because we have only 
one such observation per year, we proceed as follows. 
 For years 1929-1944, on average about 3% of regular employees filed income tax 
returns. This fraction changes over time. In particular, it falls sharply from 6.72% in 1938 
(fiscal year 1939) to 0.76% in 1939 (fiscal year 1940), because of the large increase in the 
exemption level for comprehensive income tax under the 1940 law. We assume that the  
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distribution of wage income did not change significantly from 1938 to 1939 and that the 
Pareto coefficient remained the same. Then we estimate the Pareto coefficient using the 
standard formula: (1-1/a)= {log(share of wage income in 1938)-log(share of wage income 
in 1939)}/{log(fraction of wage income filers in 1938)-log(fraction of wage income filers in 
1939)}. The estimated coefficient is a=2.76. Assuming that the Pareto coefficient is 
constant for 1929-1944, we compute the top 1% and top 5% income share for each year 
(which are reported in Table C2). Because we use 1938 and 1939 to estimate the Pareto 
coefficient, by definition our top wage income shares in 1938 and 1939 are identical. 
Therefore, we exclude the 1938 estimates from Table C2. 
The assumption that the Pareto coefficient is constant across years 1929-1944 is 
certainly restrictive. Our finding, a sharp decline in top wage income shares during this 
period, however, should be robust. The raw data clearly indicate that there was a large 
decline in wage income concentration during 1929-1944: in the early 1930s, when 2 to 3% 
of wage earners filed income tax returns, their wage income was more than 15% of the 
total salaries from National Accounts; by contrast, in 1944, almost 5% of wage earners 
filed income tax returns but their wage income was only about 9% of all wages and 
salaries. 
 
C.3 Marginal Tax Rates, 1951-2002 
 
Marginal tax rates for top wage income earners for 1951-2002 are computed using a 
method similar to the marginal tax rates for top income groups described in Section A.5. 
Marginal tax rates (MTRs) are estimated for an individual with non-working spouse and 
two dependent children, assuming that all income is employment income. The estimates 
take into account the exemptions and graduated employment income deduction, based on 
the information from Japan Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau (1988), Ishi (2001), p.82, and 
OECD (1998-2002), Taxing Wages. The marginal tax rates do not include local income 
taxes (prefectural and municipal) and social insurance contributions. In Table C3, we 
present our estimates for MTRs at the income thresholds for the top 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.1%, 
and 0.01% groups (denoted as MTR at P90, P95, P99, P99.9, and P99.99, respectively).  
 
D. Sensitivity Analysis Using the NSFIE Data 
 
The best available source for estimating the distribution of capital income by income group 
is the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE).
43 NSFIE is conducted 
once in every five years and covers over 50,000 households, one of the largest and most 
comprehensive household surveys in Japan. Starting in 1979, the survey has reported the 
holdings of various financial assets per household by income class in its savings and 
liabilities section.
44 We compute top income shares and their income composition using 
NSFIE data, and compare these estimates with the income tax statistics estimates to 
evaluate the impact of the capital income erosion on our top income shares series.  
 
D.1 Individual-unit Estimates for 1999 
 
In 1999, the NSFIE statistics report tabulations by the size of the household head’s 
income (in addition to tabulations by the size of total household income).
45 We use these 
                                                 
43  Statistics Bureau of Japan, National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (Zenkoku Shohi Jittai 
Chosa). For the reliability of NSFIE compared to other household surveys, see Takayama et al. (1989). 
44  We cannot use 1969 and 1974 NSIFE data, because the sample in these years excludes households with 
professionals and managers. 
45 Table 24, available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/zensho/1999/menu.htm.  
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data to estimate top income shares and the composition of capital income, using 
individual as the unit of observation as in our series based on the income tax statistics. 
The NSFIE statistics present, by the size of household head’s income, the average 
income of the household head and the average amount of financial assets owned by all 
household members by asset types, such as demand deposits, time deposits, insurance 
savings, securities (stocks, trust funds, public and corporate bonds), and liabilities. In our 
analysis, we divide the assets into three groups: (1) stocks, (2) returns on insurance 
policies, and (3) fixed claim assets net of liabilities (containing all financial assets except 
stocks and insurance savings).  
We convert the assets holdings into capital income, using total capital income from 
personal income reported in National Accounts.
46  For example, to estimate dividend 
income, we take total dividends accrued to individuals from National Accounts and 
allocate them across households in proportion to the distribution of stocks by income class 
reported in the NSFIE. We then compute the share of each component in total income for 
top income groups. In doing so, we assume that the NSFIE represents all Japanese 
households and that all household assets reported in the survey belong to the household 
head. We make these extreme assumptions to generate an upper bound on our 
estimates.  
In Table 4, we compare our income tax statistics results (in Panel B) with the 
estimates from the NSFIE (in Panel C) for the year 1999. Unlike income tax statistics, 
because NSFIE uses a representative sample, it contains few observations at the very 
high end of income distribution. As a result, we cannot provide accurate estimates for the 
top 0.1% group and above with the 1999 NSFIE data. 
 
D.2 Household-unit Estimates for 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 
 
From 1979 to 1999, the NSFIE statistics present tabulations by the size of the total 
household income (as oppose to household head’s income). We use these data to 
compute top income shares and capital income composition, using household as the unit 
of observation. Note that, because the income shares are no longer based on the 
individual unit, the levels of the NSFIE estimates and the income tax statistics estimates 
are not directly comparable.
47 Instead, we can compare NSFIE estimates across years, 
using the 1999 NSFIE estimates as a benchmark. We compute the share of three capital 
income components in total income for top 5% and 10% income groups, using the same 
methodology as described in Section D.1. Because the brackets of the NSFIE tabulations 
in earlier years are not as finely defined, the top bracket contains 2% to 6% of all 
households. Due to small sample and top coding, we cannot provide accurate estimates 





                                                 
46 As Hayashi et al. (1988) demonstrate, capital income in the NSFIE is seriously underreported and cannot 
be used. We thus use the asset holdings data to estimate capital income. According to Takayama et al. 
(1989), NSFIE data on assets, including stocks and bonds, are fairly accurate. 
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 TABLE 1
Income Inequality in OECD Countries
A.  Income Before Tax & Transfers














Source: Nishizaki et al. (1998) 
B.  Income After Tax & Transfers














Source: Kokumin Seikatsukyoku (1999), Chapter 3, and
Atkinson et al. (1996), Table 4-10.TABLE 2
Percentile threshold Income threshold Income Groups
Number of tax units 
(adults age 20 and 
above)
Average income in 
each group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Population
102,139,153 $20,152
Top 10%  $50,748 Top 10-5% 5,106,958 $57,666
Top 5% $65,672 Top 5-1% 4,085,566 $80,346
Top 1% $109,649 Top 1-0.5% 510,696 $121,291
Top .5% $137,412 Top 0.5-0.1% 408,557 $175,391
Top .1% $264,372 Top 0.1-0.01% 91,925 $352,165
Top .01% $648,543 Top 0.01% 10,214 $1,174,672
Source: See Appendix Secion A.
Notes: Income is defined as annual gross income reported on tax returns  before individual income taxes and employees' payroll taxes but
excluding capital gains.  Amounts are expressed in 2002 dollars, assuming an exchange rate of $1= 125 yen. 














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1935 22.5% 13.8% 8.4% 3.9% 25.9% 22.6% 2.9%
1950 11.8% 15.1% 37.3% 13.5% 4.8% 12.1% 19.7%
1987 20.6% 43.6% 3.7% 0.8% 10.2% 11.7% 9.5%
Source: Table B2.
Notes: The table presents the compositions of top estates in 1935, 1950, and 1987
In each year, approximately top 9% of adult decedents filed estate tax returns.
Sum of all components is 100%. 
Business assets include assets of unincorporated business and farm assets.
Fixed claim assets include bonds, cash, deposits, savings accounts, and other claims.
Other assets include household assets, pensions, life insurance, and other  items.













All Returns on 
Liquid Assets (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(3)+(4)+(5)
A. National Average from National Accounts
All 2,805 1.9% 0.9% 4.3% 7.1%
B. Income Tax Statistics Estimates
Top 10-5% 7,530 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Top 5-1% 10,601 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
Top 1-0.5% 16,276 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3%
Top 0.5% 32,754 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 2.1%
Top 0.1% 67,662 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 4.2%
C. NSFIE Estimates
Top 10-5% 7,781 -0.4% 0.9% 5.2% 5.7%
Top 5-1% 10,381 0.5% 1.3% 4.6% 6.3%
Top 1-0.5% 14,391 1.9% 2.2% 4.5% 8.6%
Top 0.5% 22,958 1.3% 2.3% 3.8% 7.3%
Top 0.1% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: See Appendix Section A.3.3. and Section D.1.
Notes: Table compares the composition of capital income by income group based on three independent sources.
National average in Panel A is based on the total personal income from National Accounts.
Estimates in Panel B are based on self-assessed income tax return statistics for year 1999.
Income is defined as annual gross income reported in the tax returns, excluding capital gains. 
All returns on insurance policies, almost all income, and large part of dividends are not subject to comprehensive income tax
and not reported in the self-assessed income tax returns.
Estimates in Panel C are based on the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure  for year 1999.
Net interest income is estimated based on the holdings of bonds, deposits, and loan trusts, net of liabilities.
Dividend income is estimated based on stock holdings. 
Returns on insurance policies are based on life and other insurance holdings.
Due to small sample size, estimates for the top 0.5% are imprecise and estimates for the top 0.1% are not available.
Sensitivity Analysis Using the NSFIE Data in 1999
Fraction of Capital Income Component to Total Individual IncomeYears Inflation
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Actual Fiscal Fiscal Population Number of Number of (5)/(4) Total income Average income CPI 
Year Year Year adults tax returns (%) (2002 billion Yen) (2002 '000 yen) (2002 base 100)
(incomes (tax paid (Japanese ('000s) ('000s) ('000s)
earned in) in) Calendar)
1886 1887 20 38,541 21,853 118.6 0.54 3,708 170 0.0151
1887 1888 21 38,703 21,908 139.5 0.64 3,552 162 0.0161
1888 1889 22 39,029 22,054 115.6 0.52 3,867 175 0.0158
1889 1890 23 39,473 22,267 115.4 0.52 4,072 183 0.0168
1890 1891 24 39,902 22,471 115.9 0.52 4,363 194 0.0179
1891 1892 25 40,251 22,629 117.1 0.52 4,991 221 0.0171
1892 1893 26 40,508 22,734 124.1 0.55 5,186 228 0.0160
1893 1894 27 40,860 22,892 129.3 0.56 5,438 238 0.0161
1894 1895 28 41,142 23,011 134.7 0.59 5,943 258 0.0167
1895 1896 29 41,557 23,203 151.7 0.65 6,387 275 0.0182
1896 1897 30 41,992 23,405 172.8 0.74 6,222 266 0.0201
1897 1898 31 42,400 23,623 195.3 0.83 6,636 281 0.0224
1898 1899 32 42,886 23,884 288.6 1.21 6,754 283 0.0243
1899 1900 33 43,404 24,162 349.5 1.45 7,425 307 0.0229
1900 1901 34 43,847 24,399 406.3 1.67 6,808 279 0.0257
1901 1902 35 44,359 24,674 457.9 1.86 7,117 288 0.0251
1902 1903 36 44,964 25,000 507.9 2.03 6,928 277 0.0261
1903 1904 37 45,546 25,313 543.0 2.15 7,111 281 0.0274
1904 1905 38 46,135 25,630 580.5 2.27 8,021 313 0.0281
1905 1906 39 46,620 25,889 638.4 2.47 7,614 294 0.0291
1906 1907 40 47,038 26,110 702.4 2.69 7,827 300 0.0297
1907 1908 41 47,416 26,234 860.0 3.28 7,864 300 0.0328
1908 1909 42 47,965 26,452 930.4 3.52 8,079 305 0.0317
1909 1910 43 48,554 26,689 947.6 3.55 8,453 317 0.0305
1910 1911 44 49,184 26,947 964.5 3.58 8,738 324 0.0305
1911 1912 1 49,852 27,223 1,013.5 3.72 9,290 341 0.0328
1912 1913 2 50,577 27,528 707.9 2.57 9,342 339 0.0346
1913 1914 3 51,305 27,832 727.1 2.61 9,602 345 0.0357
1914 1915 4 52,039 28,137 718.2 2.55 9,760 347 0.0329
1915 1916 5 52,752 28,427 712.6 2.51 11,040 388 0.0308
1916 1917 6 53,496 28,732 771.0 2.68 12,513 436 0.0332
1917 1918 7 54,134 29,046 779.5 2.68 14,128 486 0.0408
1918 1919 8 54,739 29,341 1,079.8 3.68 15,488 528 0.0549
1919 1920 9 55,033 29,469 994.2 3.37 15,556 528 0.0730
1920 1921 10 55,963 29,937 1,168.2 3.90 14,618 488 0.0764
1921 1922 11 56,666 30,283 1,280.9 4.23 14,615 483 0.0700
1922 1923 12 57,390 30,639 1,400.5 4.57 15,192 496 0.0690
1923 1924 13 58,119 30,997 1,389.9 4.48 14,726 475 0.0683
1924 1925 14 58,876 31,369 1,432.3 4.57 15,022 479 0.0689
1925 1926 1 59,737 31,796 804.4 2.53 15,885 500 0.0698
1926 1927 2 60,741 32,298 732.2 2.27 16,380 507 0.0666
1927 1928 3 61,659 32,805 693.8 2.11 17,008 518 0.0656
1928 1929 4 62,595 33,323 700.5 2.10 17,653 530 0.0631
1929 1930 5 63,461 33,803 677.9 2.01 17,717 524 0.0617
1930 1931 6 64,450 34,350 569.0 1.66 18,521 539 0.0554
1931 1932 7 65,457 34,907 528.2 1.51 18,558 532 0.0490
1932 1933 8 66,434 35,449 569.6 1.61 19,515 551 0.0496
1933 1934 9 67,432 36,002 629.7 1.75 20,430 567 0.0511
1934 1935 10 68,309 36,491 679.3 1.86 20,914 573 0.0518
1935 1936 11 69,254 37,018 740.7 2.00 22,612 611 0.0531
1936 1937 12 70,114 37,499 815.2 2.17 23,754 633 0.0543
1937 1938 13 70,630 37,646 1,226.6 3.26 24,982 664 0.0585
1938 1939 14 71,013 37,921 1,404.0 3.70 25,666 677 0.0641
1939 1940 15 71,380 38,260 219.2 0.57 26,544 694 0.0802
1940 1941 16 71,933 38,686 266.0 0.69 25,016 647 0.1021
1941 1942 17 72,218 38,879 726.3 1.87 25,727 662 0.1137
1942 1943 18 72,880 39,275 878.6 2.24 24,509 624 0.1387
1943 1944 19 73,903 39,867 1,053.9 2.64 24,277 609 0.1595
1944 1945 20 74,433 40,194 1,114.6 2.77 23,415 583 0.1960
1945 1946 21 72,147 38,999 343.3 0.88 11,690 300 0.9026
1946 75,750 40,988 14,104 344 2.56
1947 1947 22 78,101 42,303 7,290.9 17.23 15,986 378 5.76
1948 1948 23 80,002 43,377 7,399.8 17.06 17,467 403 10.58
1949 1949 24 81,773 44,382 7,609.9 17.15 20,063 452 11.93
1950 1950 25 84,115 45,700 4,318.1 9.45 22,065 483 12.99
Income 
Table A0: Reference Totals for Population, Income, and Inflation, 1886-2002
Population and Tax units1951 1951 26 84,541 46,410 24,853 536 15.19
1952 1952 27 85,808 47,591 26,446 556 16.03
1953 1953 28 86,981 48,734 28,885 593 17.08
1954 1954 29 88,239 49,938 30,137 603 18.12
1955 1955 30 90,077 51,488 33,545 652 18.02
1956 1956 31 90,172 52,053 36,977 710 18.12
1957 1957 32 90,928 53,004 39,694 749 18.65
1958 1958 33 91,767 54,012 42,095 779 18.54
1959 1959 34 92,641 55,051 46,773 850 18.75
1960 1960 35 94,302 56,572 52,292 924 19.49
1961 1961 36 94,287 57,255 59,791 1,044 20.43
1962 1962 37 95,181 58,496 63,838 1,091 21.90
1963 1963 38 96,156 59,801 68,886 1,152 23.47
1964 1964 39 97,182 61,153 76,764 1,255 24.41
1965 1965 40 99,209 63,156 81,472 1,290 25.98
1966 1966 41 99,036 63,773 87,954 1,379 27.34
1967 1967 42 100,196 65,256 96,852 1,484 28.39
1968 1968 43 101,331 66,739 109,011 1,633 29.96
1969 1969 44 102,536 68,285 119,546 1,751 31.53
1970 1970 45 104,665 70,471 129,768 1,841 33.94
1971 1971 46 106,100 71,661 138,988 1,940 35.93
1972 1972 47 107,595 72,898 154,441 2,119 37.61
1973 1973 48 109,104 74,150 174,040 2,347 42.01
1974 1974 49 110,573 75,382 175,373 2,326 52.28
1975 1975 50 111,940 76,550 178,345 2,330 58.46
1976 1976 51 113,094 77,578 182,870 2,357 64.01
1977 1977 52 114,165 78,554 183,911 2,341 69.14
1978 1978 53 115,190 79,502 190,195 2,392 71.66
1979 1979 54 116,155 80,413 197,947 2,462 74.28
1980 1980 55 117,060 81,286 199,280 2,452 80.25
1981 1981 56 117,902 82,375 201,987 2,452 84.12
1982 1982 57 118,728 83,459 206,147 2,470 86.43
1983 1983 58 119,536 84,537 211,201 2,498 88.00
1984 1984 59 120,305 85,595 216,423 2,528 89.99
1985 1985 60 121,049 86,641 222,426 2,567 91.77
1986 1986 61 121,660 87,598 228,851 2,613 92.19
1987 1987 62 122,239 88,536 233,389 2,636 91.98
1988 1988 63 122,745 89,427 243,536 2,723 92.40
1989 1989 1 123,204 90,288 255,023 2,825 94.60
1990 1990 2 123,611 91,114 267,838 2,940 97.53
1991 1991 3 124,101 92,200 279,382 3,030 100.68
1992 1992 4 124,567 93,273 283,116 3,035 102.35
1993 1993 5 124,938 94,281 280,026 2,970 103.51
1994 1994 6 125,265 95,259 280,972 2,950 104.03
1995 1995 7 125,570 96,224 278,334 2,893 103.71
1996 1996 8 125,864 97,185 280,772 2,889 103.71
1997 1997 9 126,166 98,155 280,338 2,856 104.65
1998 1998 10 126,486 99,142 274,392 2,768 104.54
1999 1999 11 126,686 100,039 270,310 2,702 103.82
2000 2000 12 126,926 100,970 269,971 2,674 102.47
2001 2001 13 127,291 101,642 264,609 2,603 100.91
2002 2002 14 127,435 102,139 257,286 2,519 100.00
Source: See Appendix Section A.
Notes: Actual year is the year in which income subject to taxation was earned, and fiscal year is the year in which tax returns were processed and income tax was paid.
Tax unit is defined as adult individual with age 20 and above.
Population estimates are based on census data.
Number of tax returns are based on income tax return statistics.
Total income is based on personal disposable income from Ohkawa et al. (1974) for 1886-1930 and peronal income from National Accounts for 1930-2002.
CPI is from Ohkawa et al. (1967) for 1886-1950 and Japan Statistical Yearbook  for 1950-2002. Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% Top 5-1% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top 0.1-0.01% Top 0.01%
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (9) (10) (11) (12) (5)
1886 19.14 14.19 7.22 2.98 4.94 6.97 4.24 2.98
1887 19.89 14.52 7.24 3.03 5.38 7.28 4.20 3.03
1888 17.67 13.16 6.78 2.95 4.51 6.38 3.84 2.95
1889 16.07 12.03 6.30 2.68 4.04 5.74 3.61 2.68
1890 14.33 10.76 5.63 2.44 3.57 5.13 3.19 2.44
1891 13.19 9.92 5.19 2.22 3.27 4.74 2.97 2.22
1892 14.45 10.96 5.79 2.43 3.49 5.17 3.37 2.43
1893 14.27 10.94 5.87 2.44 3.33 5.06 3.44 2.44
1894 13.40 10.37 5.69 2.40 3.03 4.68 3.29 2.40
1895 12.82 10.03 5.59 2.38 2.79 4.44 3.21 2.38
1896 13.23 10.39 5.80 2.47 2.84 4.59 3.33 2.47
1897 12.16 9.55 5.21 2.15 2.62 4.33 3.07 2.15
1898 13.57 10.46 5.58 2.02 3.11 4.88 3.56 2.02
1899 15.72 12.27 6.72 2.51 3.45 5.55 4.21 2.51
1900 16.26 12.63 6.83 2.51 3.63 5.80 4.32 2.51
1901 16.93 13.14 7.09 2.62 3.80 6.05 4.47 2.62
1902 17.99 13.97 7.55 2.80 4.02 6.42 4.75 2.80
1903 17.55 13.66 7.43 2.74 3.89 6.23 4.69 2.74
1904 16.58 13.01 7.21 2.74 3.57 5.79 4.48 2.74
1905 18.07 14.13 7.82 2.97 3.94 6.31 4.85 2.97
1906 18.12 14.08 7.64 2.83 4.04 6.44 4.81 2.83
1907 32.25 18.26 14.12 7.58 2.76 14.00 4.13 6.54 4.82 2.76
1908 33.82 18.93 14.62 7.74 2.79 14.89 4.32 6.88 4.95 2.79
1909 33.71 18.74 14.43 7.56 2.68 14.96 4.31 6.88 4.87 2.68
1910 33.54 18.88 14.61 7.75 2.81 14.66 4.27 6.85 4.95 2.81
1911 31.40 17.99 13.98 7.52 2.77 13.41 4.01 6.46 4.75 2.77
1912 31.48 17.91 13.93 7.61 2.83 13.57 3.98 6.32 4.79 2.83
1913 30.56 17.45 13.56 7.38 2.73 13.11 3.90 6.17 4.65 2.73
1914 32.53 18.55 14.49 7.98 2.92 13.98 4.06 6.51 5.06 2.92
1915 32.79 19.60 15.63 9.09 3.70 13.19 3.98 6.54 5.39 3.70
1916 30.87 19.52 15.87 9.72 4.38 11.34 3.65 6.15 5.33 4.38
1917 28.98 18.68 15.32 9.52 4.31 10.30 3.36 5.80 5.20 4.31
1918 25.55 16.62 13.54 8.30 3.68 8.93 3.09 5.24 4.62 3.68
1919 24.83 15.25 12.24 7.37 3.12 9.58 3.01 4.87 4.25 3.12
1920 28.12 17.09 13.62 7.90 3.23 11.04 3.46 5.73 4.67 3.23
1921 31.47 18.48 14.51 8.10 3.15 12.99 3.98 6.40 4.95 3.15
1922 32.96 19.55 15.38 8.63 3.40 13.41 4.17 6.75 5.23 3.40
1923 33.58 19.72 15.45 8.60 3.37 13.85 4.27 6.85 5.23 3.37
1924 33.60 19.72 15.45 8.62 3.43 13.88 4.27 6.83 5.19 3.43
1925 18.32 14.34 7.96 3.16 3.98 6.38 4.80 3.16
1926 18.55 14.64 8.29 3.39 3.90 6.36 4.90 3.39
1927 17.89 14.12 7.96 3.22 3.77 6.17 4.73 3.22
1928 18.51 14.64 8.28 3.37 3.87 6.36 4.91 3.37
1929 18.35 14.51 8.17 3.33 3.85 6.33 4.84 3.33
1930 16.78 13.21 7.32 2.95 3.57 5.90 4.37 2.95
1931 17.38 13.62 7.42 2.92 3.76 6.20 4.50 2.92
1932 17.56 13.81 7.61 3.03 3.75 6.20 4.58 3.03
1933 18.28 14.48 8.16 3.40 3.79 6.32 4.76 3.40
1934 18.96 15.01 8.46 3.49 3.95 6.55 4.97 3.49
1935 18.74 14.83 8.41 3.49 3.91 6.42 4.93 3.49
1936 18.68 14.76 8.40 3.57 3.92 6.36 4.84 3.57
1937 31.34 19.26 15.33 8.83 3.80 12.07 3.94 6.50 5.03 3.80
1938 31.81 19.92 15.90 9.19 3.81 11.89 4.02 6.71 5.38 3.81
1939 17.95 14.16 7.83 3.10 3.79 6.33 4.73 3.10
1940 16.45 12.82 6.82 2.59 3.64 6.00 4.23 2.59
1941 16.67 12.58 6.36 2.31 4.09 6.22 4.05 2.31
1942 15.11 11.28 5.69 2.07 3.83 5.59 3.63 2.07
1943 13.63 10.04 4.96 1.78 3.59 5.08 3.18 1.78
1944 10.74 7.91 3.93 1.40 2.83 3.98 2.53 1.40
1945 6.43 4.42 1.89 0.56 2.01 2.54 1.33 0.56
1946
Table A1: Top Income Shares in Japan, 1886-20021947 18.50 7.36 5.16 2.15 0.61 11.15 2.20 3.01 1.54 0.61
1948 20.37 7.79 5.24 2.06 0.55 12.58 2.55 3.18 1.51 0.55
1949 21.67 7.89 4.97 1.82 0.46 13.77 2.92 3.15 1.35 0.46
1950 20.96 7.69 4.90 1.73 0.42 13.27 2.79 3.17 1.31 0.42
1951 19.90 7.28 4.77 1.87 0.53 12.62 2.51 2.90 1.34 0.53
1952 21.19 7.85 5.18 2.02 0.55 13.34 2.68 3.16 1.47 0.55
1953 20.17 7.46 4.94 1.91 0.49 12.71 2.51 3.04 1.42 0.49
1954 19.73 7.20 4.76 1.83 0.47 12.53 2.44 2.93 1.37 0.47
1955 18.87 6.91 4.59 1.78 0.46 11.96 2.32 2.81 1.32 0.46
1956 19.55 7.37 4.94 1.90 0.49 12.18 2.43 3.04 1.42 0.49
1957 20.15 7.69 5.20 2.05 0.54 12.46 2.49 3.14 1.51 0.54
1958 20.17 7.74 5.23 2.08 0.54 12.43 2.51 3.15 1.54 0.54
1959 20.48 7.97 5.44 2.15 0.54 12.51 2.53 3.30 1.61 0.54
1960 20.75 8.17 5.51 2.22 0.58 12.57 2.66 3.29 1.64 0.58
1961 20.68 8.44 5.79 2.31 0.60 12.24 2.65 3.49 1.71 0.60
1962 21.19 8.68 5.91 2.35 0.61 12.51 2.77 3.57 1.74 0.61
1963 21.03 8.50 5.74 2.31 0.60 12.53 2.76 3.43 1.71 0.60
1964 20.62 8.33 5.59 2.18 0.56 12.29 2.74 3.41 1.61 0.56
1965 20.04 7.91 5.26 2.04 0.52 12.13 2.65 3.22 1.51 0.52
1966 19.47 7.62 5.07 1.94 0.49 11.85 2.55 3.13 1.45 0.49
1967 19.86 7.63 5.11 1.96 0.49 12.23 2.53 3.14 1.48 0.49
1968 19.45 7.56 5.05 1.91 0.46 11.89 2.51 3.13 1.45 0.46
1969 20.38 8.01 5.27 1.91 0.47 12.37 2.73 3.36 1.45 0.47
1970 21.13 8.19 5.50 2.05 0.57 12.94 2.69 3.46 1.48 0.57
1971 21.67 8.42 5.49 1.94 0.63 13.25 2.93 3.55 1.31 0.63
1972 21.49 8.10 5.14 1.60 0.44 13.39 2.96 3.54 1.16 0.44
1973 21.01 7.62 5.02 2.18 0.86 13.40 2.59 2.84 1.32 0.86
1974 19.93 7.20 4.61 1.78 0.57 12.73 2.60 2.83 1.21 0.57
1975 19.58 7.08 4.60 1.77 0.61 12.50 2.48 2.84 1.16 0.61
1976 19.52 6.81 4.28 1.51 0.34 12.71 2.52 2.78 1.16 0.34
1977 19.45 6.77 4.26 1.48 0.34 12.68 2.51 2.78 1.14 0.34
1978 19.74 6.96 4.39 1.52 0.35 12.78 2.57 2.86 1.18 0.35
1979 20.23 7.25 4.68 1.65 0.38 12.98 2.57 3.03 1.28 0.38
1980 20.10 7.16 4.65 1.65 0.38 12.94 2.51 2.99 1.28 0.38
1981 20.07 7.11 4.61 1.59 0.36 12.97 2.50 3.02 1.24 0.36
1982 19.99 7.02 4.60 1.62 0.40 12.96 2.42 2.98 1.23 0.40
1983 20.03 6.94 4.46 1.50 0.34 13.08 2.48 2.96 1.16 0.34
1984 20.09 6.95 4.48 1.49 0.35 13.14 2.48 2.98 1.15 0.35
1985 20.25 7.03 4.50 1.50 0.35 13.22 2.53 3.01 1.14 0.35
1986 20.60 7.21 4.59 1.54 0.40 13.39 2.62 3.05 1.14 0.40
1987 21.42 7.66 4.88 1.65 0.51 13.75 2.78 3.23 1.14 0.51
1988 21.52 7.63 4.79 1.62 0.53 13.89 2.84 3.17 1.09 0.53
1989 21.70 7.90 5.07 1.83 0.72 13.80 2.84 3.23 1.11 0.72
1990 21.78 8.05 5.22 2.04 0.86 13.73 2.83 3.18 1.18 0.86
1991 21.16 7.54 4.84 1.81 0.73 13.62 2.70 3.03 1.08 0.73
1992 20.58 7.12 4.60 1.65 0.50 13.46 2.52 2.96 1.15 0.50
1993 20.72 7.15 4.61 1.62 0.49 13.57 2.54 2.99 1.13 0.49
1994 20.93 7.07 4.50 1.62 0.49 13.87 2.57 2.88 1.13 0.49
1995 21.47 7.30 4.68 1.64 0.47 14.17 2.62 3.03 1.17 0.47
1996 21.61 7.36 4.71 1.69 0.50 14.25 2.66 3.01 1.20 0.50
1997 21.72 7.32 4.66 1.69 0.45 14.41 2.66 2.97 1.24 0.45
1998 22.30 7.59 4.85 1.74 0.45 14.72 2.74 3.11 1.29 0.45
1999 22.77 7.76 4.93 1.77 0.47 15.01 2.83 3.16 1.30 0.47
2000 23.52 8.22 5.32 2.04 0.57 15.30 2.90 3.28 1.47 0.57
2001 24.16 8.49 5.55 2.14 0.60 15.67 2.93 3.41 1.54 0.60
2002 24.60 8.65 5.64 2.16 0.58 15.95 3.01 3.48 1.57 0.58
Notes: Computations by authors: See Appendix Section A for details.
Year refers to "actual year" in Table A0.
Income is defined comprehensively to include employment income, business income, farm income, and capital income, but capital gains are excluded.
Top groups are defined relative to adult population (age 20 and above) in Japan.
The total income demonimator is defined as total personal  income in Japan from National Accounts.
"Top 5-1%" refers to the bottom 4% of the top 5% income group. 
Top 5% and 5-1% income share series are not estimated for those years in which  the fractions of adults filing tax returns are too small.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1886 19.14 0.54 17.88% 7.98% 36.28% 17.45% 20.41%
1900 16.26 1.67 18.77% 8.42% 32.17% 18.99% 21.65%
1901 16.93 1.86 20.01% 8.63% 29.76% 18.63% 22.97%
1902 17.99 2.03 19.74% 8.50% 29.47% 18.58% 23.71%
1903 17.55 2.15 18.83% 9.17% 30.05% 16.45% 25.50%
1904 16.58 2.27 19.99% 8.25% 30.23% 16.21% 25.32%
1905 18.07 2.47 20.34% 7.47% 29.81% 18.20% 24.19%
1906 18.12 2.69 19.02% 6.74% 30.90% 18.69% 24.66%
1907 18.26 3.28 18.26% 6.27% 32.32% 17.88% 25.28%
1908 18.93 3.52 17.38% 6.02% 31.83% 18.00% 26.76%
1909 18.74 3.55 17.17% 5.96% 31.23% 19.33% 26.31%
1910 18.88 3.58 18.85% 5.64% 29.95% 20.81% 24.75%
1911 17.99 3.72 20.07% 5.03% 28.92% 21.08% 24.90%
1912 17.91 2.57 22.56% 4.08% 28.22% 18.19% 26.96%
1913 17.45 2.61 21.86% 3.77% 27.61% 18.13% 28.63%
1914 18.55 2.55 23.09% 3.97% 26.38% 19.13% 27.43%
1915 19.60 2.51 27.61% 3.67% 25.43% 20.58% 22.72%
1916 19.52 2.68 27.88% 3.21% 30.67% 19.48% 18.76%
1917 18.68 2.68 28.73% 2.61% 34.28% 18.03% 16.35%
1918 16.62 3.68 27.51% 2.17% 34.68% 19.27% 16.36%
1919 15.25 3.37 29.67% 2.02% 30.00% 19.19% 19.12%
1920 17.09 3.90 25.92% 2.33% 34.21% 18.37% 19.18%
1921 18.48 4.23 23.66% 2.48% 35.39% 19.14% 19.33%
1922 19.55 4.57 24.05% 2.64% 34.66% 20.77% 17.88%
1923 19.72 4.48 25.23% 2.83% 32.82% 22.36% 16.77%
1924 19.72 4.57 25.01% 2.79% 32.01% 22.25% 17.94%
1925 18.32 2.53 25.56% 0.71% 29.33% 22.44% 21.95%
1926 18.55 2.27 27.67% 1.82% 24.45% 25.02% 21.04%
1927 17.89 2.11 28.71% 2.12% 21.00% 26.88% 21.29%
1928 18.51 2.10 29.87% 2.18% 19.31% 27.91% 20.74%
1929 18.35 2.01 30.28% 2.30% 16.48% 29.72% 21.21%
1930 16.78 1.66 31.30% 2.55% 13.23% 32.41% 20.51%
1931 17.38 1.51 31.36% 2.75% 12.35% 31.89% 21.65%
1932 17.56 1.61 29.38% 2.60% 14.83% 31.34% 21.84%
1933 18.28 1.75 29.04% 2.23% 17.15% 31.39% 20.18%
1934 18.96 1.86 28.14% 1.94% 18.48% 32.29% 19.15%
1935 18.74 2.00 27.81% 1.71% 18.89% 32.31% 19.28%
1936 18.68 2.17 31.65% 1.50% 19.87% 28.95% 18.03%
1937 19.26 3.26 28.46% 1.29% 22.61% 31.50% 16.14%
1938 19.92 3.70 26.30% 1.09% 35.61% 31.55% 5.45%
1939 17.95 0.57 19.11% 1.09% 43.83% 17.29% 18.68%
1940 16.45 0.69 17.72% 1.64% 46.29% 17.25% 17.11%
1941 16.67 1.87 14.11% 1.42% 52.66% 18.20% 13.61%
1942 15.11 2.24 13.48% 1.45% 51.86% 20.12% 13.09%
1943 13.63 2.64 13.20% 1.46% 48.59% 24.20% 12.54%
1944 10.74 2.77 13.19% 1.37% 44.33% 30.25% 10.85%
1945 6.43 0.88 6.05% 0.59% 78.15% 10.05% 5.16%
1947 7.36 0.13% 0.05% 95.56% 4.05% 0.22%
1948 7.79 0.13% 0.03% 93.69% 6.00% 0.15%
1949 7.89 0.34% 0.01% 77.03% 22.43% 0.18%
1950 7.69 1.13% 0.00% 47.49% 51.13% 0.26%
1963 8.50 9.01% 0.00% 14.59% 70.99% 5.41%
1965 7.91 6.21% 0.00% 16.14% 70.80% 6.85%
1970 8.19 6.74% 0.00% 20.19% 63.69% 9.38%
1976 6.81 3.45% 0.00% 17.20% 73.92% 5.42%
1980 7.16 3.18% 0.00% 19.07% 72.29% 5.45%
1985 7.03 2.50% 0.00% 14.08% 77.78% 5.64%
1991 7.54 2.63% 0.00% 11.44% 78.61% 7.32%
1995 7.30 1.62% 0.00% 10.25% 79.43% 8.69%
1999 7.76 1.43% 0.01% 8.41% 81.41% 8.74%
2002 8.65 1.56% 0.01% 8.40% 80.61% 9.41%
Notes: Computations by authors based on tax return statistics. See Appendix Section A.4 for details.
Business income includes unincorporated business profits, farm income, and self-employment income.
Employment income includes wages, salaries, bonuses, and pensions.
Rental income includes rents from farm land, residential land, housing, and buildings.
For 1886 and 1900-1945, composition estimates are based on aggregate income composition and thus imprecisely estimated.
In particular, for 1906-1925, relatively high fractions of adults (2.5% to 4.6%) filed income tax returns.
For 1947-1950 and 1963-2002, composition estimates are based on composition data by income brackets.
For 1951-1962, no estimates are provided because only aggregate composision data are available.
Virtually all interest income after 1947 and large part of dividends after 1965 are missing from the income tax statistics.
Composition of top 1% income
Table A2: Top 1% Income Share and Composition in Japan, 1886-2002Actual Fiscal Marginal Marginal Top Marginal Marginal
Year Year Tax Rate Tax Rate Marginal Tax Rate Tax Rate
(incomes (tax  at P99.9 at P99.99 Tax Rate Top 0.1% Top 0.01%
earned in) collected in)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1886 1887 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1887 1888 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1888 1889 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1889 1890 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1890 1891 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1891 1892 1.0 1.5 3.0 1.7 2.3
1892 1893 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1893 1894 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1894 1895 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1895 1896 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1896 1897 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1897 1898 1.5 1.5 3.0 1.8 2.3
1898 1899 1.5 2.5 5.5 2.7 4.0
1899 1900 1.7 2.5 5.5 2.8 4.0
1900 1901 1.7 2.5 5.5 2.8 4.0
1901 1902 1.7 2.5 5.5 2.8 4.0
1902 1903 1.7 2.5 5.5 2.8 4.0
1903 1904 2.89 4.25 9.4 4.8 6.8
1904 1905 3.91 7.50 20.4 8.8 13.9
1905 1906 3.91 7.50 20.4 8.8 13.9
1906 1907 4.60 7.50 20.4 9.0 13.9
1907 1908 4.60 7.50 20.4 8.9 13.9
1908 1909 4.60 7.50 20.4 8.9 13.9
1909 1910 4.60 7.50 20.4 8.8 13.9
1910 1911 4.60 7.50 20.4 8.9 13.9
1911 1912 4.60 7.50 20.4 8.9 13.9
1912 1913 5.5 10.0 22.0 10.8 16.0
1913 1914 5.5 10.0 22.0 10.8 16.0
1914 1915 5.5 10.0 22.0 10.8 16.0
1915 1916 5.5 10.0 22.0 11.1 16.0
1916 1917 5.5 12.0 22.0 12.5 17.0
1917 1918 8.5 17.0 30.0 17.6 23.5
1918 1919 10.5 17.0 30.0 18.1 23.5
1919 1920 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.4 25.5
1920 1921 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.7 25.5
1921 1922 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.4 25.5
1922 1923 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.5 25.5
1923 1924 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.4 25.5
1924 1925 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.5 25.5
1925 1926 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.5 25.5
1926 1927 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.7 25.5
1927 1928 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.6 25.5
1928 1929 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.6 25.5
1929 1930 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.7 25.5
1930 1931 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.1 25.5
1931 1932 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.0 25.5
1932 1933 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.1 25.5
1933 1934 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.3 25.5
1934 1935 8.0 15.0 36.0 17.3 25.5
1935 1936 9.5 15.0 36.0 17.7 25.5
1936 1937 35.0 40.0 70.0 44.9 55.0
1937 1938 13.0 25.0 50.0 27.0 37.5
1938 1939 16.0 28.0 50.0 29.0 39.0
1939 1940 20.0 40.0 65.0 38.9 52.5
1940 1941 25.0 40.0 65.0 40.1 52.5
1941 1942 30.0 48.0 72.0 46.6 60.0
1942 1943 30.0 48.0 72.0 46.6 60.0
1943 1944 36.0 54.0 74.0 51.8 64.0
Table A3: Marginal Income Tax Rates in Japan, 1886-2002
Marginal Tax Rates1944 1945 36.0 54.0 74.0 51.8 64.0
1945 1946 36.0 55.0 67.0 50.1 61.0
1946
1947 1947 65.0 70.0 75.0 68.9 72.5
1948 1948 82.0 85.0 85.0 83.9 85.0
1949 1949 65.0 75.0 85.0 72.5 80.0
1950 1950 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0
1951 1951 48.0 53.0 55.0 51.5 54.0
1952 1952 53.0 55.0 55.0 54.3 55.0
1953 1953 50.0 55.0 65.0 54.4 60.0
1954 1954 50.0 55.0 65.0 54.4 60.0
1955 1955 50.0 55.0 65.0 54.4 60.0
1956 1956 50.0 60.0 65.0 56.9 62.5
1957 1957 35.0 40.0 70.0 42.1 55.0
1958 1958 35.0 45.0 70.0 44.6 57.5
1959 1959 35.0 45.0 70.0 44.4 57.5
1960 1960 35.0 45.0 70.0 44.5 57.5
1961 1961 40.0 45.0 70.0 46.4 57.5
1962 1962 40.0 45.0 75.0 47.1 60.0
1963 1963 40.0 50.0 75.0 49.6 62.5
1964 1964 40.0 50.0 75.0 49.5 62.5
1965 1965 40.0 50.0 75.0 49.5 62.5
1966 1966 40.0 50.0 75.0 49.4 62.5
1967 1967 45.0 50.0 75.0 51.2 62.5
1968 1968 45.0 50.0 75.0 51.1 62.5
1969 1969 46.0 55.0 75.0 54.1 65.0
1970 1970 42.0 55.0 75.0 53.1 65.0
1971 1971 42.0 55.0 75.0 53.8 65.0
1972 1972 42.0 55.0 75.0 53.0 65.0
1973 1973 46.0 55.0 75.0 56.2 65.0
1974 1974 35.3 46.5 69.8 46.5 58.1
1975 1975 37.8 45.0 67.5 46.5 56.3
1976 1976 37.8 49.5 67.5 47.1 58.5
1977 1977 41.4 49.5 67.5 48.4 58.5
1978 1978 41.4 49.5 67.5 48.4 58.5
1979 1979 45.0 54.0 67.5 52.1 60.8
1980 1980 47.5 57.0 71.3 55.0 64.1
1981 1981 47.5 57.0 71.3 54.9 64.1
1982 1982 47.5 57.0 71.3 55.1 64.1
1983 1983 47.5 57.0 71.3 54.9 64.1
1984 1984 47.5 57.0 66.5 54.5 61.8
1985 1985 47.5 57.0 66.5 54.5 61.8
1986 1986 47.5 57.0 66.5 54.7 61.8
1987 1987 47.5 52.3 57.0 51.3 54.6
1988 1988 47.5 47.5 57.0 49.1 52.3
1989 1989 47.5 47.5 57.0 49.4 52.3
1990 1990 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5
1991 1991 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5
1992 1992 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5
1993 1993 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5
1994 1994 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5 47.5
1995 1995 38.0 47.5 47.5 44.1 47.5
1996 1996 38.0 47.5 47.5 44.1 47.5
1997 1997 38.0 47.5 47.5 44.0 47.5
1998 1998 38.0 47.5 47.5 44.0 47.5
1999 1999 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
2000 2000 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
2001 2001 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
2002 2002 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2 35.2
Notes: Computation by authors; see Appendix Section A.5 for details.
Marginal tax rates for a taxpayer with a non-working spouse and two dependent children are estimated.
Exemptions and standard deductions are taken into account, and local taxes are excluded.
"Marginal tax rate at P99.9" refers to the marginal tax rate at the income threshold for the top 0.1% group.
"Top marginal tax rate" is the highest marginal tax rate stipulated by the law.
"Marginal tax rate Top 0.1%" refers to the income-weighted average marginal tax rate for the top 0.1% group.# Adults  # Estate Fraction
Actual  decedents tax returns filing (2)/(1) Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% Top 5-1% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top .1-.01% Top 0.01%
Year (age 20+) (%) (in 2002 thousand yen) (in 2002 thousand yen)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
1905 569,672 23,712 4.16% 39,392 64,835 198,661 901,558 13,949 31,378 120,562 901,558
1906 543,109 28,616 5.27% 45,040 72,802 211,676 813,024 17,277 38,084 144,860 813,024
1907 566,733 36,175 6.38% 15,584 51,531 84,366 254,796 1,123,517 6,597 18,696 41,758 158,272 1,123,517
1908 548,334 39,237 7.16% 17,912 58,793 95,276 286,795 1,402,816 7,691 22,310 47,396 162,793 1,402,816
1909 575,094 32,028 5.57% 16,589 56,481 92,782 283,268 1,291,437 6,616 20,180 45,161 171,249 1,291,437
1910 558,154 47,374 8.49% 22,553 72,255 115,499 316,869 1,010,887 10,128 29,011 65,157 239,756 1,010,887
1911 544,055 48,742 8.96% 23,610 77,321 125,174 352,886 1,280,724 10,183 29,469 68,245 249,793 1,280,724
1912 548,046 47,512 8.67% 22,756 74,641 120,952 355,126 1,556,543 9,784 28,330 62,409 221,635 1,556,543
1913 536,993 44,678 8.32% 21,723 71,455 115,717 335,938 1,314,140 9,290 27,193 60,662 227,248 1,314,140
1914 573,534 38,228 6.67% 25,599 86,139 142,114 445,128 2,193,444 10,464 30,163 66,360 250,870 2,193,444
1915 564,966 39,494 6.99% 29,558 93,657 151,434 449,383 2,020,034 13,534 35,880 76,947 274,866 2,020,034
1916 623,196 47,784 7.67% 29,643 94,427 152,784 450,664 1,846,290 13,447 36,070 78,314 295,594 1,846,290
1917 627,640 38,810 6.18% 24,052 78,852 129,357 394,225 1,611,504 10,352 28,347 63,140 258,972 1,611,504
1918 805,793 55,695 6.91% 23,155 74,756 122,025 375,739 1,812,031 10,255 27,487 58,596 216,151 1,812,031
1919 679,934 89,488 13.16% 27,485 82,934 131,870 386,419 1,722,991 13,623 33,998 68,233 237,911 1,722,991
1920 762,101 137,236 18.01% 36,323 119,074 196,202 611,416 2,967,517 15,635 41,946 92,399 349,627 2,967,517
1921 668,956 130,990 19.58% 39,004 125,096 203,175 583,687 2,224,272 17,481 47,017 108,047 401,400 2,224,272
1922 678,237 124,684 18.38% 38,259 122,443 198,027 573,425 2,385,135 17,214 46,859 104,177 372,123 2,385,135
1923 698,548 111,840 16.01% 42,558 147,548 249,657 828,157 4,204,570 16,311 45,440 105,032 452,999 4,204,570
1924 670,083 123,347 18.41% 50,675 173,139 289,821 922,560 4,619,893 20,059 56,456 131,636 511,745 4,619,893
1925 642,982 55,684 8.66% 143,539 249,748 870,863 4,977,148 37,331 94,469 414,609 4,977,148
1926 619,940 80,104 12.92% 59,195 206,900 350,207 1,160,326 6,574,218 22,269 63,592 147,678 558,782 6,574,218
1927 648,975 129,086 19.89% 61,676 219,861 375,121 1,241,465 6,754,041 22,130 64,601 158,535 628,956 6,754,041
1928 669,274 103,160 15.41% 50,903 168,752 275,595 805,520 3,085,179 21,441 61,910 143,114 552,225 3,085,179
1929 680,466 97,308 14.30% 59,419 208,628 350,154 1,089,098 4,979,980 22,116 67,102 165,418 656,778 4,979,980
1930 659,662 83,424 12.65% 48,492 163,268 269,457 813,457 3,513,034 19,798 57,080 133,457 513,504 3,513,034
1931 698,288 90,670 12.98% 50,409 167,367 273,077 808,731 3,435,020 21,169 61,656 139,163 516,921 3,435,020
1932 661,659 86,854 13.13% 48,645 161,180 262,320 763,163 3,190,738 20,511 60,039 137,109 493,432 3,190,738
1933 681,678 88,183 12.94% 51,836 180,098 303,452 977,032 4,953,259 19,771 56,743 135,057 535,229 4,953,259
1934 711,414 89,302 12.55% 58,750 218,392 382,800 1,400,199 9,212,205 18,840 53,985 128,450 532,199 9,212,205
1935 675,407 60,615 8.97% 47,671 174,540 301,451 1,037,972 5,867,339 15,954 47,628 117,321 501,376 5,867,339
1936 727,603 88,670 12.19% 68,402 251,557 432,446 1,479,465 8,685,852 22,613 70,668 170,692 678,755 8,685,852
1937 704,060 92,998 13.21% 43,012 141,033 231,026 690,390 2,789,699 18,507 51,039 116,185 457,134 2,789,699
1938 768,112 69,350 9.03% 28,395 88,619 142,662 431,383 2,182,804 13,339 34,575 70,481 236,781 2,182,804
1939 769,360 68,364 8.89% 31,955 113,299 194,161 679,059 3,927,140 11,619 32,436 72,936 318,161 3,927,140
1940 739,777 77,478 10.47% 30,212 103,742 174,681 570,871 2,544,649 11,830 32,803 75,633 351,562 2,544,649
1941 714,781 148,649 20.80% 48,400 159,663 262,040 828,514 4,287,115 20,584 57,286 120,422 444,224 4,287,115
1942 748,709
1943 769,258 170,180 22.12% 45,618 146,793 235,967 680,682 2,957,416 20,324 57,619 124,788 427,712 2,957,416
1944 798,830 125,523 15.71% 31,850 99,640 160,261 461,951 2,026,342 14,903 39,019 84,838 288,130 2,026,342
1945 1,363,345 191,638 14.06% 7,763 24,385 38,617 101,827 350,494 3,608 10,152 22,814 74,198 350,494
1946 869,315 270,172 31.08% 6,108 15,939 24,265 65,757 275,103 3,650 7,613 13,892 42,496 275,103
1947 726,363 107,956 14.86% 4,686 10,632 15,095 33,909 97,929 3,199 6,170 10,391 26,795 97,929
1948 640,123 122,240 19.10% 3,764 8,724 12,617 29,180 83,594 2,524 4,831 8,477 23,134 83,594
1949 629,361 150,834 23.97% 3,073 7,089 10,146 22,523 61,411 2,069 4,032 7,052 18,202 61,411
1950 630,765 37,229 5.90% 6,899 14,407 19,764 40,802 110,093 5,021 9,051 14,505 33,103 110,093
1951 594,257 51,678 8.70% 6,905 13,946 18,948 39,448 114,833 5,145 8,945 13,823 31,072 114,833
1952 569,367 21,565 3.79% 19,097 25,982 55,272 144,030 12,212 18,659 45,410 144,030
1953 595,400 12,138 2.04% 20,005 28,878 69,276 216,189 11,131 18,779 52,952 216,189
1954 567,040 16,443 2.90% 23,802 33,909 80,485 273,472 13,694 22,265 59,042 273,472
1955 562,344 19,839 3.53% 27,902 40,197 96,142 294,328 15,606 26,211 74,122 294,328
Table B1: Levels of Top Estates in Japan, 1905-20021956 599,844 23,100 3.85% 29,721 42,585 99,389 268,874 16,856 28,384 80,557 268,874
1957 635,827 26,585 4.18% 34,174 50,240 122,064 365,110 18,108 32,284 95,059 365,110
1958 581,735 5,296 0.91% 54,320 137,146 403,321 33,613 107,571 403,321
1959 591,577 6,749 1.14% 61,058 149,072 458,069 39,055 114,739 458,069
1960 618,324 9,146 1.48% 51,054 78,636 194,021 582,115 23,472 49,790 150,900 582,115
1961 615,040 11,316 1.84% 63,860 99,588 251,310 793,981 28,132 61,657 191,013 793,981
1962 636,949 9,428 1.48% 76,879 119,048 297,964 972,761 34,710 74,319 222,987 972,761
1963 605,286 11,253 1.86% 87,321 134,906 338,515 1,223,391 39,737 84,004 240,195 1,223,391
1964 612,370 10,404 1.70% 92,580 144,622 372,134 1,133,167 40,537 87,744 287,575 1,133,167
1965 642,338 13,161 2.05% 97,174 147,776 344,552 859,992 46,571 98,583 287,281 859,992
1966 619,868 9,238 1.49% 110,085 166,776 399,034 1,242,750 53,395 108,712 305,288 1,242,750
1967 623,871 11,294 1.81% 131,925 201,489 498,842 1,693,012 62,361 127,151 366,157 1,693,012
1968 636,652 14,524 2.28% 141,016 209,379 479,215 1,372,335 72,653 141,921 379,979 1,372,335
1969 645,792 19,315 2.99% 168,872 250,106 557,592 1,585,821 87,638 173,234 443,345 1,585,821
1970 666,723 24,479 3.67% 193,456 285,891 635,198 1,843,569 101,022 198,564 500,935 1,843,569
1971 639,945 25,920 4.05% 249,332 367,274 829,692 2,584,884 131,390 251,669 634,671 2,584,884
1972 640,574 30,191 4.71% 284,154 429,325 971,775 3,101,611 138,984 293,712 735,127 3,101,611
1973 666,465 29,171 4.38% 343,481 506,656 1,100,018 3,118,922 180,306 358,315 875,696 3,118,922
1974 671,039 32,879 4.90% 307,439 447,926 967,684 2,486,612 166,953 317,986 798,914 2,486,612
1975 666,391 14,186 2.13% 284,933 415,587 914,293 2,680,877 154,280 290,910 718,006 2,680,877
1976 670,510 15,567 2.32% 277,698 404,017 855,731 2,185,130 151,379 291,088 708,020 2,185,130
1977 659,717 17,358 2.63% 278,874 406,110 872,242 2,346,307 151,638 289,577 708,457 2,346,307
1978 667,058 19,677 2.95% 292,682 423,570 911,458 2,418,108 161,794 301,598 744,052 2,418,108
1979 663,373 22,144 3.34% 301,048 434,008 888,935 2,190,017 168,087 320,276 744,370 2,190,017
1980 698,060 26,315 3.77% 318,722 464,612 1,001,483 2,669,051 172,832 330,395 816,197 2,669,051
1981 696,931 31,017 4.45% 370,232 539,247 1,157,527 3,170,641 201,217 384,677 933,847 3,170,641
1982 690,132 35,328 5.12% 404,664 589,622 1,276,338 3,658,561 219,707 417,943 1,011,647 3,658,561
1983 719,124 38,826 5.40% 153,608 421,691 616,350 1,363,240 4,094,148 86,588 227,032 429,627 1,059,806 4,094,148
1984 720,529 42,323 5.87% 158,408 428,137 619,625 1,313,990 3,693,978 90,976 236,648 446,034 1,049,547 3,693,978
1985 733,797 47,270 6.44% 170,913 463,314 675,198 1,472,996 4,347,620 97,812 251,430 475,748 1,153,594 4,347,620
1986 749,125 50,857 6.79% 177,011 480,513 699,249 1,544,482 4,679,174 101,135 261,777 487,940 1,196,183 4,679,174
1987 735,429 57,992 7.89% 212,242 584,161 861,857 2,018,490 6,755,997 119,262 306,466 572,699 1,492,101 6,755,997
1988 769,676 50,204 6.52% 258,699 748,812 1,125,328 2,790,812 10,222,238 136,170 372,297 708,957 1,965,098 10,222,238
1989 778,517 41,521 5.33% 311,516 946,480 1,460,636 3,696,641 13,548,109 152,775 432,323 901,635 2,602,033 13,548,109
1990 805,350 48,220 5.99% 342,202 1,014,153 1,533,905 3,665,958 12,483,065 174,215 494,402 1,000,891 2,686,279 12,483,065
1991 814,604 56,480 6.93% 401,415 1,197,474 1,809,678 4,385,354 15,453,762 202,400 585,270 1,165,759 3,155,531 15,453,762
1992 839,909 46,032 5.48% 409,193 1,191,916 1,774,560 3,944,065 11,237,538 213,512 609,272 1,232,184 3,133,679 11,237,538
1993 868,210 44,268 5.10% 352,589 1,000,843 1,472,683 3,225,954 8,924,398 190,525 529,004 1,034,365 2,592,793 8,924,398
1994 864,048 38,880 4.50% 316,674 894,958 1,318,912 2,874,797 7,707,469 172,103 471,004 929,941 2,337,834 7,707,469
1995 909,318 42,814 4.71% 314,596 872,533 1,269,445 2,680,425 6,837,903 175,112 475,620 916,700 2,218,483 6,837,903
1996 884,329 40,929 4.63% 298,487 815,102 1,182,011 2,500,882 6,192,633 169,333 448,194 852,294 2,090,687 6,192,633
1997 909,812 41,223 4.53% 284,271 773,023 1,124,849 2,435,816 6,878,787 162,083 421,196 797,108 1,942,152 6,878,787
1998 922,486 41,490 4.50% 267,737 709,706 1,019,806 2,127,238 5,044,079 157,245 399,605 742,949 1,803,145 5,044,079
1999 971,827 42,185 4.34% 258,585 686,285 990,990 2,079,118 5,414,767 151,660 381,580 718,957 1,708,490 5,414,767
2000 952,505 40,217 4.22% 251,075 654,660 937,014 1,976,370 4,819,662 150,179 372,306 677,176 1,660,448 4,819,662
2001 961,722 37,903 3.94% 244,755 654,291 952,826 2,095,136 6,228,714 142,371 355,757 667,248 1,635,849 6,228,714
2002 970,000 44,329 4.57% 224,236 589,069 846,304 1,779,609 4,755,073 133,028 331,834 612,978 1,449,002 4,755,073
Notes: Computations by authors based on estate tax return statistics. See Appendix Section B for details.
Top groups are defined relative to the total number of adult decedents (age 20 and above).
Estates are defined as all properties owned by decedents before deductions net of debts.
The average size (as opposed to share) of estate for each top group is reported in 2002 thousand yen (in 2002, 1,000 yen = $8).
For the correspondence between actual and fiscal years, see Appendic Section B.1.2.
Due to the difficulty in reconstructing estate statistics for actual years, our estimate for each year is imprecise, but their moving average are more accurate. 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1925 9.6% 34.1% 19.1% 9.6% 5.2% 22.2% 12.9% 5.9% -8.9%
1926 15.3% 34.6% 19.4% 9.4% 4.7% 21.5% 14.7% 5.1% -9.4%
1927 19.9% 30.2% 16.9% 8.4% 4.2% 23.7% 21.1% 4.2% -8.7%
1928 15.4% 35.1% 19.6% 9.9% 4.6% 15.6% 21.3% 4.0% -10.2%
1929 14.3% 33.5% 18.7% 9.1% 4.1% 19.7% 19.9% 4.7% -9.9%
1930 12.6% 33.0% 19.4% 10.6% 3.9% 17.2% 21.3% 3.7% -9.1%
1931 13.0% 31.9% 20.1% 11.1% 4.1% 14.6% 24.9% 3.3% -10.0%
1932 13.1% 31.6% 18.7% 10.9% 4.1% 15.3% 25.8% 3.9% -10.3%
1933 12.9% 27.6% 17.7% 10.3% 4.0% 17.4% 28.7% 3.8% -9.5%
1934 12.6% 23.0% 15.7% 8.8% 3.6% 29.9% 23.0% 3.7% -7.6%
1935 9.0% 24.0% 14.8% 9.0% 4.2% 27.6% 24.2% 3.1% -6.7%
1936 14.0% 25.0% 15.2% 8.9% 4.2% 27.6% 21.6% 3.1% -5.7%
1937 16.8% 23.0% 14.8% 9.3% 4.7% 29.6% 22.6% 3.2% -7.3%
1938 19.5% 22.8% 14.9% 9.0% 4.9% 23.0% 28.9% 4.2% -7.8%
1939 6.7% 25.4% 13.6% 10.5% 6.0% 27.9% 18.8% 5.7% -7.9%
1940 10.5% 27.7% 13.2% 11.9% 6.3% 20.0% 21.1% 6.6% -6.8%
1941 20.8% 24.9% 13.5% 13.5% 6.5% 19.7% 21.8% 6.1% -6.0%
1944 15.7% 26.3% 10.1% 18.6% 6.3% 13.3% 21.9% 7.8% -4.3%
1945 14.1% 18.9% 11.1% 17.5% 5.9% 10.2% 31.9% 7.9% -3.3%
1947 17.0% 13.0% 10.0% 39.8% 12.4% 4.4% 12.5% 16.4% -8.5%
1948 28.7% 7.8% 8.5% 39.6% 15.4% 2.3% 11.8% 19.9% -5.3%
1949 30.9% 6.3% 9.8% 40.2% 16.0% 2.4% 11.2% 21.0% -6.9%
1950 8.8% 13.7% 15.1% 37.3% 13.5% 4.8% 12.1% 19.7% -16.2%
1951 19.4% 19.4% 14.4% 36.0% 11.9% 5.8% 16.2% 13.7% -17.3%
1952 16.2% 16.2% 13.2% 28.9% 10.8% 7.4% 17.7% 17.3% -11.6%
1953 18.4% 18.4% 18.0% 26.0% 9.8% 12.3% 10.9% 20.0% -15.4%
1954 23.9% 23.9% 21.3% 23.8% 8.5% 9.0% 8.9% 19.2% -14.5%
1955 24.9% 24.9% 24.4% 21.7% 9.7% 8.3% 8.9% 16.9% -14.8%
1956 25.5% 25.5% 25.3% 20.1% 11.0% 9.1% 5.5% 15.3% -11.8%
1957 26.1% 26.1% 28.4% 17.8% 10.1% 9.5% 6.0% 14.4% -12.4%
1958 0.9% 8.4% 38.9% 16.6% 6.4% 20.0% 7.4% 15.1% -12.8%
1959 1.1% 10.9% 39.4% 15.2% 5.9% 19.5% 8.0% 14.2% -13.0%
1960 1.5% 13.8% 40.2% 12.5% 5.2% 19.3% 7.5% 12.0% -10.5%
1961 1.8% 16.3% 40.2% 10.1% 4.4% 20.0% 7.4% 11.6% -10.0%
1962 1.5% 13.9% 47.9% 8.4% 3.9% 18.7% 7.3% 10.2% -10.3%
1963 1.9% 14.0% 46.9% 7.9% 3.4% 19.8% 7.4% 10.6% -10.1%
1964 1.7% 15.7% 48.7% 7.0% 3.2% 16.0% 9.0% 9.4% -9.1%
1965 2.1% 18.0% 49.1% 6.9% 3.1% 14.0% 8.5% 9.7% -9.3%
1966 1.5% 17.9% 46.8% 6.6% 2.8% 16.1% 10.3% 9.5% -10.0%
1967 1.8% 20.7% 43.4% 5.5% 2.5% 17.9% 11.0% 9.0% -9.8%
1968 2.3% 25.2% 42.2% 6.0% 2.7% 12.5% 10.9% 9.2% -8.9%
1969 3.0% 27.0% 42.2% 5.5% 2.4% 12.3% 10.4% 8.0% -7.8%
1970 3.7% 28.5% 40.6% 5.8% 2.2% 12.8% 10.6% 7.7% -8.1%
1971 4.1% 32.0% 42.5% 4.8% 1.7% 9.3% 9.4% 6.7% -6.5%
1972 4.7% 33.0% 40.6% 3.7% 1.7% 10.2% 10.4% 6.5% -6.0%
1973 4.4% 35.0% 40.2% 3.3% 1.3% 9.7% 10.6% 6.0% -5.9%
1974 4.9% 32.2% 43.2% 3.3% 1.3% 8.3% 10.2% 7.0% -5.5%
1975 2.2% 32.0% 41.8% 2.9% 1.0% 9.1% 11.2% 6.8% -4.9%
1976 2.4% 31.5% 40.5% 3.2% 1.1% 9.3% 12.0% 7.8% -5.4%
1977 2.7% 30.4% 41.0% 3.4% 1.1% 9.6% 11.3% 8.4% -5.4%
1978 3.0% 30.7% 40.1% 3.6% 1.3% 9.0% 11.8% 9.0% -5.6%
Table B2: Estate Composition in Japan, 1926-2002
Estate Composition1979 3.4% 29.2% 41.3% 3.6% 1.4% 9.1% 11.7% 9.9% -6.2%
1980 3.8% 28.9% 41.7% 3.5% 1.2% 9.2% 11.3% 9.7% -5.6%
1981 4.5% 28.3% 43.9% 3.4% 1.0% 8.4% 10.6% 9.9% -5.5%
1982 5.2% 28.0% 46.0% 3.4% 1.0% 7.2% 10.3% 9.6% -5.5%
1983 5.5% 27.8% 44.9% 3.4% 1.0% 7.8% 10.6% 9.9% -5.4%
1984 6.0% 26.6% 45.3% 3.7% 1.2% 7.9% 11.3% 10.5% -6.4%
1985 6.6% 25.4% 45.3% 3.7% 0.9% 8.6% 11.8% 10.4% -6.1%
1986 6.9% 24.3% 44.6% 4.0% 0.9% 9.9% 12.7% 10.5% -6.8%
1987 8.0% 22.2% 47.0% 3.9% 0.8% 11.0% 12.6% 10.2% -7.9%
1988 6.6% 21.9% 52.8% 3.6% 0.6% 9.7% 11.8% 7.4% -7.8%
1989 5.3% 20.8% 51.9% 4.9% 0.5% 13.2% 10.8% 6.0% -8.0%
1990 6.0% 20.9% 56.3% 4.9% 0.5% 9.0% 10.9% 6.0% -8.4%
1991 6.9% 21.5% 57.9% 5.0% 0.4% 7.7% 10.1% 5.7% -8.3%
1992 6.5% 25.9% 56.0% 4.7% 0.4% 6.2% 9.5% 5.1% -7.9%
1993 6.1% 25.4% 54.0% 5.5% 0.5% 6.9% 10.9% 5.9% -9.1%
1994 5.3% 26.5% 50.8% 5.6% 0.5% 7.1% 12.3% 6.3% -9.1%
1995 5.6% 25.9% 50.4% 5.9% 0.5% 6.9% 13.6% 6.7% -9.8%
1996 5.5% 26.2% 48.5% 4.5% 0.5% 7.4% 15.0% 7.2% -9.4%
1997 5.3% 25.2% 47.9% 4.4% 0.6% 8.1% 15.7% 7.6% -9.5%
1998 5.4% 25.6% 48.2% 4.8% 0.5% 5.9% 16.9% 7.9% -9.8%
1999 5.2% 24.3% 46.4% 5.1% 0.6% 7.3% 18.1% 9.7% -11.5%
2000 5.1% 23.4% 48.3% 4.9% 0.5% 7.2% 19.6% 11.0% -15.1%
2001 4.8% 23.2% 43.4% 5.2% 0.6% 8.6% 20.4% 11.5% -12.8%
2002 4.6% 23.3% 43.4% 5.8% 0.5% 6.7% 21.7% 12.2% -13.7%
Notes: Computations by authors based on aggregate estate tax return statistics. See Appendix Section B.2 for details.
Estates net of debts are defined to be 100%.
Business assets include assets of unincorproate business and farm assets.
Fixed claim assets include bonds, cash, deposits, savings accounts, and other claims.
Other assets include household properties, pensions, life insurance, and other items.
Because the fraction of decedents filing estate tax returns fluctulates from year to year, 
estate compositions may not be directly comprable across years.Inflation
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9)
Actual Fiscal Number of Number of (2)/(1) Total wage income Average wage income CPI 
Year Year employees tax returns (%) (billions 2002 Yens) ('000s 2002 yens) (2002 base 100)
(wage earned) (tax paid) ('000s) ('000s)
1929 1930 9,821 336 3.42 7,911 806 0.062
1930 1931 10,009 302 3.02 8,791 878 0.055
1931 1932 10,197 274 2.69 8,969 880 0.049
1932 1933 10,385 291 2.81 8,996 866 0.050
1933 1934 10,573 322 3.05 9,190 869 0.051
1934 1935 10,761 353 3.28 9,971 927 0.052
1935 1936 10,949 384 3.51 10,135 926 0.053
1936 1937 11,137 425 3.82 10,828 972 0.054
1937 1938 11,326 655 5.78 11,450 1,011 0.059
1938 1939 11,514 774 6.72 12,053 1,047 0.064
1939 1940 11,702 89 0.76 11,806 1,009 0.080
1940 1941 11,528 102 0.89 11,012 955 0.102
1941 1942 11,355 243 2.14 12,150 1,070 0.114
1942 1943 11,181 325 2.90 11,662 1,043 0.139
1943 1944 11,007 444 4.03 12,986 1,180 0.159
1944 1945 10,834 532 4.91 13,459 1,242 0.196
1948 1948 11,006 6,904 627 10.58
1949 1949 10,729 1,410 13.14 7,225 673 13.93
1950 1950 10,928 5,114 46.80 9,532 872 12.99
1951 1951 11,835 6,463 54.61 11,104 938 15.19
1952 1952 12,275 6,838 55.70 12,846 1,046 16.03
1953 1953 14,340 6,939 48.39 14,870 1,037 17.08
1954 1954 14,800 7,625 51.52 15,439 1,043 18.12
1955 1955 15,370 8,219 53.47 16,486 1,073 18.02
1956 1956 16,660 8,745 52.49 18,813 1,129 18.12
1957 1957 17,790 9,431 53.01 20,549 1,155 18.65
1958 1958 18,860 10,268 54.44 22,776 1,208 18.54
1959 1959 19,020 10,856 57.08 25,316 1,331 18.75
1960 1960 20,220 11,715 57.94 28,091 1,389 19.49
1961 1961 21,210 12,962 61.11 31,665 1,493 20.43
1962 1962 22,190 14,106 63.57 35,153 1,584 21.90
1963 1963 23,230 15,250 65.65 38,029 1,637 23.47
1964 1964 24,080 16,123 66.96 42,642 1,771 24.41
1965 1965 25,050 17,170 68.54 46,583 1,860 25.98
1966 1966 26,160 18,277 69.87 50,978 1,949 27.34
1967 1967 27,670 19,773 71.46 56,392 2,038 28.39
1968 1968 28,690 20,676 72.07 62,196 2,168 29.96
1969 1969 29,190 22,066 75.59 69,588 2,384 31.53
1970 1970 30,230 24,244 80.20 77,696 2,570 33.94
1971 1971 31,230 26,480 84.79 86,792 2,779 35.93
1972 1972 31,620 27,096 85.69 96,653 3,057 37.61
1973 1973 32,880 28,181 85.71 108,657 3,305 42.01
1974 1974 33,220 29,895 89.99 110,902 3,338 52.28
1975 1975 33,460 30,321 90.62 114,416 3,419 58.46
1976 1976 34,020 31,068 91.32 117,435 3,452 64.01
1977 1977 34,260 31,151 90.93 120,527 3,518 69.14
1978 1978 34,360 32,113 93.46 125,063 3,640 71.66
1979 1979 35,050 32,534 92.82 129,837 3,704 74.28
1980 1980 35,860 33,361 93.03 130,085 3,628 80.25
1981 1981 36,460 33,659 92.32 132,860 3,644 84.12
1982 1982 36,920 33,996 92.08 136,637 3,701 86.43
1983 1983 37,730 34,928 92.57 140,826 3,732 88.00
1984 1984 38,260 35,306 92.28 145,394 3,800 89.99
1985 1985 38,660 36,938 95.55 148,370 3,838 91.77
1986 1986 39,320 37,287 94.83 153,379 3,901 92.19
1987 1987 39,640 37,670 95.03 157,781 3,980 91.98
1988 1988 40,540 37,918 93.53 165,970 4,094 92.40
1989 1989 41,760 38,470 92.12 173,262 4,149 94.60
1990 1990 43,160 39,307 91.07 181,689 4,210 97.53
1991 1991 44,770 40,339 90.10 189,819 4,240 100.68
1992 1992 45,890 41,247 89.88 195,086 4,251 102.35
1993 1993 46,570 42,770 91.84 197,072 4,232 103.51
1994 1994 46,900 43,726 93.23 201,399 4,294 104.03
1995 1995 47,090 44,395 94.28 203,262 4,316 103.71
1996 1996 47,540 44,895 94.44 207,393 4,362 103.71
1997 1997 47,910 45,265 94.48 209,891 4,381 104.65
1998 1998 47,500 45,446 95.68 206,707 4,352 104.54
1999 1999 46,900 44,984 95.91 202,901 4,326 103.82
2000 2000 46,840 44,939 95.94 207,231 4,424 102.47
2001 2001 46,770 45,097 96.42 207,932 4,446 100.91
2002 2002 46,040 44,724 97.14 202,579 4,400 100.00
Notes: See Appendix C for details.
Due to the extensive withholding system for wage earners, actual years and fiscal years coincide for 1949-2002.
The number of employees is total number of regular employees in the private sector.
The number of tax returns is based on income tax statistics for 1929-1944, and Survey on Private Wages and Salaries for  1949-2002. 
Wage Income is defined as wages, salaries, allowances, and bonuses, excluding noncash benefits and retirement benedits.
Total wage income is defined as 90% of total wages and salaries from National Accounts.
Wage Income 
Table C1: Reference totals for wage earners, wage income, and inflation, 1948-2002
Regular Wage Earners  YearsYear Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.01% Top 10-5% Top 5-1% Top 1-0.5% Top 0.5-0.1% Top .1-.01%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1929 21.11 7.57 13.54
1930 20.51 7.35 13.16
1931 21.65 7.76 13.89
1932 22.30 8.00 14.31
1933 23.01 8.25 14.76
1934 22.55 8.08 14.46
1935 23.14 8.30 14.84
1936 20.39 7.31 13.08
1937 19.80 7.10 12.70
1938
1939 18.78 6.73 12.05
1940 16.88 6.05 10.83
1941 13.60 4.88 8.73
1942 11.91 4.27 7.64
1943 10.34 3.71 6.63
1944 8.85 3.17 5.68
1951 23.20 14.70 4.83 2.98 0.97 0.19 8.50 9.87 1.85 2.01 0.79
1952 24.37 15.60 5.39 3.37 1.10 0.22 8.77 10.21 2.02 2.27 0.87
1953 24.06 15.46 5.35 3.36 1.12 0.22 8.61 10.11 2.00 2.23 0.91
1954 24.20 15.48 5.34 3.36 1.11 0.23 8.72 10.14 1.98 2.25 0.89
1955 24.19 15.43 5.34 3.34 1.10 0.22 8.77 10.09 2.00 2.24 0.89
1956 25.77 16.67 5.88 3.64 1.24 0.25 9.11 10.79 2.24 2.41 0.99
1957 26.84 17.31 6.10 3.79 1.29 0.25 9.53 11.21 2.31 2.50 1.04
1958 26.47 17.13 6.06 3.80 1.28 0.26 9.34 11.06 2.27 2.51 1.02
1959 26.49 17.18 6.19 4.04 1.32 0.25 9.31 11.00 2.15 2.72 1.07
1960 27.00 17.48 6.14 3.90 1.32 0.26 9.52 11.34 2.24 2.58 1.06
1961 27.41 17.91 6.58 4.23 1.34 0.26 9.50 11.33 2.35 2.89 1.08
1962 26.85 17.70 6.40 4.07 1.29 0.25 9.14 11.31 2.33 2.78 1.04
1963 26.67 17.31 6.20 3.90 1.31 0.27 9.36 11.11 2.31 2.59 1.04
1964 26.17 16.96 6.02 3.74 1.24 0.24 9.21 10.94 2.28 2.50 1.00
1965 25.01 16.12 5.59 3.43 1.13 0.23 8.89 10.53 2.16 2.30 0.91
1966 24.43 15.62 5.37 3.31 1.08 0.20 8.81 10.25 2.06 2.23 0.88
1967 25.08 16.00 5.42 3.37 1.11 0.22 9.08 10.58 2.05 2.26 0.90
1968 25.49 16.24 5.41 3.36 1.11 0.21 9.25 10.83 2.05 2.26 0.90
1969 25.24 15.98 5.18 3.21 1.03 0.19 9.26 10.79 1.97 2.18 0.83
1970 25.50 15.95 5.04 3.10 1.00 0.19 9.55 10.91 1.94 2.10 0.82
1971 25.19 15.63 4.93 2.99 0.94 0.18 9.57 10.70 1.94 2.05 0.76
1972 25.24 15.70 5.02 2.96 0.89 0.16 9.54 10.68 2.06 2.07 0.73
1973 24.91 15.44 4.85 2.81 0.85 0.16 9.47 10.59 2.04 1.96 0.68
1974 24.47 14.97 4.56 2.72 0.81 0.15 9.49 10.41 1.84 1.91 0.66
1975 23.54 14.33 4.33 2.57 0.75 0.13 9.20 10.00 1.76 1.82 0.62
1976 24.01 14.63 4.43 2.61 0.80 0.13 9.38 10.19 1.82 1.82 0.66
1977 23.36 14.11 4.29 2.54 0.74 0.13 9.25 9.82 1.76 1.79 0.61
1978 23.32 14.06 4.32 2.59 0.78 0.14 9.26 9.74 1.73 1.82 0.64
1979 23.92 14.53 4.47 2.69 0.84 0.16 9.40 10.06 1.78 1.86 0.67
1980 23.99 14.56 4.47 2.72 0.88 0.19 9.43 10.09 1.76 1.84 0.69
1981 23.92 14.62 4.50 2.72 0.84 0.16 9.30 10.12 1.79 1.88 0.68
1982 23.46 14.32 4.36 2.64 0.83 0.17 9.14 9.95 1.73 1.81 0.67
1983 23.78 14.56 4.41 2.66 0.82 0.16 9.21 10.15 1.75 1.85 0.66
1984 23.82 14.60 4.46 2.70 0.84 0.17 9.22 10.14 1.77 1.86 0.67
1985 24.28 14.83 4.51 2.73 0.86 0.17 9.45 10.32 1.78 1.87 0.69
1986 24.67 15.06 4.54 2.71 0.84 0.17 9.61 10.53 1.83 1.87 0.67
1987 25.04 15.26 4.67 2.79 0.88 0.17 9.78 10.59 1.89 1.91 0.70
1988 25.10 15.30 4.65 2.75 0.84 0.16 9.80 10.65 1.90 1.91 0.68
1989 25.30 15.41 4.70 2.78 0.88 0.17 9.89 10.72 1.92 1.90 0.70
1990 25.54 15.57 4.77 2.84 0.90 0.17 9.97 10.80 1.94 1.94 0.72
1991 25.71 15.72 4.77 2.87 0.90 0.17 9.99 10.95 1.91 1.96 0.73
1992 25.79 15.77 4.77 2.87 0.92 0.18 10.03 11.00 1.90 1.95 0.74
1993 25.51 15.54 4.69 2.80 0.87 0.17 9.97 10.86 1.88 1.93 0.71
1994 25.43 15.38 4.65 2.80 0.91 0.18 10.05 10.72 1.85 1.90 0.73
1995 25.54 15.40 4.69 2.82 0.88 0.17 10.14 10.71 1.87 1.94 0.71
1996 25.25 15.16 4.60 2.78 0.88 0.18 10.09 10.56 1.83 1.90 0.70
1997 25.21 15.08 4.56 2.75 0.88 0.18 10.13 10.52 1.80 1.87 0.70
1998 25.57 15.44 4.80 2.94 0.94 0.18 10.13 10.64 1.86 2.00 0.76
1999 25.89 15.73 4.89 3.00 1.00 0.21 10.16 10.84 1.89 2.01 0.78
2000 25.74 15.68 4.95 3.07 1.03 0.22 10.06 10.73 1.88 2.04 0.81
2001 25.68 15.66 5.01 3.12 1.06 0.24 10.02 10.65 1.89 2.06 0.83
2002 25.80 15.78 5.05 3.15 1.07 0.23 10.02 10.72 1.90 2.08 0.84
Notes: Computations by authors; see Appendix Section C for details.
Wage income is defined as wages, salaries, allowances, and bonuses, excluding non-cash benefits and retirement benefits.
Top wage income groups are defined relative to all regular employees for 1929-1944 and regular employees in the private sector for 1951-2002.
Estimates are based on income tax statistics for 1929-1944 and Survey on Private Wages and Salaries  for 1951-2002
The 1929-1944 estimates are less precise than the 1951-2002 estimates and not fully comparable to the 1951-2002 estimates.
Table C2: Top Wage Income Shares in Japan, 1929-2002Marginal Tax Rates on Employment Income
Basic  Exemption
exemption for each  Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Top
per tax unit dependent Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate Marginal
Year ('000 ('000 at P90 at P95 at P99 at P99.9 at P99.99 Tax Rate
current yen) current yen) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1950 25 12 55.0
1951 38 17 30.0 33.0 43.0 48.0 53.0 55.0
1952 50 20 30.0 38.0 43.0 53.0 55.0 55.0
1953 60 35 21.3 30.0 40.0 50.0 55.0 65.0
1954 68 34 21.3 35.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 65.0
1955 75 40 21.3 30.0 40.0 50.0 55.0 65.0
1956 80 40 20.6 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 65.0
1957 88 48 12.0 18.0 25.0 35.0 40.0 70.0
1958 90 50 12.0 18.0 25.0 35.0 45.0 70.0
1959 90 65 13.5 18.0 25.0 35.0 45.0 70.0
1960 90 70 13.5 18.0 25.0 35.0 45.0 70.0
1961 90 50 9.0 18.0 25.0 40.0 45.0 70.0
1962 98 50 13.5 20.0 25.0 40.0 45.0 75.0
1963 108 50 13.5 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 75.0
1964 118 50 13.9 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 75.0
1965 128 58 15.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 75.0
1966 138 60 15.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 75.0
1967 148 68 15.0 20.0 30.0 45.0 50.0 75.0
1968 158 78 20.0 20.0 30.0 45.0 50.0 75.0
1969 168 95 17.3 21.1 29.4 46.0 55.0 75.0
1970 178 115 14.6 16.4 25.9 42.0 55.0 75.0
1971 190 130 12.6 15.2 22.8 42.0 55.0 75.0
1972 200 140 14.4 17.1 27.0 42.0 55.0 75.0
1973 208 155 16.4 19.1 28.8 46.0 55.0 75.0
1974 233 220 12.0 15.1 22.7 35.3 46.5 69.8
1975 260 260 12.8 16.8 24.3 37.8 45.0 67.5
1976 260 260 14.4 16.8 27.0 37.8 49.5 67.5
1977 290 290 14.4 16.8 27.0 41.4 49.5 67.5
1978 290 290 16.8 19.2 30.6 41.4 49.5 67.5
1979 290 290 16.8 19.2 30.6 45.0 54.0 67.5
1980 290 290 16.8 21.6 34.2 47.5 57.0 71.3
1981 290 290 19.2 24.3 36.1 47.5 57.0 71.3
1982 290 290 19.2 24.3 36.1 47.5 57.0 71.3
1983 290 290 19.2 24.3 36.1 47.5 57.0 71.3
1984 330 330 20.0 22.5 33.3 47.5 57.0 66.5
1985 330 330 22.5 27.0 38.0 47.5 57.0 66.5
1986 330 330 22.5 27.0 38.0 47.5 57.0 66.5
1987 330 330 22.5 27.0 38.0 47.5 52.3 57.0
1988 330 330 18.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 57.0
1989 18.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 57.0
1990 18.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 47.5
1991 27.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 47.5
1992 27.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 47.5
1993 27.0 27.0 38.0 47.5 47.5 47.5
1994 27.0 28.5 38.0 47.5 47.5 47.5
1995 18.0 19.0 28.5 38.0 47.5 47.5
1996 18.0 19.0 28.5 38.0 47.5 47.5
1997 18.0 19.0 28.5 38.0 47.5 47.5
1998 380 380 18.0 19.0 28.5 38.0 47.5 47.5
1999 380 380 18.0 19.0 28.5 35.2 35.2 35.2
2000 380 380 18.0 19.0 28.5 35.2 35.2 35.2
2001 380 380 18.0 19.0 28.5 35.2 35.2 35.2
2002 380 380 18.0 18.0 28.5 35.2 35.2 35.2
Notes: Computations by authors; see Appendix Section C.3 for details.
Marginal tax rates for a taxpayer with a non-working spouse and two dependent children are estimated, assuming all income is employment income.
Exemptions and deductions are taken into account.
Local income taxes and social security contributions are excluded.
"Marginal tax rate at P99.9" refers to the marginal tax rate at the income threshold for the top 0.1% group.
"Top marginal tax rate" is the highest marginal tax rate stipulated by the law.
Table C3: Wage Income Tax and Marginal Tax Rates in Japan, 1951-2002TABLE D1







All Returns on 
Liquid Assets (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)=(3)+(4)+(5)
1979
All 100.0% 6.2% 1.4% 3.0% 10.7%
Top 10-5% 8.8% 6.9% 2.2% 2.7% 11.8%
Top 5% 13.4% 8.4% 3.6% 2.5% 14.6%
1984
All 100.0% 8.0% 0.8% 3.5% 12.4%
Top 10-5% 9.0% 9.1% 1.5% 3.2% 13.8%
Top 5% 13.4% 10.5% 1.9% 2.9% 15.4%
1989
All 100.0% 7.4% 1.1% 5.2% 13.7%
Top 10-5% 9.0% 6.9% 1.4% 4.4% 12.6%
Top 5% 14.2% 5.8% 2.9% 4.2% 12.9%
1994
All 100.0% 6.4% 0.8% 4.5% 11.7%
Top 10-5% 9.1% 5.1% 1.0% 3.9% 9.9%
Top 5% 14.2% 4.1% 1.3% 3.3% 8.7%
1999
All 100.0% 1.9% 0.9% 4.3% 7.1%
Top 10-5% 9.3% 1.7% 0.7% 3.5% 6.0%
Top 5% 13.8% 1.7% 0.9% 3.1% 5.7%
Notes: Computations are by authors; see Appendix Section D.2 for details.
Estimates are based on the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure,  1979-1999.
In contrast to Table 3, Panel C, these NSFIE estimates are based on the household unit and not the individual unit.
Net interest income is estimated based on the holdings of bonds, deposits, and loan trusts, net of liabilities.
Dividend income is estimated based on stock holdings. 
Returns on insurance policies are based on the holdings of life and other insurance savings.
Estimates for above the top 5% groups are not available due to the problem of small sample and top coding.
Senitivity Analysis using the NSFIE Data, 1979-1999
Fraction of Capital Income Component to Total Household IncomeFIGURE 1
Real GDP per Capita in Japan and the United States, 1790-2002


























































































































United States JapanFIGURE 2
Change in Income Inequality in Japan, 1890-2003
Sources: Ono and Watanabe (1976), Table 6; Otsuki and Takamatsu (1978), Table 4; Minami (1995), Table 6-4, Series I' & II; 
Wada (1975), p.21; Tachibanaki (1998), Table 3-1; Ohtake (2005), Table 1-1.
Notes: Gini coefficient for income distribution (before tax and government transfers) of all Japanese households are reported.
EES refers to Employment Status Survey ; PLCS to People's Living Conditions Survey ; FIES to Family Income and Expenditure Survey ;





































Average Real Income & Consumer Price Index in Japan, 1886-2002





























































































































































Real Income per Adult
CPI 2002FIGURE 4
Top 1% and Next 4% Income Shares in Japan, 1886-2002
Source: Table A1, columns (2) and (9).

























































































































Decomposition of Top 1% Income Share in Japan, 1886-2002
Source: Table A1, columns (4), (10), and (11).
Notes: "Top 0.5-0.1%" share refers to the share of income accrued to the bottom 0.4% of the top 0.5% income group.



























































































































Top 0.1% Income Shares in Japan, the United States, and France.



























































































































Composition of Top 1% Income in Japan, 1886-2002
Source: Table A2.
Notes: Computations by authors based on income tax return statistics. See Appendix Section A.4 for details.
Business income includes unincorporated business profits, farm income, and self-employment income.
Employment income includes wages, salaries, bonuses, and pensions.
Rental income includes rents from farm land, residential land, housing, and buildings, but excludes imputed rents.
For 1886-1945, composition estimates are based on aggregate income composition and thus imprecisely estimated.
In particular, for 1906-1925, relatively high fractions of adults (2.5% to 4.6%) filed income tax returns.
For 1947-2002, top 1% income composition estimates are based on composition data by income brackets.
For 1887-1899, 1946, and 1951-1962, no estimates are provided because data are not available.
For 1963-2002, estimates are provided only twice a decade.

















































































































Top 0.01% Estate and Top 1-0.5% Estate in Japan, 1905-2002
Source: Table B1, columns (8) and (10).
Notes: The average estate levels (in 2002 yen) of the top 0.01% group and the bottom half of the top 1% are reported.
The 1905-1957 estate levels are much less precisely estimated than the 1958-2002 levels. 









































































































































































) Top 0.01% estate
Top 1-0.5% estateFIGURE 9
Top 0.01% Income Share and Marginal Tax Rate, 1886-2002
Source: Table A1, column (13) and Table A3, column (6).
Notes: 
Top 0.01% MTR refers to the marginal tax rate for the average taxpayer in the top 0.01% income group.
Marginal tax rate is estimated for an individual with non-working spouse and two dependent children.



















































































































































Top 0.01% MTRFIGURE 10
Top 5% Wage Income Share in Japan and the United States, 1929-2002
Source: Japan, Table C2, column (2); U.S., Piketty and Saez (2003), Table IV, column P90-100, updated to 2002.
Note: the 1929-1944 estimates are less precise than the 1951-2002 estimates and are not fully comparable 



































































































United States JapanFIGURE 11
Top 1% Wage Income Share in Japan and the United States, 1929-2002
Source: Japan, Table C2, column (3); U.S., Piketty and Saez (2003), Table IV, column P99-100, updated to 2002.
Note: the 1929-1944 estimates are less precise than the 1951-2002 estimates and are not fully comparable 
































































































Japan United StatesFIGURE 12
Top 0.1% Wage Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates in Japan and the United States, 1960-2002
Source: Japan, Table C2, column (5) and computation by authors' based on Table C3 (see Appendix Section C.3 for details); U.S., Saez (2004).
Notes: "Top 0.1% MTR" refers to the marginal tax rate for the average individual in the top 0.1% wage income group with only wage income and with a non-working spouse and two dependent children.
Marginal tax rates in Japan exclude local income taxes and social insurance contributions.

















































































Top 0.1% MTR Top 0.1% Share
















































































Top 0.1% MTR Top 0.1% ShareFIGURE A1
Top 0.1% Income Share in Japan With & Without Capital Gains
Source: Series without capital gains, Table A1, column (4); series with capital gains based on authors' computations.

























































































































With capital gainsFIGURE A2
Top 0.1% Income Share Before & After Correction, 1886-1947
Source: Series after correction, Table A1, column (4); series before correction based on authors' computations.
Notes: Dividends and bonuses are fully exempted from individual income tax in 1898-1919 and partially exempted in 1920-1938.


























































































Compositions of Total Personal Income & Top 1% Income, 1930-2002
Notes: Panel A presents the composition of total personal income denominator based on National Accounts.
Imputed rents are excluded from rents because they are not included in the income tax statistics.
Returns on insurance funds are included in dividends and interest, but not included in income tax statistics.
Panel B presents the composition of top 1% income from Table A2.
All returns on insurance funds after 1947, almost all interest income after 1947 and large part of dividends 
after 1965 are missing from income tax statistics. 
See Appendix Section A.4 for details.


























































































































































Top 0.1% Income Share in Alternative Sepcification of Years, 1886-1945
Notes: "Preferred Specification" series are from Table A1, column (4). "Formal Law" series are by authors' computation.
In "Formal Law" series, we define actual years based on the income tax laws' stipulations. 










































































Composition of Aggregate Estates in Japan, 1925-2002
Source: Table B2.
Notes: Estimates are based on aggregate estate compositions in estate tax statistics.
Total exceeds 100% because estates net of debts are defined to be 100%.
Business assets include assets of unincorporated business and farm assets.
Fixed claim assets include bonds, cash, deposits, savings accounts, and other claims.
Other assets include household assets, pensions, life insurance, and other  items.
Because of changes in the fractions of decedents filing estate tax returns, compositions are not comprable across years.








































































Agricultural Land Residential Land Houses & Structures
Business Assets Stocks Fixed Claim Assets
Other Assets